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EDITORIAL

A characteristically eclectic range of significant and timely articles are published in this current issue of the Journal for Critical Animal Studies, each aiming to bring greater clarity, depth and vision to the critical animal studies literature and beyond. For some authors this will be achieved principally by re-visiting long established themes and arguments, for others their critical contribution will be gauged by making addressing emerging gaps in the literature, and grappling with ideas and outcomes that have become increasingly relevant to consider at the present time. Whatever the specific focus I am confident that the content will both invite and challenge us - the reader - to constructively revisit our own dominant ideas, perceptions, and understanding, and open these up to new and ever critical lines of engagement, debate, discussion and action.

Reflecting on the content in more detail, David Delafenêtre's *The Divided Kingdom: Inconsistency in the UK Legislation Restricting the Tail Docking of Dogs* is the first of three Essays in this issue. In his essay David harnesses a rigorous historical framework to better contextualize and develop a critique that focuses on the contested and problematic nature of tail-docking in the United Kingdom. The conclusion makes a strong and unambiguous case for adopting universal principles of animal protections which are based on non-speciesist ethical considerations, having previously illustrated the woeful failure of welfarist approaches to formulate animal protection legislation.

In, *And Say The Bakemono Responded: Animism, Derrida and the Question of the Animal in Hayao Miyazaki's Princess Mononoke*, Chris Crews focuses on the figure of the monster in the popular imaginary, and explores the multiple way(s) in which these creatures have had - and in many ways continues to have - a subversive and de-stabilizing effect on the socially-constructed contours that are erected to divide humans from nonhuman animals. The essay skilfully incorporates a wide range of memorable examples, and harnesses an impressive range of literature(s) (with attention paid in particular to discussing various works of Derrida) in order to underpin and develop the central themes, arguments and conclusions.

Politics of Meat makes a series of engaging, critical and persuasive insights that will be of great interest and relevance to a wide range of academic, activist, and other popular communities. Many examples and illustrations used in the essay are drawn from popular food advertisements and cookery in the UK. Thus not only does Erika constructively advance our critical understanding of the intersection between specieism and patriarchy, but she also extends the relevance and applicability of The Sexual Politics of Meat beyond a largely US-centric popular culture.

In the Commentary section Lisa Kemmerer reflects openly on her investigative research that emerged through problematizing the dominant economic frameworks that underpin different types of animal organizations. Drawing primarily on Lisa's experiences of four horse sanctuaries Limited Funds: Assessing Rescues and Sanctuaries gives a reflective, thought-provoking and often complex reading of the uneven economic landscapes that different organizations face, and the implications that these contexts have on the various approaches and decisions that are made. Through her analysis Lisa also carefully exposes the problematical approach(es) of the directors of the horse sanctuaries, particularly in the way that their approaches serve to reinforce, rather than challenges, the dominant (cultural) ways in which different species of animals are compartmentalised: "While the directors rescue horses, they consume cattle, pigs, chickens, and turkeys, and help to create a market for veal, eggs, and dairy products." The commentary concludes with several constructive and important recommendations that are particularly orientated around issues related to education, outreach, and prevention.

This issue's Rebuttal sees David Sztybel develop a further series of responses that build upon the opening dialogue between David and Katherine Perlo (this dialogue was published in 2008, JCAS Volume VI, Issue I). In his characteristically meticulous, critical, and engaging style David advances the exchange sufficiently by developing a range of persuasive, robust and critical (counter-) arguments. It is well worth getting to grips with this critique, and critically reflecting on the content, irrespective of whether or not you are familiar with the previous dialogues that have taken place. The scope and breadth of the themes, arguments, and conclusions extend impressively across a wide-range of important and timely debates.

The active commitment that JCAS has to expand the range of contributions beyond the traditional 'academic' essay and book/ film review format is again demonstrated here by the
first **Poetry** submission to be published in the journal: *Three Poems on Gestation Crates: A Pig Triptych* by Dana Medoro. Dana reflects on the wider context and the inspiration behind her poems with a personal, thought-provoking introduction which culminates in the memorable argument: "Poetry persists because critical thinking exists." The poems themselves are extremely moving, provocative, and unsettling, and the imagery and anger with which they are developed strikes a deep and troubled cord.

There are four **Book Reviews** in this issue, beginning with Carol Gigliotti's (Ed) (2009) *Leonardo's Choice: Genetic Technologies and Animals*, which is reviewed by Dan Lyons. Paying great attention to detail, Dan harnesses an exceptionally well-considered, reflective, insightful and critical review of this extremely important addition to the existing literature.

The next contribution is by Dan Featherstone who reviews Dara Lovitz's (2010) *Muzzling a Movement: The Effects of Anti-Terrorism Law, Money, and Politics on Animal Activism*. Dan confidently handles the key themes and arguments that are put forward in the book in a constructive and insightful manner. Like *Leonardo's Choice*, this book addresses many important areas and debates which are of critical interest to academic and animal activist communities generally, and particularly those who are actively involved in forms of direct action.

The third review is by Audrey Kali, who focuses on Rhonda Wilkie's (2010) *Livestock/Deadstock: Working with Farm Animals from Birth to Slaughter*. The review tries to unpack many of the core issues and arguments that the book addresses, which is a problematic endeavour, not least as the stories and the 'reality' are composed of many contradictions and paradoxes. Nonetheless, Audrey argues that it is this complexity that must be recognised and understood if more nuanced, critical and appropriate interventions are to be made.

The final contribution is by Heather Hillsburg, who reviews *Eating Animals* by Safran Foer (2010). Heather's review is extremely insightful, measured and clearly written. Thus the review contains generous praise about Foer's approach and questioning for example, but it also harbours reservations in other areas, for example concerning the ways in which some of the primary research has been interpreted (e.g. the unproblematic way in which family and morality are aligned for example). The conclusion though - in which Heather reflects on her
own personal and subjective experiences of reading the book - firmly reiterates the important contribution that *Eating Animals* has made to the existing literature.

One **Film Review** completes this current issue. Focusing on Shannon Keith's documentary *Skin Trade* (2010) Carol Glasser considers the effective nature of the film, particularly in making painfully visible the destructive and savage consequences for the (non-human) individual as a result of commodifiying (non-human animal) life. For all its strengths, which are many, the film also falls short when making vital connections to other areas of exploitation and abuse (these gaps include exploring connected issues of human exploitation, and the obvious links between fur and leather). With these limitations in mind, Carol considers the film as being essential viewing for animal advocates and animal rights organizations, as well as wider academic, policy making and popular circles.

**Richard J White**

**Chief Editor**
ESSAYS

The Divided Kingdom: Inconsistency in the UK Legislation Restricting the Tail Docking of Dogs

David Delafenêtre

Mr Tipping: If the National Assembly for Wales took a different view from the Parliament here, it could be the case that there were different provisions in Wales than there would be here in England.

Mr Bradshaw: Yes, in theory, it could.

Mr Tipping: Is that a good thing?

Mr Bradshaw: It is devolution!

Mr Tipping: It may be devolution but there is an amount of philosophical work about what defines cruelty. It is a universal concept.

(EFRA, 2004)

Introduction

The World Small Animal Veterinary Association [WSAVA] defines tail docking as “the amputation of a dog's tail at varying lengths to suit the recommendations of a breed Standard” (WSAVA, 2001). The amputation of the puppy's tail is usually performed either with scissors, a knife or with a rubber band at between three to five days of age. Since docking involves interference with the sensitive tissues and bone structure of the animal, it is considered an act of mutilation by WSAVA, comparable to ear cropping, another non-therapeutic procedure

1 This article is a revised and updated version of a paper entitled “The Divided Kingdom: Inconsistency in the British Legislation restricting the Tail Docking of Dogs” presented at the Minding Animals conference in Newcastle, Australia on 13 July 2009. The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

2 David Delafenêtre is an independent scholar, at Victoria, BC, and has a PhD in Studies of the Anglophone World from the Sorbonne. He has taught history and sociology at four universities in British Columbia. In 2005, David introduced a course on the History of the Animal Protection Movement. His current research deals with a comparative study of quarantine in Australasia. David can be contacted at delafenf@yahoo.com
inflicted on dogs. The controversy over whether ear cropping and tail docking on companion dogs should be made unlawful originated in 19th century Britain (Delafenêtre, 2009, 196). By 1896 opposition to docking had grown to such an extent that the Kennel Club [KC] debated a motion entitled "No dog born after 31 March 1896 can, if docked win a prize at a show held under Kennel Club rules" (Bower, 2006, 1). The motion was lost on the grounds that docking was then considered a trivial operation. So while the KC proceeded to pass an outright ban on showing cropped dogs in 1898, tail-docking remained unchecked until 1966 when the practice could only be carried out before the animal's eyes were open (BVA, 2007). In the 1980s, the veterinary profession eventually joined forces with animal protection organizations to press for a ban against non-therapeutic tail docking in dogs (Ryder, 2000, 191) The passage of the European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals in 1987 contributed to the campaign coming to the attention of British politicians. In 1991 Schedule 3 of the 1966 Veterinary Surgeons Act was amended so that tail docking could only be carried out by a vet from 1 July 1993 when the amendment came into force. But the British government failed to deliver its policy objective of phasing out tail docking and the confrontation between both sides of the debate intensified. The Council of Docked Breeds [CDB] formed in 1991 and the KC argued that docking was virtually painless, necessary and amounted to an elective surgery. Consequently, in 2001 the KC amended the standards of docked breeds to allow for the natural undocked option. Yet that so-called “freedom of choice” - the right to dock or not - claimed by breeders showed that docking was merely done for purely cosmetic reasons, a view put forward by the anti-docking lobby. The Anti-Docking Alliance [ADA] founded in 2000 and all the major animal advocacy organisations argued that tail docking should become a prohibited procedure since it was painful, unnecessary and removed a major means of communication for the dog (Stafford, 2006, 24).
Therefore, the issue of restricting tail-docking in the UK was unfinished business when the British government decided to initiate a reform of its outdated animal welfare legislation in the early 21st century. Indeed, the dog tail docking provisions became the most controversial matter of the legislative package and should be seen as the latest stage of campaigning on an issue that had been hotly debated in the 1980s and 1990s. By 1999, the United Kingdom had experienced some substantial constitutional changes with the adoption of devolution. This paper examines how the devolution of powers affected dog tail docking policies looking at three stages of the parliamentary process: the drafting of primary legislation, the establishment of secondary legislation and the implementation of the adopted regulations.

Compared to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 gave more limited powers to the Welsh Assembly Government. As a result, the House of Commons would work on an Animal Welfare Bill for England and Wales whereas the Scottish Parliament, Holyrood, would design its own Animal Health and Welfare Bill. Designed to replace the outdated Protection of Animals Act 1911, the Westminster initiative had pressured Edinburgh to follow suit. The Scottish Executive felt that unless it replaced its Protection of Animals Act 1912, animal welfare legislation in Scotland would be unfavourably compared to that of England and Wales (Scottish Parliament, 2005a). In 2002, as the legislative process finally got underway in Britain, Belfast indicated that it would wait for Westminster to complete its Act before launching a review of the Northern Ireland Animal Welfare Act 1972 (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2002). Passed in 2006, the Animal Welfare Act and the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act initiated a second stage of legislative scrutiny dealing with dog tail docking. This time, the National Assembly for Wales, the Senedd, was responsible for designing its own set of regulations. The drafting of secondary legislation thus involved three parallel exercises in Holyrood,
Cardiff and Westminster, England having her interests represented by the British House of Commons under the UK system of devolution. By the Spring 2007 when the three sets of tail docking regulations came into effect in Britain, Northern Ireland had just returned to direct rule. The implementation of the restrictions on docking in Britain was bound to influence the tail docking provisions included in the Welfare of Animals Bill that the Northern Ireland Executive introduced in Stormont, Northern Ireland Assembly, on 21 June 2010.

Not Getting their Acts Together

Created in 2001, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [DEFRA] was given the task of preparing a draft version of the Animal Welfare bill. To that effect, in January 2002, DEFRA launched a four-month extensive consultation on a wide range of animal welfare matters. One of the questions asked was “Should the tail docking of dogs be banned?”. Significantly, this was the issue that generated the most interest with a stunning 80% of responses dealing with dog tail docking. Due to the overrepresentation of individual breed societies, an analysis of the replies issued in August 2002 reported that 82% of opinions expressed were against a ban (DEFRA, 2002a). This contrasted with the conclusions of a paper on dog tail docking published the same month by DEFRA’s own Animal Welfare Veterinary Division:

The arguments put forward by those who wish docking to be continued are unsound from a scientific viewpoint, are contrary to accepted standards for the welfare of the dog(s) and serve only to contribute to artificial physical breed standards.

While presenting a solid case against against the prophylactic argument of the hunting lobby, the report nevertheless added:

Where, however, a ban on tail docking is not likely to be in the best interests of a particular dog because it is destined to work in the field, it may be prudent to exempt such dogs for the time being, with any exemption being subject to
review in the light of further knowledge based on scientific evidence (DEFRA, 2002b).

The latter section was removed when another almost identical report was issued two months later (DEFRA, 2002c). Nevertheless, these conclusions would form the basis of the debate over how to legislate dog tail docking because it established the ground for distinguishing between cosmetic and prophylactic docking. While Elliot Morley who as Animal Welfare minister had been vocal against cosmetic docking, his successor, Ben Bradshaw, followed a more conciliatory path with the pro-docking supporters (Times, 2003). Both engaged in a series of meetings with stakeholders but in contrast to Morley who had indicated that DEFRA was only considering an exemption for “working breeds”, Bradshaw confirmed in an interview with The Times in 2004 that he was moving away from a total ban on tail docking and even favoured the status quo (Times, 2004). In the meantime, DEFRA’s lead was bound to influence the Scottish initiative.

The Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department [SEERAD] did not address dog tail docking until March 2004 when it organized a public consultation. The preamble of the announcement indicates that the Scottish Executive was aware of what had transpired south of the border:

consideration is being given to a proposal to ban or restrict the docking of dogs’ tails for prophylactic or preventative purposes. There may be arguments for retaining the practice for those dogs whose tails are particularly prone to injury (e.g. certain working dogs). (SEERAD, 2004)

The early consistency of policies on tail docking in Westminster and Holyrood was actually in line with the Animal Health and Welfare Strategy for Great Britain jointly agreed by the Scottish Executive, DEFRA and the Welsh Assembly Government in June 2004 (SPERDC, 2006a). It was designed to ensure that governments would consult regularly to support a common strategy on animal welfare issues. In July 2004, DEFRA published a draft bill and
submitted it to the scrutiny of the House of Commons Environment Food and Rural Affairs Committee [EFRA]:

> It is proposed to ban or restrict the docking of dogs’ tails for prophylactic purposes. There may be arguments for retaining the practice for those dogs whose tails are particularly prone to tail injury (eg certain working dogs) (DEFRA, 2004).

On the basis of the evidence received, EFRA recommended an exemption for working dogs but made recommendations regarding ways to avoid the exemption from being abused. In its response of February 2005, DEFRA accepted EFRA’s report and confirmed that it supported keeping the docking of working gundogs legal (EFRA, 2005a). For its part, SEERAD proceeded to submit its draft bill to a second consultation conducted between May and July 2005 (SEERAD, 2005). The compatibility of the draft bills on dog tail docking was evident at the pre-legislative stage and confirmed that both DEFRA and SEERAD were on the same wave length. In fact, the Scottish Minister stated to the Scottish Parliament Environment and Rural Development Committee [SPERDC] that, at the time of preparing the Bill, he had expected the proposals on tail docking for Scotland and England and Wales to be similar (SPERDC, 2006b). Holyrood followed Westminster’s pattern and planned to insert an exception to the ban for working gundogs in secondary legislation.

> The only exception to prohibition on tail docking will be to allow the docking of a dog’s tail where the veterinary surgeon is satisfied that dogs from the litter are likely to be used as working (gun or sniffer) dogs (Scottish Parliament, 2005b).

However, a week after the Scottish Executive had introduced its Animal Health and Welfare bill on October 05, 2005, the Regulatory Impact Assessment of the Animal Welfare bill revealed that DEFRA had changed its position on dog tail docking: “Sincere views were held by those who both support and oppose a ban on cosmetic docking and our preference is that there should continue to be freedom of choice” (DEFRA, 2005). Bradshaw’s move towards maintaining the status quo ran in the face of increasing evidence challenging the moral
justification for docking (Bennett & Perini, 2003). Westminster’s decision came as a surprise to Ross Finnie, the Scottish Minister for the Environment and Rural Development, because insiders had previously said that the provision in the English bill would mirror the Scottish version (SPERDC, 2006c). Remarkably enough though, the introduced bills in the House of Commons and the Scottish Parliament were very similar in their wording. There was no specific reference to dog tail docking which was considered to fall within the category of prohibited procedures and would be considered for an exemption in subordinate legislation.

The introduced bills of October 2005 put an end to the policy convergence over dog tail docking that had existed between DEFRA and SEERAD prior to the parliamentary debates. When Bradshaw presented his bill before another Environmental, Food and Rural Affairs Committee on November 15, 2005, he announced that the House would be given a free vote on the issue of dog tail docking (EFRA, 2005b). While the Committee welcomed that announcement, it was seen by the anti-docking lobby as a relaxation of the minister’s previous line that cosmetic docking would be banned. The only recommendation that EFRA made regarding the proposed secondary legislation on the docking of dogs’ tails was that it should be the subject of a public consultation. This minimal review contrasted with the intense scrutiny that the Scottish dog tail docking proposal received during the committee stage. By early January 2006, it was clear that SPERDC had serious doubts about granting an exemption for working gundogs. This coincided with the second reading of the Bill in the House of Commons where Bradshaw also encountered substantial opposition. He subsequently proposed three options of secondary legislation to the Standing Committee that was reviewing the bill. However, his preference for a complete exemption was rejected by the majority of the committee members whose view was for a total ban. As a result, Bradshaw indicated that he would bring forward a statutory instrument which would implement a full ban on the tail docking of dogs (House of Commons, 2006a). This would have brought
Westminster legislation in line with that of Scotland since SPERDC eventually took a similar view when it reported to the Scottish Parliament on 7 February 2006:

In principle, the Committee considers that the arguments advanced for prophylactic docking of working dogs’ tails do not apply consistently across all dogs which may be described as ‘working dogs’ and still owe a considerable amount to breed standards and tradition. The Committee considers that there are also very significant problems about how any exemption for working dogs may be formulated and applied in practice and heard a range of conflicting evidence on this issue (SPERDC, 2006b).

Two weeks later, the Scottish Executive made it clear it would follow SPERDC’s recommendation arguing that the evidence from professional veterinary organizations in favor of a total ban had been compelling. This contrasted with the earlier conclusion of the House of Commons’ EFRA who had argued that both the British Veterinary Association [BVA] and the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons [RCVS] had somewhat been unclear about their proposed position on prophylactic docking (EFRA, 2004). In this respect and in anticipation of the vote Westminster was about to take, RCVS issued a statement on 08 March 2006 in which it informed MPs that its position on the docking of dogs’ tails had changed (Vollner, 2006). The Royal College recommended that the docking of dogs’ tails should be banned except where the operation was carried out for therapeutic purposes. The RCVS professional guidance of 2005 stating that dog tail docking should only be carried out for “therapeutic or truly prophylactic purposes” (RCVS, 2005) had indirectly supported the case of those who argued for an exemption for working dogs (BASC, 2006). The uncertainty surrounding the validity of the prophylactic argument had led to a softening of the RSPCA position in England regarding the exemption for working dogs (Ares, 2005). This tentative position differed from that of the Welsh RSPCA and Scottish SPCA [SSPCA] and was clearly challenged by a paper entitled Why Tail Docking Should be Prohibited produced by Advocates for Animals, the largest Scottish animal advocacy group (Advocates for Animals, 2005a). On December 14, 2005, the report was handed to the Vice Convenor of SPERDC
outside the main public entrance to the Scottish Parliament by BBC Celebrity TV Veterinarian Emma Milne symbolically accompanied for the occasion by two natural Old English Sheepdogs (Advocates for Animals, 2005b).

However, Ben Bradshaw deliberately overlooked the clarification of the RCVS and instead of seizing the opportunity of a consistent policy on dog tail docking with Scotland, presented a new clause, this time inserted in the primary legislation that would be voted at the report stage of the bill on 14 March 2006:

We are offering the House three options - first, a ban on tail docking, but with an exemption for working dogs; secondly, a ban with no exemption for working dogs; and thirdly, the status quo, which allows cosmetic docking. (House of Commons, 2006b)

At the outset, Bradshaw made it clear he supported the first option and reminded the House of Commons that it reflected the principle that had been approved by EFRA in 2005. Once again the minister had changed his approach and his claim to the contrary was disingenuous at best (House of Commons, 2006c). In the end, the result was very close with the House voting by 476 to 63 for granting an exemption to “working gundogs” and rejecting a complete ban by only 278 to 267. Of course, the bill still had to pass through the House of Lords. In the meantime, the Westminster vote resulted in a number of amendments being lodged in the Scottish parliament that would have exempted working dogs from the tail docking ban. Those amendments were defeated by a substantial majority. On the day of the final vote to its Animal Health and Welfare Bill (May 31, 2006), Holyrood accepted one amendment that would make it an offence to take an animal out of Scotland for the purpose of having a mutilation carried out on it which had been prohibited in Scotland (Scottish Parliament, 2006a). This had largely been proposed in response to the vote on dog tail docking in the House of Commons and in order to prevent Scottish breeders from engaging in docking tourism to circumvent the legislation.
In fact, the RCVS letter seemed to have comforted the Scottish Executive in its position. Eventually, the Scottish parliament decided to proceed without allowing an exemption for the so-called ‘working breeds’ even though it conflicted with the version favoured by the House of Commons. The final vote was seen as a relief by those who had campaigned for a total ban and had realized the pressure Westminster’s decision had exerted on the debate:

I am delighted that Parliament stood firm and listened to logic on tail docking. The issue is small in the context of the bill, which covers many health and welfare issues, but the debate focused minds on the barometer of what is acceptable in modern Scotland (Scottish Parliament, 2006b).

The fact that Britain was to have two distinct pieces of primary legislation dealing with dog tail docking became a topic for discussion in the House Of Lords (House of Lords, 2006). The diverging path had been established at the stage of primary legislation but Bradshaw tried to downplay the consequences:

for the foreseeable future there will be inconsistency in the approaches between England/Wales and Scotland (and possibly Wales if they decide to introduce their Regulations in a different form from the English Regulations) (DEFRA, 2007a).

In the end, the House of Lords’ main contribution was to clarify the role of the veterinary surgeon who would only have to certify that certain evidence had been produced by the owner to indicate that the dog was of a specified breed and likely to be used for work in connection with law enforcement, the armed forces, emergency rescue, pest control, or shooting (RCVS, 2006). Due to the legislative process adopted by both Westminster and Holyrood, the regulations dealing specifically with dog tail docking were to come in force only when secondary legislation was adopted. Meanwhile, in August 2006 the Northern Ireland Executive undertook a process of public consultation on proposals for a draft animal health and welfare bill which coincided with the finalization of animal welfare legislation in the rest of the United Kingdom. Consequently, the Northern Ireland consultation ran parallel with another round of British consultation dealing specifically with the tail docking of dogs.
The very existence of an exemption for working gundogs in Wales and England was used by the Countryside Alliance to support its case in Northern Ireland: “The shooting association is working to ensure the Government accepts the difference between cosmetic docking and the docking of working breeds (Shooting Times, 2007).” Clearly BASC was reapplying the strategy that had worked for England and Wales by dissociating itself from the campaign conducted by purebred associations who had by then suffered a serious setback since the prophylactic argument was restricted to gundogs and had only been accepted in England and Wales. Not surprisingly, the questions asked by Northern Ireland Department of Agriculture and Rural Development [DARD] during the consultation of 2006 reflected the British pattern:

Do you agree there should be an extension of legislation restricting the docking of dogs’ tails? If so, should the practice be banned altogether, or restricted to certain breeds of dog, or to only those dogs actively employed as working dogs? (Northern Ireland, 2006)

The consultation results were comparable to those of similar exercises previously carried out in the rest of the UK during the making of primary legislation with dog tail docking again turning out to be a most contentious issue (DARD, 2010a). The drafting of secondary legislation on dog tail docking proved to be as controversial in Britain.

**Fawlty Powers**

In the Fall of 2006, the stage was then set for another round of consultations and parliamentary scrutiny this time with respect to exemptions from certain mutilations. In England and Wales, the exercise focused on defining how the regulations on dog tail docking would be outlined and enforced. In Scotland, Holyrood reconsidered the issue probably as a result of the legislation passed by the British parliament.
Since SEERAD believed that the case for an exemption for working dogs had not been made, the draft regulations did not propose to exempt the tail docking of any dog including working dogs. However, people who believed that there should have been an exemption for working dogs were given the opportunity to present evidence to support their case in a consultation (SEERAD, 2006). This decision meant that technically it was still possible for the three national jurisdictions to come up with similar regulations. Undoubtedly Finnie hoped that the spirit of the primary legislation would be upheld. Eight days after Royal Assent was given to the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act, a parliamentary briefing was circulated to the Members of the Scottish Parliament stating that: “Ministers are minded not to include an exemption for working dogs, but have undertaken to consider evidence on tail injuries suffered by undocked dogs of normally docked breeds before bringing in a ban” (Edwards, 2006). Even the most vocal proponent of an exemption, Ted Brocklebank, had admitted at the time that:

The Conservatives will certainly monitor injuries to the tails of working dogs. Of course, that evidence could take up to three years to find because pups left undocked now will not be ready to work for at least two years. (Scottish Parliament, 2006b)

In Scotland, the notion of being distinct from England preceded the stage of regulations: “I am particularly pleased that Parliament has voted to ban tail docking without exemption. In doing that, we have shown that in Scotland we are not afraid to be different. We are leading the way in animal welfare” (Scottish Parliament, 2006b). The consultation question put the onus on the pro-docking lobby to prove their case: “Do you believe that the Regulations should be amended to permit the tail docking of working dogs? If so, what veterinary evidence do you have to support your case? If not, why not? (Edwards, 2006) Out of 160 responses, 122 dealt with dog tail docking. The veterinary professional bodies convinced SPERDC on 6 March 2007 that an exemption for working dogs was not necessary (SPERDC, 2007). The Scottish Executive concurred with that view as the strength of evidence produced
by those who supported tail shortening was insufficient (Scottish Executive, 2007a). In addition, Scotland had reviewed similar restrictions on non-therapeutic docking before legislating its own: “we are mindful of the situation in other countries where a tail docking ban has been imposed, that there has been no call for the ban to be removed due to an increase in tail injuries” (Scottish Executive, 2007b). The Scottish Parliament overwhelmingly passed the tail docking regulations on 14 March 2007 (Scottish Parliament, 2007). The impact of the Scottish lead was in turn seen during the debates that took place in both Cardiff and London.

At the time of primary legislation, Ben Bradshaw had somehow already pre-empted the debate in England and Wales by selecting the exempted breeds or types of breeds even though it was supposed to have been left to the national authority:

I will give hon. Members a further insight into the breeds that we would consider if the new clause were passed without amendment. The exemption for working dogs would include spaniels, hunt point retrieve [HPR] breeds, working terriers and crosses involving one or more of those types (House of Commons, 2006d).

The Animal Welfare Act gave English and Welsh Ministers the responsibility to make regulations listing the types of working dogs that may have their tails docked and laying down the evidence to be produced. As expected the Secretary of State for England followed Bradshaw’s suggestions but the draft regulations introduced by the Welsh Assembly government initially limited the exemptions to spaniels, terriers or crosses of those breeds. During the Welsh consultation, concerns were voiced by the hunting lobby that HPR breeds were not included in the list (Welsh Assembly Government, 2007a). The British Association for Shooting and Conservation [BASC] also argued that the exemption should be similar to the draft regulations in England which had in fact been prepared with BASC as well as enforcement agencies therefore confirming the influence of those lobby groups on the
minister’s agenda (DEFRA, 2007a). BASC actually credited itself for the exception allowed for working gundogs:

As BASC members have previously been informed, following a hard fought campaign to exclude working gundogs (HPR breeds, spaniels and terriers) from this ban, Parliament voted through a derogation for these animals. This was a significant success as BASC took on the combined might of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons and the RSPCA and through intensive lobbying of MPs, achieved an understanding of why this exclusion was so important to the shooting community. (BASC, 2007)

So during the consultation, shooting groups and their allies, police forces, successfully argued for the addition of 14 HPR breeds to the Welsh exemption list. However, this “victory” was achieved without the support of the rest of the pro-docking lobby. The CDB had lamented the breakup of an earlier coalition between themselves, countrysports alliance and the KC:

It would appear that the lobbying machine of the Countryside Alliance (CA) and the British Association for Shooting and Conservation (BASC) who had been encouraging MP’s to save docking for working dogs at the expense of show dogs, had won the day” (CDB, 2007).

The fact that no breed from the KC Working and Pastoral breed groups was to be exempted illustrates how the hunting lobby used a narrow definition of “working breeds” to achieve an exemption. When the draft regulations came under the scrutiny of the National Assembly for Wales, BASC and the Police Federation failed to convince the Environment, Planning and Countryside Committee to include HPR breeds of any type or crosses (National Assembly for Wales, 2007a). In plenary session, the National Assembly for Wales defined its priorities and provided a rationale for diverging from the English intentions: the Wales Regulations would only permit tail docking on specific named breeds of spaniels, terriers and Hunt Point Retrievers. “This is because the consultation exercise undertaken in Wales revealed that only these specific breeds are used as working dogs in Wales” (Welsh Assembly Government, 2007b). Yet, this was achieved through two last minute amendments on 27 March 2007. Those who tabled the amendments had been in favour of a complete ban (National Assembly
for Wales, 2007b). While the Animal Welfare Minister, Carwyn Jones, regretted that the Senedd had not been given the opportunity of a debate, he opposed the amendments. Symptomatically, his position which resembled that of England suffered a defeat when the amendments were approved. This result suggests that Wales might have followed Scotland in adopting a complete ban if the Senedd had had the same devolved powers as Holyrood at the time the primary legislation was passed. In total, 21 breeds of gundogs were identified for the purpose of the Welsh regulations. For its part, Whitehall came to a different conclusion:

there were a number of reasons for including spaniels, terriers and hunt point retrieve breeds as groups, one of which was the recognition that a considerable number of cross-breeds, particularly in the terrier group, make very effective working dogs…(House of Lords, 2007)

Based on the group classification of the KC, the English exemptions could affect at least twice the number of breeds listed in the Welsh regulations. The English draft regulations had been met with substantial opposition during the consultation stage. It was pointed out, for instance, that the types of exempted breeds, which was supposed to be tightly drawn, would make it difficult for the RSPCA to enforce the regulations. DEFRA was also taken to task by the Companion Animal Welfare Council [CAWC] for not having opted for a complete ban and particularly for the inconsistency of the rationale for an exception:

There is no peer reviewed scientific information that independently supports the view that prophylactic docking is effective in preventing tail damage, despite the fact that docking has been banned in many other countries for more than 10 years, and in some countries for nearly 16 years. There is no substantive evidence that undocked dogs of breeds that are normally docked have a significantly higher incidence of tail damage requiring significant medical or surgical intervention… to be consistent, the list should include retrievers, Labradors, Great Danes, Greyhounds, and other dogs that damage their tails. Why are other working dogs of a similar type to those listed, such as the English Pointer, not included? Is Defra being hoodwinked here?(CAWC, 2007)

Ben Bradshaw also encountered opposition when the draft regulations came under parliamentary review in March 2007. He accused his critics of trying to re-open a debate that was settled the previous year. The vote in England occurred the day following the Welsh
decision. The House of second thought, the Lords, did not amend the tail docking clause that was proposed to them but several members expressed regret that the Scottish option had not been put to them:

To continue the theme of kings, dogs and docking, my noble friend Lord Roper observed that Edward VIII, when Prince of Wales, said that if he could pass only one law, it would be to prevent the docking of puppies’ tails. We are where we are, and we should regard this as a step forward, although I am sorry that the Government have not offered us the Scottish route (House of Lords, 2007).

Eventually, the regulations issued by the three national entities increased the discrepancy noted at the first level of devolution. Besides their obvious inconsistency, there were several matters for concern. The evidence prescribed in the English and Welsh regulations was not identical and fell well short of establishing that the puppy was likely to become a working dog (Scottish Parliament, 2008a). Moreover, in England and Wales docked dogs would no longer be shown at events to which members of the public were admitted on payment of a fee. The absence of such a ban in Scotland meant that while it had become illegal to dock a dog’s tail, it was still possible to show docked dogs there. Indirectly, the absence of a partial showing ban would enable disgruntled breeders in England and Wales to exhibit docked dogs in Scotland. More generally, the prospect of cross-border inconsistencies on dog tail-docking had been raised during the preparation of secondary legislation in the three national parliaments. While Bradshaw had argued that the Scottish regulations would prevent any docking tourism, he overlooked the fact that there was no provision to address the possibility of taking a pregnant bitch over the border to have her whole litter docked before coming back to Scotland. This was a violation of the Sewel memorandum signed in 2005 by the UK government and the Scottish Executive and designed to ensure that there was no scope for the exploitation of gaps between the animal welfare regimes north and south of the border (Scottish Executive, 2005). The spectre of docking tourism was also addressed in Wales but Carwyn Jones admitted that:
Inevitably, in a situation where the law is seen as more lax in one part of the UK compared with another, there will be movement. I do not think that there is any way of stopping that…. I assume that this is happening in Scotland, anyway—it may be that people are crossing the border into England in order to have their dogs’ tails docked (National Assembly for Wales, 2007a).

Scottish legislators had actually been alerted to the loophole in their primary legislation but the Scottish Executive did not modify amendment 30 and this would come to haunt them even though tail docking tourism would also undermine English and Welsh regulations. Overall, the failure of the three national authorities to address the potential for tail docking tourism resulting from the inconsistency of their respective legislations was bound to create confusion and enforcement issues even beyond British borders.

By May 2007, tail docking of dogs in the UK was governed differently in the four national jurisdictions. The mere fact that Northern Ireland was the only part of the kingdom where dog tail docking was still being regulated according to the 1991 legislation implied that it could de facto become the destination of choice for those who wanted to carry on docking on all customarily docked breeds. This state of things also implied that Stormont would have different options to consider when it would tackle its own Northern Ireland Animal Health and Welfare Strategy.

When direct rule was restored in May 2007, the newly appointed minister of agriculture, Michelle Gildernew, was expected to quickly proceed with the animal welfare file. Yet she made it clear that she would meet with stakeholders before finalizing a proposed legislation. The hunting groups continued lobbying parliamentaries after the consultation was completed (Countryside Alliance Ireland, 2006). All through the process, the minister maintained her cautious approach emphasizing two principles: that DARD was aiming at ensuring that protection for animals in Northern Ireland would at least be equal to the powers introduced in Great Britain and that it would reflect an all-Ireland cooperation. The first
aspect of Gildernew’s policy proved difficult to achieve due to the inconsistency of the British dog tail-docking legislation introduced just before Gildernew took office. Once again, Bradshaw ignored the implications of the incoherence of the three British dog tail docking regulations. He sounded confident that the Scottish general ban would still enable Scottish ministers to introduce a working dog exemption in regulations “if evidence of problems later came to light” (DEFRA, 2007a). For their part the Scots had expressed the wish that if their legislation was working, England would consider reviewing its own regulations (SPERDC, 2007). Obviously the issue of harmonizing legislation would figure prominently during the implementation stage of the three sets of tail docking regulations. In Northern Ireland, the challenge of consistency held a different meaning as Minister Gildernew’s desire to closely work with her counterpart in Dublin became difficult to conciliate (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2008).

The Irish government was slow to move on the animal welfare issue finally launching a consultation with respect to its proposed Animal Health and Welfare Bill between 28 May and 11 July 2008. Despite claiming that a new animal welfare legislation remained one of her key ministerial priorities, Gildernew’s single move that year was to meet with the newly formed animal welfare coalition, the Northern Ireland Companion Animal Welfare Committee [NICAWC] (Blue Cross, 2008). The creation of NICAWC was part of a counter-offensive launched by the anti docking lobby to highlight the negative effects the British dog tail docking legislation was having on Ireland where both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic were preparing their own animal welfare legislation. For their part, the Scottish pros of an exemption for working gundogs similar to the regulations put into place in England and Wales engaged on a campaign to achieve the same result in Edinburgh. The variation of legislation across the UK quickly unravelled a series of problems of implementation and
Gildernew probably chose to delay formulating Belfast’s own tail docking provision in order to see how her British counterparts would fix the loopholes present in their regulations.

**Cleaning up their Acts?**

Apparently vindicated by the English and Welsh regulations, the pro-docking lobby mounted a campaign targeting the Scottish regulations banning prophylactic tail docking. James Scott, BASC Scotland’s Press and Policy Officer had been dismayed by the Scottish ban on dog tail docking and had vowed to challenge it:

> BASC Scotland will continue to lobby for an exemption from this ban for working dogs. The Executive has already stated its commitment to review this legislation, so it is important that we receive evidence of injuries sustained because of a ban to submit to this process (BASC, 2007).

Even before the ban came into force, pro-docking interest groups were apparently forecasting an increase in tail injuries and were defiant of a legislation that in their opinion was both unworkable and unjustified. The offensive took the form of two successive petitions lodged in the Scottish Parliament in the Fall of 2008. Michael Brander, the author of the first petition presented in September 2008 underscored the flaws of the original ban:

> I deliberately bred a litter and whelped my bitch in England soon after the Act came into force, having the pups docked and the DEFRA forms signed by a vet to prove the Act was unenforceable bad law (Brander, 2008).

This clearly was a violation of the intent of the law even though it was not deemed unlawful since the puppies were born in England. However, it underlined one of the major weaknesses of the Scottish legislation that had been foreseen prior to its implementation. In fact, Alex Hogg, chairman of the Scottish Gamekeepers Association, legitimized circumventing the law in the name of “animal welfare”: 
It is also clear that breeders are protecting their animals by taking them to England for at least a week before they give birth so they can subsequently be docked in England and then returned to Scotland (BBC Scotland, 2009a).

Not surprisingly, a coalition composed of BASC Scotland, the Scottish Countryside Alliance, the Scottish Gamekeepers’ Association and the Scottish Rural Property and Business Association was behind the second petition submitted in November 2008. It called on the parliament to urge the Scottish Government to amend the regulations to allow prophylactic tail docking of working gundogs under tightly specified circumstances. In content, the proposal would have been similar to the general provisions of the English and Welsh regulations (BBC Scotland, 2009b). The main basis of the second petition was a study published in a veterinary journal (Houlton, 2008). Allegedly, it reported a highly significant association between tail injuries and undocked working dogs (Scottish Parliament, 2008b). However, the study relied on a convenience sample and was carried out before the ban came into force. What the study shows is that injuries are not confined to the tail and can be adequately addressed by methods less severe than tail amputation. (Advocates for Animals, 2008).

In response to the petitions, the Scottish Parliament Information Centre issued a briefing in which it pointed out that it was significant that veterinary surgeons in countries where tail docking has been banned without exception for some time, were not pressing for a resumption of docking to avoid tail injuries (Scottish Parliament, 2008c). The government also argued that it would be difficult to prohibit the movement of pregnant dogs from Scotland to prevent the tail docking of their pups outside of Scotland and it would be exceptionally difficult to prohibit the importation of docked puppies into Scotland. Nevertheless, a prohibition on selling a docked puppy in Scotland would remove the incentive to take a pregnant bitch from Scotland for the purpose of having her puppies’ tails
docked. In this respect a court case in Wales shows that it would have been possible for the Scottish government to address the loophole in their legislation. In June 2008, a woman who had taken puppies to the Irish Republic to have them docked and then selling them in South Wales as 'legally docked', was convicted in court (Western Telegraph, 2008). The magistrates decided that taking the pups abroad with the intention of having the tails removed was an illegal act. The defendant had maintained that because the procedure was done in the Republic of Ireland, it was outside UK law. The case was brought by Pembrokeshire County Council and clarified the law banning the docking of puppy tails in the UK. This legal precedent could have been used by the Scottish authorities to enforce their regulations and tackle docking tourism. Ultimately though, the Scottish Public Petitions Committee decided to suspend the study of the petitions until a study that was commissioned in October 2007 was peer-reviewed and published. The study received funding from the three national governments and was undertaken by the University of Bristol and the Royal Veterinary College in North Mymms (DEFRA, 2007b). Initially, it was to take 12 months but its publication was delayed by more than a year. Meanwhile, the Irish veterinary profession had become involved in the debate and was campaigning for a complete ban on non-therapeutic dog tail-docking. In contrast to the RCVS that has yet to change its 2005 guidelines on dog tail docking, Veterinary Ireland issued in February 2008 a long statement where it challenged the justification for prophylactic docking arguing that the risk of tail injury was equal in working dogs compared to non-working dogs and thus there was no argument to say that an exception should be made for working dogs only – all dogs whether working or not were at equal risk to tail injury:

This refutes any argument which may be put forward to make allowances for the 'prophylactic' docking of certain working breeds so as to reduce the incidence or severity of future tail injuries (Veterinary Ireland, 2008a).
It is noteworthy that Veterinary Ireland in line with the view of the World Small Animal Veterinary Association of which the BVA and British Small Animal Veterinary Association are members emphasizes the “non beneficial” character of non-therapeutic tail docking (Veterinary Ireland, 2009). The intervention of the veterinary profession in the debate over tail docking occurred at the time the Irish government was preparing a review of its Protection of Animals Act 1911. While the consultation document did not specifically mention dog tail docking, it covered the larger issue of mutilations on companion animals. The Veterinary Ireland National Council asked that legislation be introduced to render it a specific offence to bring an animal to another jurisdiction with the sole purpose of having prohibited procedures performed. This included bringing a pregnant bitch to another jurisdiction to whelp so that the new born pups can have any of these acts performed upon them (Veterinary Ireland, 2008b). Obviously this proposal demonstrated that the consequences of the inconsistency of devolved dog tail docking legislation in Britain were being felt across the Irish Sea.

While the routine cosmetic docking had been banned in Britain, it was still legal across the Irish Sea. Gildernew’s wait and see attitude raised questions in the Northern Ireland Assembly and led to a heated debate in January 2009. Opposition members accused her of procrastinating. As one member put it: “We cannot wait for the Republic of Ireland to get its act together” (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2009). Eventually Gildernew had to endorse a motion calling for her to move forward with animal welfare legislation at a much faster pace. In March 2009, Veterinary Ireland renewed its call for a ban on cosmetic and prophylactic docking. The Dogs Trust, one of the biggest dog welfare organisations in the UK had actually taken part in the Irish consultation and was reporting cases of British breeders bringing either puppies or pregnant bitches to Ireland for docking purposes before returning home (Irish Times, 2009). The public outcry over docking tourism in Ireland and the sensitivity of the dog
tail docking issue at home probably accounted for Gildernew’s decision to announce in May 2009 that she would introduce a bill after the Summer recess (Northern Ireland Executive, 2009a). In anticipation of the Fall parliamentary session, the minister was still anxious to see the outcome of legislative proposals that were at the time discussed in Dublin. Similarly she wanted to take into account the lessons learned from the implementation of the British regulations (Northern Ireland Executive, 2009b). The possible review of the tail docking restrictions that might result from the findings of the RVS/Bristol University study expected to be finalised in the Fall of 2009 provided Gildernew with an additional incentive to initiate a final stage of consultation on her proposed Welfare of Animals bill. A draft of the bill was submitted for comments by stakeholders during a workshop held on 17 September 2009. The proposals included in the draft animal welfare bill clearly reflected the impact that the debate south of the border had had on the Northern Ireland’s Animal Welfare policy-making. DARD intended to ban the docking of dogs’ tails, except for therapeutic reasons without any exemption for working dogs:

> An offence will be created if anyone carries out a prohibited procedure which involves interference with the sensitive tissues or bone structure of an animal. It would also be an offence to take an animal to any other jurisdiction to have a prohibited procedure carried out (DARD, 2009).

Obviously, Belfast was leaning towards the Scottish version of tail docking regulations that had earlier that year received a boost. The BBC Landward program tail docking survey conducted in February 2009 was significant since 80% of veterinary practices reported no increase in tail injuries since the ban came into force (BBC Scotland, 2009c).

In the absence of legislative action coming from Dublin, DARD submitted a draft animal welfare bill to pre-legislative scrutiny in the Fall of 2009. Gildernew’s staff presented their rationale for a total ban on dog tail docking to the Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development [CARD]. The issue of docking tourism was also addressed:
If, for example, the South does not ban the docking of tails, it will remain legal for someone to buy a dog with a docked tail there and bring it to the North. However, the buyer would have to confirm that the dog had been bought in the South. We are aware of that issue. (CARD, 2009a).

However, as in Scotland, the Welsh legal precedent on docking tourism could serve as a foundation to introduce measures designed to target law evasion. In response to concerns expressed by some members of the committee who favored an exemption for working dogs, DARD Animal Welfare staff provided additional evidence to the committee on March 16, 2010 before taking the proposed draft to the Executive (CARD, 2009b). The All-Island Animal Health and Welfare Strategy that was formally agreed at the Agriculture North South Ministerial Council Sectoral meeting on 31 March 2010 comforted Gildernew’s initial policy objective (DARD, 2010b). In a speech delivered on 12 April 2010 the minister emphasized the need of developing complementary policies within Ireland. The Northern Ireland Executive was no doubt aware that the issue of aligning tail docking policies within Britain was still being tested in Scotland.

On April 13, 2010, Colin Shedden the Director of BASC Scotland alerted the Petitions Committee to a Working Dog Injury Survey Analysis prepared by Biomathematics & Statistics Scotland [BioSS] (McKendrick, 2010). Yet the research had not been peer-reviewed and the author himself acknowledged the potential biases of the survey since it was both commissioned and conducted by a BASC supporter. The unscientific approach adopted by the shooting lobby remained problematic because it pre-judged the outcome of studies and their interpretation. For example, to this date, there has been no published evidence to support the claim that there has been an increase in tail injury incidence since 2007. The sole merit of McKendrick’s analysis was to define ‘tail injury’ as having required medical treatment. In his response to the BioSS study, the head of the Scottish Animal Welfare Division, Ian Strachan, pointed out that the study:
does not address the extent of tail injuries in the total dog population, the causes of these injuries, where tail injuries occur, and whether dogs of the same breed are more likely to injure their tails due to them being used as working dogs. There is also no indication to show how many dogs need to be docked to prevent one tail injury. (Strachan, 2010)

The long-awaited RVS/Bristol University study published in June 2010 addressed those issues. Diesel et al (2010) was the largest study to assess the risk of tail injury and risk factors for dogs from all parts of Great Britain. From the two hundred and eighty-one tail injuries recorded from a population of 138,212 dogs attending 52 participating practices, the authors concluded that the overall risk of tail injuries was low, that being a working dog was not a major risk factor for tail injury and that approximately 500 dogs would need to be docked in order to prevent one tail injury (Diesel et al, 2010, 817). One of the problems associated with previous studies had been their failure to assess whether the extent of most injuries would require the amputation of the whole or part of the tail. As Dr. Sylvia Jackson, the convener of the cross-party group in the Scottish Parliament on animal welfare, noted in 2006: “The SSPCA considers that, although working dogs can and do injure their tails, the vast majority of those injuries are minor and can be treated by veterinary surgeons”(Scottish Parliament, 2006b). Diesel et al (2010, 815) confirmed that claim since their study showed that less than one third of tail injuries led to amputation. Whether the RVS/Bristol University findings will put the issue of prophylactic docking to rest remains to be seen but subsequently, on 29 June 2010, the Scottish Public Petitions Committee agreed to write to the Scottish Government, the SSPCA and Advocates for Animals seeking a response to specific points raised by the article. By then, Northern Ireland had taken the lead on dog tail docking in Ireland.

The Welfare of Animals Bill was introduced on 21 June 2010 after the publication of the RVS/Bristol University study that certainly strengthened Gildernew’s stand on dog tail docking (Northern Ireland Executive, 2010). The tail docking of dogs is to be banned, except
as part of medical treatment by a veterinary surgeon or in circumstances to save the life of the
dog. The latter clause will need to be clarified to avoid any potential abuse. The bill also
includes a ban on the showing of dogs where the tail was docked after the introduction of the
new Welfare of Animals Act (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2010). The partial showing ban is
pretty similar to the one in force in England and Wales but it was missing from Scottish
regulations. However, an outright ban on showing docked dogs would be preferable. In 2009
the Irish veterinary profession made it clear that not restricting by law the showing of docked
dogs would result in continuing demand for them and would thus create incentives to find
ways around the ban (Veterinary Ireland, 2009). The Scottish pattern would tend to support
that assertion. The day after the Bill was introduced saw another heated debate during the
committee stage of the Welfare of Animals Bill (CARD, 2010). Challenged by a couple of
CARD members, DARD staff stated that in addition to the evidence gathered against granting
an exemption for working dogs, the information provided by DEFRA and the RSPCA
reported problems of enforcement in England.

It is too early to predict whether the proposed tail docking clause in the Bill will remain intact
after the committee stage. The Northern Ireland Assembly is in recess for the Summer of
2010 and CARD has issued a public notice inviting comments on the Welfare of Animals Bill
(CARD, 2010b). The fact that Dublin has given priority to its Dog Breeding Establishments
Bill 2009 before tackling its Animal Health and Welfare Bill means that the two Irelands will
not follow a parallel legislative exercise on dog tail docking. However, Gildernew’s Irish
counterpart, Brendan Smith, has previously emphasized the convergence of ideas (Ireland,
2010). This suggests that the island of Ireland has the potential to achieve what Britain failed
to deliver: a consistent piece of legislation. At time of writing, the Irish parliament is not
likely to discuss the tail docking issue before 2011. It is worth noting though that the Irish
Kennel Club [IKC] has sided with the Veterinary Ireland Companion Animal Society [VICAS] and animal welfare organizations against the hunting lobby to support the dog breeding bill to ensure that the Republic will no longer be the ‘puppy farm capital of Europe.’ (Veterinary Ireland, 2010). A similar coalition on animal welfare legislation could help Dublin pass the most progressive of the tail-docking provisions in the Anglo-Celtic Isles. Considering that Irish Home Rule was once the first attempt at devolution, the words spoken by John McCallister, a Northern Ireland Assembly member, on January 26, 2009 are particularly relevant for our concluding remarks: “The real evil is not partition, it is animal cruelty” (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2009).

**Conclusion**

The article set out to examine the impact of devolution on tail-docking policies vis-à-vis three stages of the parliamentary process. Overall, the implementation stage of the British devolved regulations has revealed a monty-python-esque scenario that has highlighted the fact that the rationale for their inconsistency was seriously flawed. As one member of the National Assembly for Wales had commented: “I am afraid that that does not seem to be a commonsense approach to animal welfare” (Welsh Assembly Government, 2007c). Ironically, the making of regulations was the last piece of legislation processed under the Government of Wales Act of 1998. Technically under the new Government of Wales Act 2006 the Senedd could request a Legislative Competency Order from Westminster which would allow a measure to pass primary legislation to ban the docking of tails. Or the Assembly could achieve the same outcome by maintaining the regulations but removing the working dog exemption. Wales’ pioneering legislation banning the use of electric training devices passed in March 2010 shows that the Welsh Assembly Government through the Companion Animal
Welfare Enhancement Scheme (CAWES) that it set up in 2008 has made good use of its ability to legislate on animal welfare. Of course, this implies that England also has the tools to correct her tail docking legislation at the primary or secondary level regardless of how the West Lothian question is solved by the new coalition government. As one DARD official recently stated:

DEFRA advised us that the decision made in England was not based on scientific evidence. A political decision was taken in the House that an exemption would be allowed for working dogs (CARD, 2010a).

CAWC who has monitored the developments in Britain since the tail docking regulations came into force is likely to put pressure on Whitehall to review its legislation (CAWC, 2009). Significantly, the editorial in the Veterinary Record, where the RVS/Bristol University study was published, focused not on whether working dog exemptions should be created in Scotland but rather whether the current exemptions in England and Wales could be justified at all (Veterinary Record, 2010, 800). The Northern Ireland’s proposed primary legislation on dog tail docking should also encourage the Scottish Executive to maintain its regulations or even improve them. A complete ban of non-therapeutic docking in the UK would definitely put pressure on the KC to alter its breed standards and remove the docking option altogether as was done with ear cropping last century. In July 2007, the tail clauses of all standards which referred to a breed as being ‘Customarily docked’ were amended to ‘Previously customarily docked.’ (KC, 2007). In this regard, while the KC should be commanded for its campaign for a ban against electric shock devices, it should distance itself from hunting lobby groups whose denial of valid ethical concerns over prophylactic docking compromises the health of working dogs in England and Wales. As Libby Anderson, policy director for Advocates for Animals, remarked on 8 July 2010: “Every puppy that is docked suffers a tail injury” (Advocates for Animals, 2010). Hunting lobby groups have systematically ignored the results of scholarly research that counter their claims. Lately, BASC Scotland has been
dissimissive of the scientific evidence provided by the RVS/Bristol University study and continue to condone docking tourism south of the border (Shedden, 2010). To put an end to that situation, a tightening of the Scottish regulations could be discussed in the Fall when the Scottish Executive considers the feedback it receives on the RVS/Bristol University Report (Strachan, 2010b). Any change could of course be achieved whether or not Scots opt for independence at the forthcoming November referendum.

Ultimately, Bradshaw’s flawed compromise on dog-tail docking created a regional animal welfare problem comparable to the Australian experience at restricting dog tail-docking (Delafenêtre, 2009). Between 2002 and 2004, the Australian federal policy objective of a complete ban on non-therapeutic tail-docking was weakened by the legal inconsistency that progressively emerged between the eight jurisdictions involved. In response to the regional confusion over the legal definition of dog tail docking and whether the ban excluded prophylactic docking, several Australian states took measures to clarify their legislation. Western Australia is the latest State to amend its tail docking regulations and restrict the procedure to therapeutic reasons (Western Australia, 2010). This will help eliminate the risk of docking tourism within all Australian States and Territories. Yet New Zealand’s decision not to ban dog tail docking in 2004 has recently been confirmed by the National government and continue to indirectly contribute to docking tourism across the Tasman Sea (New Zealand, 2010). Therefore, while the process of harmonizing tail docking legislation between UK’s four countries is definitely feasible, it could be affected by the tail docking restrictions that Dublin will adopt.

As I have argued elsewhere the goal of a consistent national policy in Australasia essentially failed because governments adopted a welfarist approach to formulate animal protection
legislation (Delafenêtre, 2009). Although devolved powers within a unitary state differ from the powers of jurisdictions within a federation, the study of the parliamentary process involved in the making of dog tail docking legislation in the UK leads to similar conclusions. The adoption of universal principles of animal protection needs to be based on non-speciesist ethical considerations. In this regard, campaigns to ban non-therapeutic surgeries on dogs must emphasize the key principle of protecting the structural and functional integrity of the animal as defined by Orlans et al. (1998, 282). An anti-speciesist framework of analysis such as the one outlined in our comparative case study challenges the speciesist principles promoted by animal industries. Even proponents of welfarism have acknowledged that the current trend of companion animal protection activism is bound to influence what they call farm animal management (Phillips, 2009). I would argue though that the liberationist nature of campaigns designed to put an end to those invasive practices that alter a companion animal’s physical integrity has further implications since it reflects a change in traditional attitudes towards other non-human animals.

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And Say The Bakemono Responded: Animism, Derrida and the Question of the Animal in Hayao Miyazaki's Princess Mononoke

Chris Crews

Introduction

Across diverse cultures and throughout the ages, the figure of the monster abounds and plays an important role in the social imaginary. From Leviathan and kappas to werewolves and the Wendigo, the world is full of monster stories. There is something about monsters that is both horrific and seductive, at once familiar yet always signifying some form of otherness. As Timothy Beal notes, monsters “blur lines between inside and outside, this worldly and otherworldly, self and other” (2002: 196). Monsters tell powerful stories about transgressing boundaries, and our response provides a rich cultural site for exploring the meaning and significance of these transgressions. Looking at depictions of the border between human and nonhuman animals from the perspective of the monster provides the opportunity to open a posthumanist dialog about the construction of the human and the animal as subjects. In this sense, I am following Jacques Derrida's suggestion that the question of the animal is also a question of transgressing and producing boundaries, a question of "limitrophy" (2008: 29). This focus on the figure of the monster also allows us to examine in closer detail the messy entanglements and hybrid constructions that occur at that very border of these multiple and often mutable identities. As Elaine Graham suggests in her work on monsters, they "serve both to mark the fault-lines but also, subversively, to signal the fragility of such boundaries" (Graham, 2002: 12).

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In this paper I argue that a productive site for exploring these entanglements is the visual portrayal of the *bakemono*, or Japanese monster, as seen in Japanese animated films, or anime. When the boundary between worlds or realities dissolves or overlaps, the *bakemono* usually follows. These animated monsters take many forms, and narratives often revolve around a struggle between worlds or within a particular character, yet it is always through a series of performative acts that we come to understand the monster. These monster performances are always embedded in a narrative of becoming, whether they are animal, human, cyborg, or demon, and how those identities are represented is key to our response. Because anime offers a unique medium where visual representation has no inherent limitations—anything can be drawn and animated—species and identity boundary can be opened and questioned in extremely creative and compelling ways. A powerful example of the transgressive and open-ended potential of anime is found in the numerous works of Japanese artist and filmmaker Hayao Miyazaki and his collaboration with the Japanese animation company Studio Ghibli.

In order to unpack the visual performativity of the *bakemono*, I undertake a critical reading of the ways in which the boundaries between humans, animals and monsters become entangled in the internationally acclaimed anime *Mononoke Hime (Princess Mononoke)* by Hayao Miyazaki. I argue for the value of seeing anime through the lens of animism, and call for the necessity to develop an expanded view of visual politics and species representation, one where subjectivity is not limited to humans, but instead is open to a multiplicity of beings, including monsters. I argue the essential openness of anime allows for a rich visual archive of counter-hegemonic animal and nonhuman representations that can be productively engaged with by those seeking to trouble animal-human and nature-culture binaries. I also argue we need to take Derrida's claim seriously that there are inherent limits to how the Western
philosophical tradition "thinks" the question of the animal because of the ontotheological foundations of this tradition, and which we need to step outside of if we hope to make progress on this question. Because of this, I argue the importance of animism is its more open theoretical framework for the question of the animal, one which allows us to explore an enlarged notion of animal response, and which can take into account a multiplicity of performative "becomings."

To make this case, I draw upon three primary areas of study. The first approach draws from French philosopher Jacques Derrida and his work on the question of the animal, and in particular his interest in animal response. A growing body of literature has emerged around this question, and has provided an important point of intersection with critical animal studies, political theory and posthumanism.

The second approach involves the emerging study of new animism, or ecologically-grounded spiritual practices, and the ontological and political implications of these various practices for thinking about nonhuman persons and relational politics today. An animist perspective sees the world as full of living beings, so the starting point for discussions on response and subjectivity is quite different.

The final areas I draw upon are visuality and performativity, which pull all these strands together by examining the material-semiotic fields of meaning found in anime narratives, and encourages us to look more closely at the depictions and performances of animal and nonhuman subjects. This framework also helps us engage notions of the performative as understood within feminist and queer theory, and draws attention to the process of social
construction. By pulling these diverse areas of inquiry together, I aim to sketch out a transdisciplinary framework useful for the question of the animal.

I want to begin my exploration with the central problem of animal subjectivity, in particular the debate revolving around the long-standing human claim of an animal-human divide. Derrida terms this *l'animot*, or “the animal,” a totalizing discourse that collapses and subordinates species diversity into a singular category of “the animal” before the “I am” that claims itself as uniquely human. “I repeat that it is rather a matter of taking into account a multiplicity of heterogeneous structures and limits: among nonhuman and separate from nonhumans, there is an immense multiplicity of other living things that cannot in any way be homogenized, except by means of violence and the willful ignorance, within the category of what is called the animal or animality in general” (Derrida, 2008: 48). In tracing out this history, Derrida provides a helpful starting point for engaging with the philosophical roots of this divide as well as reminding us of the ongoing political violence this divide makes possible. As Cary Wolfe points out in his introduction to *Zoontologies*, the control, manipulation and slaughter of animals is absolutely essential to the human way of life, and plays a central role in both maintaining a species divide and allowing for the re-mapping of animality onto marginalized identities or groups (2003: xx). My own interest in this question, besides what Wolfe has outlined above, originate from my agreement with the stakes that Derrida argues are being fought over in the question of the animal.

War is waged over the matter of pity. This war probably has no age but, and here is my hypothesis, it is passing through a critical phase. We are passing through that phase and it passes through us. To think the war we find ourselves waging is not only a duty, a responsibility, an obligation, it is also a necessity, a constraint that, like it or not, directly or indirectly, everyone is held to. Henceforth and more than ever. And I say "to think" this war, because I believe it concerns what we call "thinking." (Derrida, 2008: 29)
Therefore I see this work as a first pass at rethinking our ethicopolitical relationships outside the ontotheological frame of humanism, where the question of the animal is more than just a thought experiment, it is a recognition of an obligation I feel to "thinking" species relations differently.

My engagement with this question of the animal started with the animated monster, and found its way to Derrida thanks to his mention of a Greek monster which he calls ecce animot, or the chimera. “Ecce animot. Neither a species nor a gender nor an individual, it is an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals, and rather than a double clone or a portmanteau word, sort of a monstrous hybrid, a chimera waiting to be put to death by its Bellerophon” (Derrida, 2008: 41). Having grown up on the many chimeric figures which populate the world of anime, I recognized his notion of hybrid multiplicity has a strong resonance with depictions of animated monsters, so I began looking at the animated monster for its potential in highlighting and exploring how animation might function as a site to rethink the question of the animal. If we consider monsters more broadly, it is their transgression of fixed boundaries and the creation of hybrid subjects—neither human nor animal yet with traces of both—that they are so productive. The added power of visual animation is that it literally animates and brings to life—and here I cannot help but think of Frankenstein's monster—the human anxiety and fears linked to the boundary crossing monster and the challenge it offers to the stability of the human subject. "Monsters are in the world but not of the world. They are paradoxical personifications of otherness within sameness. That is, they are threatening figures of anomaly within the well-established and accepted order of things" (Beal, 2002: 4). In his study of the role of monsters in various religious traditions, biblical literature scholar Timothy Beal traces the longstanding importance of monsters as otherworldly beings and as divine agents, and in particular highlights their important relationship with sacrifice, purity,
pollution and punishment for violation of social norms or divine laws. Many of these same themes play an important role in the film, and help us to explore the varied depictions of border identities between humans, animals and monsters.

In *Princess Mononoke* we find a story deeply informed by contemporary Japanese spiritual beliefs, monster folklore and earlier indigenous animist practices, many of which were eventually consolidated into Shinto, or *kami-no-michi*, meaning “way of the gods” or “the kami path” (Yamamoto, 1987: 1; Kasulis, 2004: 10). This unique relationship between Japanese culture and Shinto spiritual beliefs informs a number of anime narratives, and thus warrants special attention when considering the prevalence and presentations of animal and nonhuman actors. John Nelson suggests as much when he asks: “Where but in Japan will a corporation begin construction of a state-of-the-art laser refraction laboratory with an ancient ritual to calm the spirit of the earth” (1996: 3)? It is in depicting these entangled cultural practices that anime proves amazingly rich as a site for investigation.

In order to be sensitive to this, I focus on Japanese monsters in my analysis, commonly referred to as *bakemono*, who are part of the large collection of ghosts, monsters and spirits commonly referred to as *yōkai* (Yoda and Alt, 2008: 7). Many of the monsters found in anime, and in *Princess Mononoke* in particular, draw upon native folklore and Shinto beliefs as points of reference. According to Miyazaki’s original story proposal, he drew inspiration from both the Emishi people and the earlier Jōmon culture of Japan to inform parts of his narratives and visual aesthetics (Nausicaä Net, n.d.). Because of this, *Princess Mononoke* illustrates how animist practices and ideas have influenced anime narratives and provides a chance to examine how these influences may impact the construction and depiction of intra-species relations and nature in novel ways absent from most Western created animation.
The bakemono is one figure in an immense Japanese bestiary collectively referred to as yōkai. Michael Foster documents this menagerie in his book *Pandemonium and Parade: Japanese Monsters and the Culture of Yōkai*, where he argues the word yōkai encompasses monsters, demons, fantastic beings and unexplained experience (2009: 2). Over time different terms have been used to describe these phenomenon, including obake, bakemono, and kaii genshō, but I will primarily use the term bakemono, which literally translates as “changing thing,” because this term is commonly used in anime to refer to all sorts of monsters (Foster, 2009: 5). Two more important concepts which appear in the film are kami and mononoke. Kami are central to Shinto spiritual beliefs and usually refers to some manifestation of a god or spirit, as is the case in this film. As John Nelson points out in his discussion of the Shinto Suwa Shrine in Nagasaki, the “practitioners of Shinto hold that anything we can see or sense that is full of power, mysterious, marvelous, uncontrolled, strange, or simply beyond our abilities of comprehension is what constitutes the Kami” (1996: 27). Several of the main animal figures in the film are forest deities referred to as kami. Similar to the term kami, the word mononoke also has otherworldly spiritual connotations, and often translates as the “spirit” of something: “Mononoke could be the spirit of an inanimate object, such as a wheel, the spirit of a dead person, the spirit of a live person, the spirit of an animal, goblins, monsters, or a spirit of nature” (Nausicaä Net, n.d.). One of the main characters, San, embodies this conception as a spirit of the wolf tribe who guards the ancient forest. The bobble-headed white spirits know as kodama, who make several appearances in the film to signify a healthy forest, are another example of the various monsters appearing in Miyazaki’s films.

So what is the relationship of the animated bakemono, the virtual monster, to our inquiry into the question of the animal? I believe the animated monster is productive not only because it performs on the border between subjectivities, especially those of human and animal, but
because it can recombine and create new spaces beyond these borders. Monsters destabilize whatever they come into contact with, and risk pulling anything they touch into this alternate world. Paul Wells describes this fluid and transgressive potential of the animated animal with the term bestial ambivalence, where he argues that the power of the animated animal is not prefixing the animal in a specific form, but rather allowing "a space for characters, or phenomenon, to operate on more symbolic or metaphoric terms," a condition which "invites a greater degree of possibly highly charged emotive or abstract interpretation" that "embodies the openness of debate and not the fixedness of conclusion" (2009: 5). This concept of bestial ambivalence works equally well in this context, as the animated monster not only blurs fixed identity, but also operates on multiple registers, including the symbolic and the metaphoric, in its troubling of the subject. This desubjectivation, this becoming-monster, underlies my reading of the bakemono here.

The monster signifies a state of becoming which resists classification and exists in a constant state of flux. I see the monster as both real and imaginary, a being which must be accounted for, but which also resists explanation. It is real in that the danger it poses must be guarded against and the power of the monster, regardless of the specific shape or form it takes, is both respected and feared. Every culture has its stories about the influence of monsters and instructions on how to protect oneself from them. But more than that, there is a strong belief in the actual existence of monsters and spirits which cannot be written of as some Freudian projection or cultural fabrication, a move often made in monster studies.

A prime example of this trend is a comparative survey of monster stories by American anthropologist David Gilmore, who defines monsters and their kin as purely "imaginary, not real, embodiments of terror," and who suggests that "a psychoanalytic approach is
unavoidable in any serious approach to monster lore" (2003: 6,16). While I don't want to discount a psychoanalytic reading of monsters in relation to culture, to simply write monsters off as fabrications of the id is not only unconvincing, but once more privileges the human as the sole subject and limit of being. This ontological claim is called into question by animist, as well as those involved in shamanic or magick practices. One argument in this paper is precisely that we need to take seriously these marginalized ontologies by rejecting the subordination of monsters and spirits to the purely human, as Gilmore suggests we must.

But the monster also functions on the level of the imaginary in the sense that it operates outsides the confines of what often passes for accepted knowledge, existing beyond the realms of the possible, the visible and the known. It is no accident that monsters, especially the bakemono, are usually associated with wild places and tasogare, or "twilight" (Figal, 2007: 3). Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the figure of the monster has retained its power even today. Here a psychoanalytic reading of the monster may be productive, as it can help us to better understand how monstrosity is deployed to protect boundaries, enforce norms, and legitimate hierarchy. The power of imagination is to make the intangible tangible: if the monster can be named, then it can also be contained or controlled.

In *Princess Mononoke*, the bakemono functions on both of these levels. At times, the monster signifies the ancient forest beyond the borders of the human settlement which is defended by the forest gods, a wild and dangerous place which must be conquered and controlled. But the bakemono is also a signifier of the characters who are nonhuman or hybrid. In the case of Ashitaka and San, two of the main characters in the film, they have transgressed a boundary and entered into a zone of indistinction between human, animal and monster. For others, like
Moro the wolf goddess or the deer-like Forest Spirit, their status as divine animal gods make them monsters in the eyes of the humans.

In order to delve deeper into these monster representations, let us turn to one of the main characters in the film, Ashitaka, who is a young prince of the Emishi people. The Emishi are depicted as an animist culture living deep within the forest in a village headed by an old wise woman or female shaman called Hii-sama. The story begins when a demon boar (tatari kami or “curse god”) named Nago attacks the Emishi village. While fighting the monster Ashitaka is grabbed by its oozing black tentacles, leading him to shoot and kill the monster to protect the villagers. As its tentacles wither away a dark scar appears on Ashitaka's arm, marking a transference of the curse, a demonic contagion.

This first interaction is revealing for two reasons. First, Nago was originally a boar god (inoshishi kami) in the distant land of the ancient forest spirits, but he was transformed into a curse god after being shot by Lady Eboshi, the leader of Irontown (Tatara Ba), who is trying to destroy the forest. So his transformation from a forest guardian into a curse god was linked to human actions, an important point we will return to later. It is also worth noting that the act which turned Nago into a monster originated from a violent encounter with human military technology. The movie is supposed to take place during the Muromachi Era (14th-16th century), and corresponds both to the introduction of guns from China and changing Japanese relations with the forests (Wright, 2005: 8). Due to this, the transformation of Nago from a boar god to a demon monster connects human technology and warfare to the monster.

When the Emishi village shaman Hii-sama comes to offer a prayer to the dying boar Ashitaka shot, she asks him to bare the villagers no ill will. The dying Nago responds: “You damned
filthy humans. You will know well my suffering and hatred...” (Wilkes, n.d.: 1). By killing the demon boar, Ashitaka initiates a process of becoming-monster that folds back onto itself. At this point, Ashitaka is neither fully human nor monster, instead he is in a state of becoming-**bakemono** that might be likened to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of becoming-animal. “Becoming can and should be qualified as becoming-animal even in the absence of a term that would be the animal become...This is the point to clarify: that a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself...” (1987: 238). Gilles Deleuze, a French philosopher, and Felix Guattari, a French psychoanalyst, developed this notion of becoming-animal most fully in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, where they suggest this process of becoming-animal takes place in the context of multiplicity, or what they often call the "pack," and involves a process of rhizomatic contagion and assemblage, rather than filiation or evolution (1987: 241). Ashitaka's process of becoming-**bakemono** occurs precisely through such a doubling of contagion and assemblage. The moment of contagion occurs when the demon curse is transferred to Ashitaka from the boar's demonic tentacles, while the assemblage process begins with the animal-demon Nago combining with the human Ashitaka, thus initiating a process of becoming.

This boundary crossing encounter also invokes issues of sacrifice and purity, especially as they relate to the defending of identity borders and communal norms, both important concepts in this film. The battle with the boar a council meeting is called in the village shrine where Hii-sama performs a divination for Ashitaka, revealing that the boar became a demon after being shot by the humans and ravaging through the countryside. She also announces that because of his interaction with the demon, Ashitaka is now a danger to the village and must leave. They must cast him out in order to protect the community from the transgression of killing a **kami**, and because of their fear of demonic contagion. As Judith Butler suggests in
her reading of Mary Douglas's *Purity and Danger*, there is a fear of bodily transgression at play in such moments. “Douglas suggests that all social systems are vulnerable at their margins, and that all margins are accordingly considered dangerous. If the body is synecdochal for the social system per se or a site in which open systems converge, then any kind of unregulated permeability constitutes a site of pollution and endangerment” (Butler, 1999: 168). I will return to this point again in a moment.

To explore this relationship of pollution with purity which Butler hints at, I believe René Girard's dual conception of the scapegoat and the surrogate victim is instructive. Ashitaka becomes the scapegoat for the community in order to atone for an imbalance with the spirit world, and by sending him into exile, the community hopes to end the sacrificial crisis created by killing Nago. "When a community succeeds in convincing itself that one alone of its number is responsible for the violent mimesis besetting it; when it is able to view this member as the single “polluted” enemy who is contaminating the rest; and when the citizens are truly unanimous in this conviction—then the belief becomes a reality...they are ridding themselves of some present ill" (1979: 81). Although he risked his own life to protect the village, he must become the sacrificial victim to ensure the balance between humans and spirits, in this case the *kami*, remains intact.

Representations of *kami* and the natural world in Miyazaki’s films express an underlying belief of the early Shinto worldview, that is, continuity between humanity and nature. This concept is also encapsulated by the Japanese word *nagare*, meaning "flow," and leads to the conception of vital connections between the divine nature of the *kami*, and by extension the natural world, and humanity (through respectful rituals); between post-mortem souls and the living...and between the inner and outer worlds (as expressed through ideas about pollution and purity). (Wright, 2005: 9)

The English subtitles in the film expand on this notion through Hii-sama's last words to Ashitaka as he cuts his hair: “Our laws forbid us from watching you go Ashitaka. Whatever comes to pass now, you are dead to us forever” (Wilkes, n.d.: 1). The first step in this
sacrificial process of becoming begins with Ashitaka cutting off his topknot and leaving it as an offering in the village shrine, an important ritual performance acknowledging his death, symbolically and socially, within his human community.

The next important moment I want to examine in the film occurs when Ashitaka arrives on the borders of the ancient forest. It is here that we first meet San, or Princess Mononoke, a character who raises a completely different set of questions about identity construction and boundaries, but who is also a monster of sorts. Anthropomorphically San is depicted as a young human female, yet she was raised from birth by the wolf goddess Moro alongside her wolf pups. Because of this, I see San as a partial werewolf assemblage. Antonia Levi touches on this werewolf aspect of San in her discussion of differing narratives about wolves within anime.

She is not a werewolf in any literal sense, but she is a lycanthrope in the psychological sense. She believes herself to be a wolf in her heart, although in her case, the cause is not mental illness but her own life experience. She does not transform, however, and she is torn between her humanity, represented largely by her growing love for a human man, Ashitaka, and her wolf nature, which loves the forest and will destroy anything that threatens it. (Levi, 2006: 152)

An important aspect of San identity, contrary to Levi’s claim, is precisely that she has been claimed by the spirits of the forest and the Wolf tribe. This is noted by San's moniker of mononoke, the spirit of a thing, and the human belief that San is possessed by the wolves. In her discussion of the female characters in Princess Mononoke, anime scholar Susan Napier similarly describes San as "inscribed with wildness and primordial sexuality, making her Otherness not simply female but bestial as well," and she argues that San "appears as terrifyingly Other, a creature of supernatural forces totally outside the realm of the human" (2000: 183). Looking at her in this way also suggests the possible value of thinking about species performativity similar to how Butler has examined gender, with attention to how
differences in animist beliefs about subjectivity might suggest a different reading of San and her animal performances. Understanding and examining how San performs her identity as a wolf then becomes quite significance for our discussion here, and echoes Wells’ earlier remarks concerning the ability of anime to help rethink how we might imagine animal subjects differently.

Another way to consider this notion of species performativity speaks directly to San's upbringing in the film. Her human parents were defiling the forest when the wolf god Moro found them, and in a panic they abandoned San, leaving Moro to claim the baby. In effect, San is a feral child whose soul was possessed by the animal spirits of the ancient forest where she lives, thus leading her to act and see herself as a wolf among wolves. And while San may not physically transform into a wolf in the sense Antonia Levi discusses werewolves, her performance as a wolf does in fact transform her into something other than human. Napier similarly argues that even though she was born human, San is "clearly a liminal figure, closer to the animal and other kami characters," and she credits this depiction to Miyazaki's use of "the fantastic and the uncanny aligned with nonhuman actants and nature..." (2000: 186).

Like Ashitaka, San can also be seen as a sacrificial offering, in this case to the wolf god Moro in payment for humans disrupting the balance of the forest, with San acting as the substitute for her parents. What is different, however, is that rather than killing San to restore some previously disturbed order, the wolves make her one of their own—a defender of the forest against the humans. San is possessed by the spirit of the wolf clan (hence the name mononoke), and not only imprints herself with an identity as a wolf, but also develops the ability to communicate with the wolves and other animals.
Lady Eboshi, the woman who earlier shot the boar Nago, describes San to Ashitaka as “a pitiful girl whose heart was stolen by the mountain dogs [wolves]” and suggests that if Irontown is successful in clearing the forests and defeating the forest gods then “the Mononoke-hime may return to being human as well” (Wilkes, n.d.: 2). Even San's visual appearance signifies her hybrid status, and points to another place where we can think about the role of performative acts in constituting identity. In this case, San wears clothes and moccasins reminiscent of a human, but she is always shown in wolf skins with ears and a clay mask with a stylized face that Miyazaki said was inspired by Jomon-era dogū clay artwork from Japan (Nausicaä Net, n.d.). Dogū took many forms, ranging from statues to masks and jewelry, and many dogū were described by Japanese prehistorians such as Torii Ryūzō, Yawata Ichirō and Oba Iwao as having strong ritual connections with earth goddess worship and animist spiritual practices during this time. (Kaner and Bailey, 2009: 27; Department of Asian Art, n.d.). The authors note in their discussion of dogū imagery and their link with shamanistic practices that “beliefs in transformation and the ability to cross the boundaries to the spirit world may materialize in the pottery vessels, from which strange human-like and animal-inspired forms seem to emerge” (Kaner and Bailey, 2009: 32). These boundary crossing and ritual performances help link together prehistoric forms of Japanese animism with Miyazaki's contemporary depictions of San's performance of her wolf self and the various Shinto and animist inspired themes embedded in the film.

At this point I want to return to Girard and his discussion on ritual masks, keeping the above discussion in mind. San's donning of the clay mask prior to fighting the humans can now be seen as part of an animist ritual performance which not only re-affirms her identity as a part of the divine wolf tribe but also with the spirits of the forest and the kami who populate it. While San herself may be mortal, by donning the mask she is able to call upon the power of
the forest spirits and initiate her own process of becoming-animal which the humans see as monstrous.

"The mask mixes man and beast, god and inanimate object...Masks juxtapose beings and objects separated by differences. They are beyond differences; they do not merely defy differences or efface them, but they incorporate and rearrange them in original fashion. In short, they are another aspect of the monstrous double" (Girard, 1979: 167).

However, I want to complicate the discussion of San's identity a little further at this point, since both the boars and the apes (shoujou) in the film reject San's animality and see her as purely human. During an encounter shortly after a major battle between San and Lady Eboshi, the apes—who live in the forest and have been trying to replant trees on the clearcut hillsides around Irontown—explicitly critique San for not caring about what happens to the forest, saying “Princess of Mountain Dogs is unconcerned. Because she is human” (Wilkes, n.d.: 3). In another scene slightly later in the film, the tribe of boars that Nago was a part of has come to fight the humans. Upon seeing San and Ashitaka in the forest, they ask the wolf goddess Moro why there are humans inside the sacred forest. This tension between San's performed and biological identity is highlighted further during a scene where Moro and Ashitaka are talking about the boars marching through the forest in preparation for the final battle against the humans.

Ashitaka: What do you intend to do with San? Do you intend to abandon her as well?

Moro: Just like a human. Such an irrational, selfish thought. San is one of us. She lives with the forest, and shall die when it dies.

Ashitaka: Release the girl! She is human!

Moro: Quiet, young one! How can you pretend to understand that girl's misfortune? She was but a child who was thrown to us so that the humans could escape our teeth! Unable to become completely human or Mountain Dog...she is my dear, ugly, furless child! (Wilkes, n.d.: 4)
Here I want to turn back for a moment to an earlier scene in the film where I believe we can situate Moro's comments into a larger context of human-animal-monster entanglements.

While fleeing Irontown after a battle with Lady Eboshi, the wounded Ashitaka tells San that she is beautiful—a comment that elicits momentary shock from the astonished girl who seems unprepared to deal with such a human moment. Equally important because of the context and timing, this brief exchange between San and Ashitaka occurs just before the above scene with the apes criticizing San for being human and not caring about the fate of the forest. The two young wolves that San travels with defend San against the apes, even going so far as to threaten them for disrespecting San, and by extension, the wolf tribe. This leads the apes to respond that the wolves should hand over Ashitaka so they can eat him, and drive away the humans who are destroying the forest.

Shoujou i: We eat human.

Shoujou ii: We eat that human.

The Shoujou: Let us eat that human.

San: Shoujou, why do you, admired as the wise ones of the forest, want to eat the likes of a human?

Shoujou i: We eat human. We receive human's power. We want power to defeat humans. So we eat.

San: You mustn't do it. You won't obtain the power of the human even if you eat the human. Your blood will just become tainted. The Shoujou will be no more!

Shoujou i: We planted trees. Plant trees, planted trees. Humans uproot everything. Forest not return. We want to kill humans! (Wilkes 3)
In this interaction I see traces of a political inversion of Derrida's carno-phallogocentrism, one where the monster wolf girl San rejects the link between the eating of flesh and the phallogocentric power of man. To carry this Derridian allusion a step further, “eating well” for the apes would surely not include eating the flesh of man, even thought their desire to eat human flesh and dominate others is exactly what Derrida points to as constituting the historical figure of the subject. "The viral strength of the adult male...belongs to the schema that dominates the concept of subject. The subject does not want just to master and possess nature actively. In our culture, he accepts sacrifice and eats flesh" (Derrida, 1995: 281). In this case it is unlikely that the apes really desire to possess nature, but the desire for the perceived power of the human most certainly applies. In order to fight the humans, the apes argue, they must consume and become like them. It is this very logic which San rejects outright, instead suggesting such an act will only lead to an abomination where all subjectivity will be destroyed through a corruption and tainting by the consumption of human flesh. This interchange can be productively contrasted with the lyrics from 'I Wanna Be Like You' (The Monkey Song), which is sung by the monkey King Louie in Disney's animated film The Jungle Book (1967). In this parallel encounter of ape and man, Louie sings to the young human Mowgli: "I wanna be like you, I wanna walk like you, talk like you too. You'll see it's true, an ape like me can learn to be human too" (LyricsG, n.d.). But unlike Miyazaki's framing of this species encounter, the Disney film offers us no critical rejection, but only a reaffirmation of humanism.

For San, who speaks as a hybrid assemblage of becoming-animal and bakemono, nothing could be worse than trying to mimic the human in order to gain its power. This refutation seems to pose an interesting paradox, as the notion of hybridity is rejected by the very subject situated at this nexus, but I believe San is not rejecting hybridity but rather the danger of re-
inscribing carno-phallogocentrism in the animal. Seen in this light, we find a refutation of the humanist position by the monster, a response calling into question the notions of purity and corruption leveled at the monster by the human.

We earlier raised this notion of bodily corruption and pollution as discussed by Butler and Douglas, but it seems appropriate to expand on this idea further since it helps connect earlier discussions of the transformation of the body and of identity as seen through the lens of the becoming-monster. While Ashitaka sees himself as human, because of his process of becoming-bakemono he is unable to return to his former human life among the Emishi. Likewise San, who was abandoned by humans in the forest, can never return to the world of humans. Their fates are linked as becoming-monsters in exile, neither fully animal, human nor monster, yet both entangled in a performance of becoming.

I want to suggest that this film's fluid and multiple depictions of becoming-with subjects points to the increasing power of philosophical and political troubling of fixed identities or subjects—in this case via a depiction of the becoming wolf San and the monster-human Ashitaka—and suggest anime can be seen both as a reflection of, and a wrestling with, the instability highlighted by the discourse of posthumanism and the troubling of the privileged human subject. "There have, I think, been signs of a growing awareness that a decisive, differentiating criterion radically dividing the human from the animal or humans from other animals is nonexistent or at best phantasmatic...When that decisive opposition is threatened or weakened, whether because other animals share too much of the presumed distinguishing characteristic or because humans seem to have too little of it, anxiety or even panic set it" (Lacapra, 2009: 155). We certainly see this anxiety in Ashitaka, who hopes to lift his own monster curse.
He is driven by the desire to regain his human form, a desire which drives him to seek out the ultimate *monstrum tremendum*, the *Shishi Kami* or Forest Spirit, who is the keeper of the animated bestiary. "Like a letter on the page, the monster signifies something other than itself: it is always a displacement, always inhabits the gap between the time of upheaval that created it and the moment into which it is received, to be born again. These epistemological spaces between the monster's bones are Derrida's familiar chasm of différance: a genetic uncertainty principle, the essence of the monster's vitality..." (Cohen, 1996: 4). In *Princess Mononoke*, the time of monstrous upheaval that Cohen references, or the sacrificial crisis which Girard speaks of, begins when Lady Eboshi attempts to destroy the forest and ends when she kill the Forest Spirit by severing its head with a bullet from her rifle. This delimits a cycle of violence between the humans and animals which ultimately spin out of control and leads to the near-death of both the humans and animals as the Forest Spirit, now transformed into a lifeless god of death (*shinigami*), seeks out its severed head. This is also the cycle where the performance of human dominion over the animal world is most explicit and, I believe, can be read as a serious critique of human actions coming from Miyazaki.

Miyazaki depicts the humans of Irontown as both creators and destroyers of monsters, as well as the source of the rupture, here signified by their desire to control and separate themselves from their ecological surroundings. Miyazaki's choice of visual contrasts between the ancient forest and the human city makes this separation all the more dramatic. It also provides an important intervention point from a critical ecological perspective, allowing us to ask about the constructed binary of nature versus culture and how this Cartesian framing continues to control our world.

The sanity that binds us one to another in society is not necessarily the sanity that bonds us companionably to the creatures with whom we share the Earth. If we could assume
the viewpoint of nonhuman nature, what passes for sane behavior in our social affairs might seem madness. But as the prevailing reality principle would have it, nothing could be greater madness than to believe that beast and plant, mountain and river have a "point of view." We think that sanity—like honor, decency, compassion—is exclusively a social category. It is an attribute of the mind that can only be judged by other minds. And minds exist, so we believe, nowhere but in human heads. (Roszak, 2001: 13)

Irontown is depicted as a fortified castle on a lake surrounded by clearcut hillsides and with belching smokestacks. For the humans of Irontown, the forest represents a wild, fearful, and dangerous place inhabited by powerful gods and dangerous animals.

This view echoes what Richard Louv has described as a nature-deficit disorder signaled by the growing disconnect between people and their ecological surroundings. "Our society is teaching young people to avoid direct experience in nature. That lesson is delivered in schools, families, even organizations devoted to the outdoors, and codified into the legal and regulatory structures of many of our communities. Our institutions, urban/suburban design, and cultural attitudes unconsciously associate nature with doom..." (Louv, 2008: 2). In contrast to this nature equals danger narrative which Louv describes, Miyazaki depicts the forest as full of majestic trees, vibrantly colored plants, tranquil pools of water and a diversity of animal life living together in a balanced cycle of life and death. However, Miyazaki is not merely re-inscribing a romantic conception of nature and its defenders as good and technology and civilization as bad, as a simplistic reading might suggest.

Susan Napier addresses such a claim in her analysis of this film, and argues that rather than a re-inscription of some romantic notion of nature, the film wrestles with the historical changes caused by modernization and its undeniable impact on human relations with and to the land. "Miyazaki’s “supernaturalization” of the natural is a deliberate defamiliarization strategy
offering an alternative vision to the conventional Japanese view of nature, which, while acknowledging the wildness of nature, prefers to view it as something that can be tamed and cultivated. In the film nature is beautiful, sacred, and awesome, but it is also vengeful and brutally frightening" (Napier, 2000:188). But even more than that, I believe Miyazaki is trying to signal the importance of thinking critically about these changes, about their supposed inevitability, and about the knowledge which informs such assumptions. Miyazaki suggested as much in an interview where he talked about some of these issues in the film.

Then, there is actually a dilemma between the issue of humanism and growing a forest. It is exactly the problem of the environmental destruction we are facing on a global scale. This is the complexity in the relationship between humans and nature...I think that the Japanese did kill Shishi Gami around the time of the Muromachi era. And then, we stopped being in awe of forests...from ancient times up to a certain time in the medieval period, there was a boundary beyond which humans should not enter...As we gradually lost the awareness of such holy things, humans somehow lost their respect for nature. This film [Princess Mononoke] deals with such a process in its entirety. (Toyama, 1997)

Miyazaki's call to rethink ecological relations, and his evocation of the tension between humanism and the forest, lends additional support to the claim I have been advancing, namely that Miyazaki's films can be seen as a rich site for exploring the question of the animal and humanism on multiple levels. It was because of Iron town's insatiable demand for wood and iron to forge weapons that the conflict with the forest and the animals began in the first place. This is not to deny that the animals guarding the forest, in particular the boars and wolves are not dangerous, for they clearly can be, but they did not intentionally seek out conflict with their human neighbors. Ashitaka rebukes Lady Eboshi precisely for her role in this process of ecological destruction and proliferation of armed warfare between the humans which has now drawn the forest into the conflict. “You say that, not satisfied with plundering the forest of the mountain god and turning it into a Tatari-gami, you would bring forth more and more new hatred and curses...” (Wilkes, n.d.: 2). War, suggests Ashitaka, breeds more monsters.
Deleuze and Guattari also speak to this relationship in their discussion of becoming-animal and its relationship to war, invoking the appearance of the werewolf whom we have already discussed in relation to the wolf girl San. “War contained zoological sequences before it became bacteriological. It is in war, famine, and epidemic that werewolves and vampires proliferate” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 243). While San may not be a werewolf in the classic sense, her genesis and motivations in *Princess Mononoke* cannot be separated from the human conflict at the border between worlds. Because of this, the border plays the decisive role in shaping the narrative of the conflict and the point of identity for both San and Ashitaka. It is precisely to this focus on borders that Deleuze and Guattari also point us in their hypothesis on the phenomenon of bordering and its relationship with multiplicity, the pack and the process of becoming-animal: “a multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, not by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and dimensions it encompasses in “intensions”...the borderline is defined or doubled by a being of another nature that no longer belongs to the pack, or never belonged to it...” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 245). This perfectly describes San's character: she belongs to yet is outside of both the wolf pack she identifies with and the human community she was born into, allowing her to play the double role of *mononoke* and *bakemono*. Likewise, Ashitaka is no longer a member of the Emishi community, yet he somehow manages to straddle the human-monster chasm without completely identifying with either.

In the opening of this article I suggested that anime provides a visual medium in which animals and other nonhuman subjects can perform in ways outside of constructed binaries, and have traced this idea through a reading of *Princess Mononoke*. One of the central problems, however, that Derrida's argument about animal response points to, is the tendency to reinforce the function of language and abstraction in claims separating the human from the animal.
The question of the response is thus that of the question, of the response as response to a question that, at one and the same time, would remain unprogrammable and leave to the other alone the freedom to respond, presuming that were possible...The Cartesian animal, like its descendants (once again I'll try to recognize here Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, and Levinas, which also means so many others), would remain incapable of responding to true questioning. (Derrida, 2008: 84)

However, thanks to a growing body of work on animal linguistics and cognition, there is no doubt that animals can respond, and in fairly complex ways (Allen and Bekoff 1997, De Wall 2009, Grandin 2005, Hauser 1999, Hess 2008, Pepperberg 2008). Sometimes the response may be vocal, as with African Grey parrots like Alex or Einstein. Other times communication may be acted out or performed, such as the gorilla Koko's use of sign language or the waggle dance of Karl von Frisch's honey bees. However, these empirical examples don't even begin to considering the growing body of literature on animal whisperers or companion species, nor the much larger world of spirit animals, totems and familiars within animist, shamanic and pagan practices (Abram 1996, Adler 1986, Haraway 2008, Harvey 2006). How can we address this gap in the understanding between various scientific fields (ethology, primatology, zoology), animal studies and animist spirituality on the one hand, and the norms of accepted scientific and social discourses—public and private—concerning species and human-animal relations on the other? I believe we need a new theoretical framework that thinks with animals.

This new framework would need to operate on the theoretical levels of ontology and epistemology. At the level of ontology, it would require expanding the starting assumptions about the nature of being to include nonhumans and animals as "proper" beings, a supposition which underlies the basic belief system in most forms of animism. Such a shift would allow for a direct philosophical challenge to what Matthew Calarco describes in Zoographies as the problem of the "ontotheological philosophical tradition" and its "fundamentally humanist and
anthropocentric" claims about a human-animal divide rooted in organized religion (2008: 104). In regards to epistemology, the insights gained from animism could open up new realms of knowledge and offer new ground to challenge accepted forms of knowledge. But most importantly, it offers a crucial element missing from most work on the question of the animal: Animism provides a philosophical and theoretical alternative to the lingering human-animal matrix derived from this Western ontotheological tradition.

This is especially important in light of Calarco's claim that when Derrida talks about "thinking" in *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, what he is trying to draw our attention to is not only "the limits of philosophy and the metaphysical tradition" to deal with this question, but more importantly, that the "resources to think through this question are not likely to be found wholly within that tradition" (2008: 113). My wrestlings with how to address this lack of attention to the ontotheological has also informed my thinking about why a fusion of anime, animism and performativity may be productive.

Along these same lines, I have tried to show how *Princess Mononoke* can offer a useful case study for imagining how an animist ontology, linked with the idea of performativity, can be productively deployed through the medium of anime. In other words, thinking about and looking at how the animated animal can perform visually may offer an alternative way to begin rethinking the question of the animal. And while Butler claims that "the body becomes its gender through a series of acts which are renewed, revised, and consolidated through time," I think her argument is equally applicable to how the construction of the animal and the human occurs (1988: 522). By considering the categories of animal and human to be constructed concepts akin to gender, we can begin to reconsider how the animal is co-constituted through performative acts. Co-constituted in the sense that we both animate
animals based on how we think they are (ie. our ontology of the animal), but also recognizing that the repetitive depiction of animals plays an equally important role in constructing how we think and produce knowledge about animals (ie. our epistemology of the animal).

I want to suggest that such a move would place visual politics at the center of questions about animal performance and subjectivity. As Wells has argued, animation "ensures that the discourses about the animal remain in a constant circulation, perpetually interrogating the status and identity of the animal. The animated animal is measured thereafter against the changing views and knowledge of animal life as it emerges through both artistic and scientific sources, and those context that share a mode of creative interpretation of creatures” (Wells, 2009:178). Such a theoretical approach also help us better understand how the animated animal intersects with feminist questions of the performative and animism by expanding common conceptions of a person and by pointing towards a politics of seeing sensitive to nonhuman subjectivity.

In other words, an animist viewpoint allows us to shift the ground on which we begin to think about the question of the animal and other nonhuman life as unique and distinct subjects worthy of consideration. Graham Harvey, in his discussion of the links between the developing field of new animism and other academic disciplines, also draws a connection between queer and feminist theories of gender and animist deconstructions of personhood.

Since animisms do not privilege human form or characteristics as definitive of personhood there may be rich resources for the further elaboration of new reflections on embodiment...Animists—like feminist and queer theorists—are generally enthusiastic about diversity. Since in this case the diversity may arise from a shared and more pervasive understanding that persons (including their embodiment, gender and so on) are constructed by and in relationships, which are necessarily contingent, ambiguous and contestable, there is considerable common ground. (Harvey, 2006: 199)
This is certainly the case with San, who not only transgresses the boundaries of the human with her wolf identity, but also transgresses traditional gender norms as a nomadic, feral warrior of the forest rather than a domesticated, delicate and submissive figure linked to the home. But even more than that, San shows through her performance of an animist ontology a world where wolves, boars and apes are as much a part of her community as are the humans.

With this shift we can also mark a transition in which nature and culture necessarily begin to blur, if not dissolve altogether, that is akin to what Donna Haraway has termed the naturalcultural. "From the beginning and to the present, my interest has been in what gets to count as nature and who gets to inhabit natural categories. And furthermore, what’s at stake in the judgment about nature and what’s at stake in maintaining the boundaries between what gets called nature and what gets called culture in our society" (Haraway and Goodeve, 2000: 50). Paul Wells speaks directly to this issue raised by Haraway, and his suggestion productively links not only the work of Haraway, Deleuze and Guattari, and Butler together with the animated animal, but also points back to the earlier question raised by Calarco and Derrida concerning the limits of our knowledge.

In essence, this discussion is concerned with “animals-in-the-making” and how their creation is a consequence of these conditions, and speaks readily to Haraway's conflation of nature and culture in the term “naturalcultural.” The “naturalcultural” is effectively the creative and intellectual environment in which the representations of animated animals exist; consequently, this raises fundamental questions about the relationship between nature and culture. These issues underpin how animals are constructed to perform, their function in these performances, and the meaning that is played out accordingly. (Wells, 2009: 17)

What the various performances in Princess Mononoke ultimately point to is exactly this kind of opening where we might begin to both re-envision the boundaries between human and animal subjects and challenge the nature-culture divide that helps maintain such binaries. San's performance offers a radical becoming-with-animal at the boundary between not only
human-animal relations, but also the visible and the invisible worlds which her animist ontology allows us to grasp a glimmer of.

There is a long road ahead in trying to deconstruct the humanist and anthropocentric hegemony that we find ourselves immersed in, but for those interested in developing a posthuman, relational framework which takes seriously our obligation as one species in a multiplicity of animal life, this is a road that needs more fellow travelers and better maps. As Carrie Rohman suggests at the closing of *Stalking the Subject*, more work is required which can “radically reconsider the terms of ethical inquiry, the contours of the "other," and the assumptions about subjectivity embedded in our vision of what constitutes legitimate theoretical and scholarly work” (2009: 160). I see the figure of the *bakemono* as helping us to trace and explore some of these binary constructions of human-animal, but also calling to us from the borders of representation of the nonhuman subject. I also believe we can productively use anime to not only rethink subjectivity, but also as what Thomas Kasulis calls a "holographic entry point," or an object "through which we become aware that the whole is reflected in every part" (2004: 21). I see anime as one such entry point for cultural discussions on the question of the animal that I have explored here.

A transdisciplinary approach of this sort offers theorists a rich field for analyzing questions of the nonhuman and species politics, but this is just the tip of the iceberg. If we are serious about exploring this question in the context of popular culture, we need to expand the territory where our discussions roam, howl and leave tracks. One important aspect of reorienting our work toward a more holistic and complex biopolitics involves taking serious animal response in new and unconventional ways, as I have attempted here with my reading of the *bakemono* figure in *Princess Mononoke*. For those arguing that anime offers a unique
type of visual politic where the animal subject can be performed in radically different ways, an important part of future work in this direction would involve developing an archive and theory of animatic representation which can incorporate insights from visual politics, animist and Shinto spiritual practices, and feminist theories of performativity into a productive theoretical framework. Such a fusion would be central to developing an expanded theory of personhood, response and becoming that seeks to move beyond the discourse of humanism and helps advance critiques sensitive to and building on Derrida's question of the animal.

References


"The Recipe for Love'? Continuities and Changes in the Sexual Politics of Meat

Erika Cudworth ¹

Introduction

The blade plunged gently into the muscle then ran its length in one supple movement. The action was perfectly controlled. The slice curled over limply onto the chopping block. The black meat glistened, revived by the touch of the knife…I saw the knife enter the firm dead flesh, opening it up like a shinning wound. The steel blade slid down the length of that dark shape…They [slices of meat] fell with a flat slap – like a kiss against the wood.
(Rees, 1992: 3)

Here, the young female narrator in the novel The Butcher describes the cutting of steak. Working in a butchers shop over her student vacation she watches a butcher at work, and finding the dismemberment of corpses and the cutting of ‘meat’ highly arousing, fantasizes about sex with him. There are numerate examples in this novel, described by critics as “an erotic tour de force”, where women physically resemble meat, are referred to as pieces of meat or as animals, or use meat as a metaphor for their own bodies, desires and experiences. Such strong associations, whilst dramatic, are easily made, for writing such as this draws on a range of cultural tropes which associate sexuality and the bodies of certain non-human animals with particular formations of gender relations.

Carol Adams thesis of the sexual politics of meat will be well known to many readers here. She argued that interlinked, co-constituted narratives around gender, species and sexuality are apparent in everyday texts of popular culture around food and eating. Her best known work, The Sexual Politics of Meat (1990), uses literary theory to

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understand the gendering and naturing of food as a set of social practices. Adams contends that meat is the most culturally significant food and is male identified. Women eat greater quantities of “second class” foods such as vegetables, grains and pulses, eggs and dairy products (1990: 26). Eggs and dairy are also “feminized foods”, not only because they are associated with female consumption, but because they are by-products of the reproductive systems of female animals (1990: 27). It is the difference of species that enables the production and consumption of meat, and in enabling us to eat meat; animals must be slaughtered and butchered. Adams argued that the live animal is the ‘absent referent’ in the concept of meat, literally absent by being dead. She also contended that live animals were both materially and discursively invisible in the popular culture of ‘meat’ food.

The theory of the sexual politics of meat has been called into question by some of those engaged with what I would call ‘uncritical posthumanism’. Judith/Jack Halberstam (2008) for example, infers ‘radical’ notions of sexuality and subversions of gender relations in what she calls ‘Pixarvolt’, non-human animation films which themselves exemplify rather odd applications of supposed ‘animal values’. Halberstam (and others, see contributions to Giffney and Hird, 2008) emphasize fluidity and change in relations of gender and sexuality, as exemplified in various forms of popular culture which deploy ‘animal’ tropes. It is from this position that Halberstam has recently accused Adams of oversimplification and overgeneralization in terms of her reading of images and her understanding of contemporary formations of gender relations. Adams’ thesis of the sexual politics of meat has also been seen to apply specifically to certain kinds of U.S. popular culture, and even then, to be reliant on a few selected examples. Whilst I would agree that Adams uses strong examples to illustrate her case (and particularly in her more recent book, The Pornography of Meat (2003)), I will defend her broad thesis here. I will also be extending it in two respects. First, I will be arguing that Adams work has applicability beyond the context of U.S. food culture. In substantiating this, I will be using a range of illustrative cases drawn from the more subtle repertoire provided by the cultural texts of meat which predominate in the British context. The illustrations here come not only from advertising, but also from cookery literature and my second

development of Adams analysis focuses on the cooking of meat itself. The sexual politics of meat is constituted not only by the gendered and sexualized construction of certain foods for certain consumers, but also in the manner in which it is cooked and prepared.

This paper draws on a range of representations of meat and animal foods including recipes and articles in cookery and women’s magazines, advertisements carried by such publications and also found on television and bill boards, sponsored by individual companies, the British meat industry and supermarket chains. I examine the gendering of certain foods, the gendering of ‘foodwork’ and the sexualisation of animal foods. I will argue that the gendered and eroticized presentation of foods derived from the bodies of farmed animals is normalized in texts of cooking and eating in contemporary Britain. In so doing, I adopt a similarly critical structural approach to that of Adams (1990, 2003), employing discursive analytics in considering the ways food and eating may be mediated through social relations. In illustrating my argument, I present a number of different examples from advertising, cookery books and articles in ‘food’ magazines and mainstream ‘women’s magazines’. These illustrate themes which are common, normative as found from a sample of such publications from the early 1990s until 2009. The examples selected are illustrations of key themes and across a range of food derived from the bodies of farmed animals.

Adams (2003, 2009), and other feminist writers and activists, have been critical of the ways in which the gendered and sexualized narratives which frame meat advertising have influenced the vegetarian and vegan promotional campaigns of some US based animal rights organizations such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). For Adams, organizations such as PETA have been incorporated into the discursive regime of the sexual politics of meat in the process of resisting the exploitation of animals through the eating of ‘meat’. In this paper, I consider the disruptive potential of the “narrating [of] subordinated food cultures” (Gvion, 2009: 53), such as vegetarianism, and the discourse of welfarism, for the sexual politics of meat. In popular cultural texts, the use of (hetero)sexuality to promote vegetarianism has been far less explicit, but I will suggest that it still makes its presence felt.

The empirical material for this article is drawn most heavily from the two best selling food magazines in the UK, Good Food, published monthly by the BBC, and Sainsbury’s Magazine, published for the UK based supermarket chain by New Crane Publishing.
The paper proceeds through three areas. First, I consider the ways the sexual politics of meat might be apparent in the manner in which animals bodies are cooked and otherwise prepared, and consumed. Second, I look at the ways animal bodies, fragments of bodies and other foods derived from animal bodies are represented in the contemporary popular culture of food and eating in the UK in ways that articulate relations of gender and sexuality. The final section considers the extent to which the sexual politics of meat is reconfigured and/or reinscribed through contemporary changes in food culture, such as the discourse of welfarism and the expression of minority food cultures which resist some aspects of the consumption of animals as food.

**Gender, species, cooking and eating**

The connections already made between meat eating and the social constructions of masculinities are fairly well known. In his analysis of cultural taste, Bourdieu argued that in French popular culture, there is the belief that fish, fruit and vegetables will not prove sufficiently ‘filling’ for men who require the energy-giving properties of red meat (Bourdieu, 1984: 190). Bourdieu contends that in meat-eating cultures men believe that eating red meat is inherently more masculine than eating white meats or fish. Like fruit, fish is “fiddly” food which “male hands” find “difficult”, and fits ill with masculine practices of gulping food whilst women pick and nibble. Bourdieu does not engage with the broader social, political and economic context in which food is produced, prepared and consumed, but the important point he makes is that such cultural differences are means of registering distinction, and through such distinctions, formations of power relations such as those of gender, constitute themselves. Feminists have drawn such insights into a more critically structural approach to food and eating. In British history, there is a similarly gendered food hierarchy in which red meats have been associated with masculinity and white meats, fish and dairy products associated with femininity (Murcott, 1983: 111; Twigg, 1983: 21-2). Charles and Kerr’s (1988: 140) study of food in working class British families in the 1980s revealed a strong belief, amongst both men and women, that men should consume the most meat, and evidence that men were consistently favoured with superior quantities and kinds of meat food. Alternatively, poststructuralists have emphasized the fluidity of food discourses and the variety of responses to an increased range of foodstuffs (Lupton, 1996: 13); yet the diversity of diet is overdrawn in
such accounts and power relations of species embodied in the foods we eat, is not acknowledged. Whilst commodity culture appears to diversify and change rapidly, where food is concerned the “discourses of judgment have an enduring structure” and there is a “profound continuity” in food behaviour (Warde, 1997: 42, 165).

It is not only what is eaten and by whom that is of interest in considering the gendering of meat food; the mode of cooking may also be significant. Structural functionalist anthropologists considered that meat orientated cultures prefer roasting as it provides bloody food closer to the rawness of slaughter. Societies with a meat and vegetable diet both roast and boil meat, whereas plant based cultures rarely prepare meat and boil most plant food (Levi-Strauss, 1970: 478-9). Certainly in European history, roasting has been associated with power and privilege and boiling associated with frugality, and in contemporary Western cultures, roasting is celebratory and requires more expensive cuts of meat, whilst stewing is more mundane. For Levi-Strauss, this division between boiling and roasting meat is gendered, with bloodier roasted meat associated with masculinity. Feminist scholarship has to date, however, paid little attention to the mode of cooking in the gendered analysis of meat food.

In contrast, the gendering of ‘foodwork’ has been a focus of attention. Charles and Kerr (1988) found that most men were not keen to cook or shop, and that their interventions in the kitchen were seen as generally unhelpful by their female partners. The provision of a meal involving meat was also seen by most women and men as being a key part of a woman’s role within the household. Murcott found that women rarely bother to cook for themselves but see cooking for their families as important “service work” (1983: 84-5). More recently, Bore and Sobal (2006) have referred to this labour in producing family meals as “foodwork”. In their sample of “newly married couples”, they found that one partner bore sole responsibility for all foodwork tasks in over half the couples, yet women were no more likely than men to undertake this role. Similarly, a study of childless couples found that female partners decreasingly defer to male choices in food, and see foodwork as a “trade off” against other domestic tasks (Kremmer, 1999). Such findings may reflect changes in the distribution of domestic labour amongst younger cohorts of heterosexual co-habitees, but this does not seem to be borne out by larger scale qualitative studies where data is obtained across social class and age cohorts and suggests that certain forms of domestic labour, such as cooking, remain heavily feminized (Doucet, 2006). Cross-national studies using macro data sets have found that women still perform the bulk of all domestic work, and that cooking, cleaning and childcare are routinely
defined as female (Cooke, 2006; Fuwa, 2004; Sullivan, 2000). Kerr, Charles and Murcott’s earlier studies pertinently consider the preparation and consumption of food in the context of women’s domestic labour and acknowledge that the eating of certain animals by certain groups of people can be seen as an expression of social hierarchy and of social difference. However, these practices are also an expression of the social relations of species. What is not commonly discussed in the literature on food and eating, even in some of these more critical examples cited above, is the way the politics of meat is co-constitutive of gender relations in food preparation and consumption. As we will see below, and in the section which follows, the gendering and sexualization of certain foods, prepared in certain ways, for certain kinds of consumer, is a persistent structure of British food culture.

Gendered notions of food provision and the division of labour in the domestic kitchen have certainly shifted in Britain over the last twenty years. Whilst British television chefs and cooks continue overwhelmingly, to be male, their unseen interlocutors are likely to be female. We have seen a move away from explicit gendering of foodworkers in popular food culture however. A discourse of female competence, contrasted with male awkwardness, was apparent in cookery texts from the early to mid 1990s, whereas in the mid 2000s, such obvious associations between gendered care and cookery are rarely found. Cookery sections in weekend newspaper supplements, television programmes and food magazines currently extol home cooking, regional cooking and healthy eating. Yet cookery magazines carry the gender of their consumers in their advertising as ever they did with a staple fare of sanitary protection, make up, and perfume in addition to the many advertisements for food and food products.

In the early 1990s, Britain’s popular food magazine BBC Good Food, ran a weekly feature attempting to educate ignorant men in culinary knowledge, “Male Orders” - for the “wannabe male cook” (March, 1994: 40). None of the men featured were vegetarian, and most chose to cook meat. Occasionally the feature focused on groups of culinary incompetents with titles such as “Men in the Kitchen” (November, 1990: 37). Whilst the purpose of such articles is apparently to encourage men to gain culinary confidence, they tend to reinforce the status quo by emphasizing the difficulties men of all ages have, when it comes to food preparation. This lack of male skill indicates by default, an assumption of female competence, and insinuates that men require an individual woman provider. In addition, the men ‘attempting’ to cook are patronized by the female ‘experts’ writing the articles:
Marcus...was wary of trying something tricky without guidance. We suggested salmon in puff pastry as it looks stunning but is easy to make, and is sure to impress his girlfriend.
(May, 1993: 88)

It is also assumed that when men do cook, they bring a specific set of gendered aptitudes and ideas to the task:

‘Cooking is just like engineering’, claimed retired engineer Doug Cammack, as he beat the choux pastry for his profiteroles from a lumpy nightmare into a smooth paste…security consultant Bob Penrice gripped his swivel vegetable peeler, applying both logic and science to the art of peeling a carrot.
(November, 1990: 37)

Lack of male culinary experience is described as a product of lack of opportunity, absolving men who do not cook from responsibility for their lack of competence, and implying that responsibility lies at the feet of women as mothers and partners. In the final analysis, female kitchen competence is not surrendered easily, and traditional gender roles are articulated: “they [men] actually looked at ease in the kitchen - it was almost as if they belonged!” (November, 1990: 38). Whilst men apply ‘masculine skills’ in the kitchen however, it is implied that women cook by intuition:

His engineering skills had taught him that flow charts were necessary if he was to get a three-course dinner on the table by a certain time. To us, his charts looked like culinary common-sense - and probably something his wife and countless other women do automatically.

There are instances in which, however, men have long been considered competent: butchering, carving and barbecuing. In The Sexual Politics of Meat, Adams (1990) made the argument that animal slaughter and butchery was linked to the social construction of masculinities with evidence from literary and popular cultural texts. I have also considered the machismo of slaughterhouse culture and material practices (Cudworth, 2008). The gendering of the killing and dismemberment of farmed animals is also reflected in meat advertising through a discourse of male competence in the more aggressive aspects of food preparation. For example, an advert for Tesco beef has the caption: “The art of tenderness. An expert speaks”, and depicts a burly man holding a scabbard across his chest, framed by weighing scales, meat hooks, a saw and a cleaver.
(Family Circle, October, 1994). The violence of the act of butchering is displaced by the contradictory associations of image and text. Whilst the caption suggests that the butcher is expert in ‘tenderness’, the image indicates that butchering is a bloody affair. The butcher creates tenderness in that which he produces. In the accompanying text, the animal is the absent referent: “We’re tough on what we choose. It has to be the right age, weight and shape”. However, whilst the animal is absent, its dead flesh takes on qualities of a living thing: “we chill it down gently, so it’s more relaxed”. Meat is created by male skill and cooking facilitated and even de-skilled by butchering: “There may be nothing faster or easier to cook than a steak but a really succulent one takes old fashioned time and effort to prepare...We need sharp knives. You won’t”.

An exception to this gendered discourse of male skill in butchery and female service in cooking, involves the preparation of ‘seafood’. Here, we find women in a relatively rare position - that of slaughterer and butcher. The Good Food magazine periodically pictures (female) hands pulling apart crabs and lobsters (for example, October, 1990: 1-4), and provides dismemberment instructions (August 1994:80). The recipes requiring the killing of crustacea have a marked tendency to form part of menus regarded as somehow special due to the imputation of aphrodisiac properties to the flesh of such animals (for example, ‘Hot buttered lobster with garlic, basil and ginger’. Sainsbury’s Magazine, December, 2002, no.116: 88). Whilst the killing of most animals is associated with men and machismo, hidden from public view in abattoirs, the killing of molluscs and crustaceans may be undertaken by women in domestic spaces.

There is a tendency for recipes involving boiling meat to be infused with narratives around familial care and nourishment, whereas those with roast or grilled meat are more closely associated with masculinity and are more likely to be sexualized. Many ‘traditional’ British recipes reflect their origins as peasant cookery designed to tenderize poor meat and are often described as ‘comfort food’ presumed to be cooked by a woman catering for the needs of a family:

Braises and stews are the quintessence of good home cooking. They are the hot pots...casseroles, pot roasts, ragouts and juggled game of our grandmother’s kitchens.
(Sunday Times..., 1993: 67)

This “feel-good food” (Smith 1994: 14) is made from hard working parts of animals: the forequarters of pigs, sheep and cattle and the muscles from the neck, shoulder and front
legs. Slow cooking, or mincing breaks down connective tissue that builds up in a mature animal (Sunday Times..., 1993: 67). The source of those cuts, animals’ bodies, is omitted from such narrative. Animals are potential meat; their bodies fragmented into recipe ingredients, for example “a marbling of fat between the meat fibres seems happily to be tailor made for slow cooking” (Smith, 1994: 14).

Such food is supposed to provide compensation for the harshness of daily life, often defined in terms of the climate, when: “the best escape from a cold grey day is to produce wonderful aromas and flavours in the soothing warmth of your kitchen” (Sainsbury’s..., November 1993: 150). Problematically, kitchens are often far from warm and soothing, and cooking may be perceived as undesirable work. Narratives in these texts form part of a gendered discourse of foodwork, often forming part of elaborate dinner menus. For example, “straightforward” coq au vin (Good Food, April, 1994: 110), involves dismemberment of a chicken, followed by an hour at a stove, and takes an hour and a half to cook, wherein it must be attended. Smith’s “effortless” braised lamb strains credulity even further (Sainsbury’s..., October 1994: 80). This dish forms part of a menu involving preparation forty eight hours in advance, two and a half hours work the day before, and five hours on the day of the dinner. Articles such as these provide ‘timed and tested’ menus so the final result appears effortless. This certainly confirms cooking as a form of foodwork, but that work remains gendered. Delia Smith’s menus for example, include timeslots for bathing (in bubbles) and putting on makeup, in addition to clearing the evidence of ones labour from the kitchen.

Feminist analysis of food preparation can be found in analyses of the ways in which forms of domestic labour, such as cooking, remain feminized despite changes in other aspects of the gendered division of household work in the last twenty years (Doucet, 2006; Cooke, 2006; Sullivan, 2000). Whilst the gendering of the foodworker was very apparent in the cultural texts of meat from almost two decades ago, it has become more subtle. Cookery magazines are not gender specific in terms of explicit gender referents in their specific articles and recipes. However, such magazines retain a more subtle form of gendering in the adverts they carry for non-food products. Demonstrating less change has been the gendering and sexualization of the (animal) foods we eat, to which we will now turn.
The gendering of animals-as-food and the pornography of meat

This section deploys Adams' approach to the gendering and sexualization of animal bodies as food, with references to some of the cultural texts of British food. Adams (1990) argued that the power relations of species structure the food we eat. It is the difference of species that enables the production and consumption of meat, and in enabling us to eat meat; animals must be slaughtered and butchered. The live animal is the ‘absent referent’ in the concept of meat. Farmed animals are both literally absent – because they are dead, and representationally absent - live animals are invisible in the popular culture of ‘meat’ food. Further, Adams suggested that the representation of animals as ‘meat’ is gendered and sexualized. As a cultural object, ‘meat’ is male identified, whilst lower status foods such as vegetables, grains and pulses, eggs and dairy products are associated with female consumers. Eggs and dairy are also “feminized foods” because they are by-products of the reproductive systems of female animals (1990: 27). This section of the paper considers how well these arguments translate in the contemporary UK context.

First, it could be argued that Adams notion of the absent referent might be compromised by the increased visibility of farmed animals on British television in particular, and the links made between animals and food – best exemplified on television programmes with such unambiguous titles as ‘Kill it, cook it, eat it’. Current developments in popular gastronomy suggest that whether or not actual animals are linked to the cooking and eating of their flesh, this is little disruptive of the politics of meat:

…the animal “absent referent” has recently been integrated into the act of meat-eating in mainstream gastronomic discourses, resulting not in vegetarianism but in a certain kind of pious carnivorosity. Celebrity chefs slaughter animals in front of live studio audiences and proceed to prepare meals with the bodies. (Parry, 2009: 2)

In these new elements of celebrated carnivorism, killing ‘food’ is naturalized. This regime of representation is also strongly gendered as slaughter is framed by a rite-of-passage discourse in which emotional responses to and concerns for animals are derided as ‘sentimentality’ and chefs maintain their masculinity by overcoming this in
slaughter. It may be then, that the gendered constitution of meat culture is actually more significant than Adams thought. In this new development in the popular culture of food the witnessing of animal killing is framed in gendered ways which resist (and effectively so it would seem) compassion for animals. It may be that despite the actual presence of a living animal, the animal remains essentially invisible. Farmed animals are not ‘seen’ because they are discursively constituted as always already meat, as ‘becoming-meat’ (Cudworth, 2008).

Another contemporary development also brings the absent referent back in to the representation of meat. From the early 1990s, we have seen the increasingly common promotion of meat food through the deployment of welfarist discourses that appear to be ‘animal-centred’. As Matthew Cole points out however, popular discourses around ‘happy meat’ operate within a speciesist frame and prioritize human gustatory pleasure over animal welfare considerations, ultimately “attempting to remoralise the exploitation of farmed animals” and on occasion, using gendered notions of virility in promoting a more ‘natural’ product (Cole, 2009: 2-3, 17).

The term “food pornography” was used by Rosalind Coward to describe a “regime of pleasurable images” which placed food as a contradictory sensual pleasure for women - simultaneously indulged and forbidden (1984: 102-103). Food media has become ever more shaped by pornographic conventions over the last thirty years, and constitutes a spectacle to secure a base of consumers “whose appetites are literally and figuratively kept wanting” (Hansen, 2008: 49). Others consider that there are politically significant challenges to this regime of pleasure around food. For example, British television cook and writer Nigella Lawson can be seen to negotiate an identity for a woman that questions the traditional understanding of the housewife and is based on the pleasures of cooking and eating for the cook (Hollows, 2003). Perhaps more significant however, in examining food as pornography, is the way in which non-human animal bodies continue to be presented in a manner which recalls the mainstream pornographic presentation of female bodies. The Pornography of Meat, focuses on the extent to which animal flesh is represented in pornographically themed advertising and contends that “[the] Pleasurable consumption of consumable beings is the dominant perspective of our culture” (Adams, 2003: 13). She selects some strong examples from U.S. food culture in making her case that the fragmented bodies and body parts of non-human animals consumed as meat are gendered and sexualized, and looks in detail at the fetishisation of feet, buttocks and genitalia. She argues that this is ‘anthropornography’, “the depiction of non-human
animals as whores” (2003: 109), suggesting that the positioning of non-humans as sexual/sexualized objects legitimates domination and exploitation of women and animals.

Over the last twenty years, British meat advertising has displayed a tendency to target male consumers through two forms of gendered discourse. First, there is a traditional discourse of heterosexual masculinity that associates the former with the receipt of female domestic service within the home. Meat is symbolized as something a woman buys and cooks for her family, primarily her male partner. A second discourse is machismo, in which masculinity is associated with virility, physical strength and potency, and advertisements deploying such narratives tend to target young single men as meat consumers.

An illustrative example is the advertising campaign of the British Meat and Livestock Commission in the early 1990’s, the slogan of which was “Meat to Live”. In each advert of the campaign, a “Meat to Live” caption is superimposed on photographs of young white men engaged in physical activity: pushing each other into swimming pools, playing football or volleyball on the beach, performing cartwheels and jogging. The ‘M’ of ‘meat’ is separated out, encouraging a double take. First we might see “eat to live”, then “M eat to live” with the accompanying text contending that meat constitutes one of the “right foods” in a healthy diet. The image of an active young man epitomizing healthfulness confirms the message of the text - if men eat meat, they will have “vitality for life”, for example:

…you don’t have to go to any great lengths to rediscover your youthful energy. You just need to drop into your local butchers or supermarket meat department. (Good Food, December, 1990: 65).

This is a story linked to some very old tales indeed - mythologies of masculine strength and virility deriving from animal blood. Men are seen to possess specific and valued qualities from which women, by their absence from such images, are excluded.

Gendered discourses of food and eating also involve the feminization of certain animal food. Milk, cheese and eggs, produced by reproductive manipulation of female animals, tend to be constituted as appropriate for consumption by women, as Adams (1990) suggests. Cream and cream cheeses are sometimes also food pornography for women. In the early 1980s British women were encouraged to consume cream in cakes that were, according to the advertising campaign, “Naughty but Nice”. There are similar adverts at the time of writing, linking female consumption with dairy products such as
‘Philadelphia’ cream cheese and ‘Galaxy’ milk chocolate. Chicken’s meat is often presented as suited to female consumption, certainly when in boiled, bloodless form. Recipes for roasting the bodies of whole birds tend to focus on the family or entertaining whilst those targeted at specifically female consumption usually involve boiled parts of birds in casseroles, stews and particularly soups (Good Housekeeping, March, 1994: 171).

The sexualization of products in British food culture is a distinctly gendered affair. Food for both female and male consumption may be sexualized, and certain foods are constructed as sexually appealing to look at, or are presented in a sexualized context. Whilst more subtly framed than the U.S. examples cited in Adams work, animal flesh is sometimes depicted in a sense that can be read as pornographic - certain images may recall (hetero)sexual pornography in which women’s bodies are displayed for male viewers. For example, celebrity cook Delia Smiths’ Guide to Meat Cookery contains close up shots of various cuts of raw meat from the bodies of different animals, accompanied by a descriptive comment (“carves like a dream”, “now has all the awkward bones taken out”). The meat is photographed to look moist, and is arranged ‘decoratively’ (1994: 20-9). Such images are of attractive ‘pieces’, objectified fragments of an animal whose experiences in the processes of meat production are thereby erased. In an advertisement for supermarket brand beef, the meat itself can be read as a feminized object. In British slang, vaginal lips may be described as ‘beef curtains’ - slices of meat. This animal flesh recalls such narratives, and is sexualized by the accompanying text:

…the juiciest bits are in the Sunday roast, not the Sunday papers. If you want something really juicy this Sunday...You’ll find that our Traditional Beef is deliciously succulent and tender.... But then, Sunday has always been a day for getting the knives out.
(Good Housekeeping March, 1994: 41-2)

The gender of the consumer is established by references to certain tabloid newspapers which target heterosexual men with sexual stimulation via soft-core pornographic photographs, and ‘titillating’ stories. It is insinuated that men may also gain sexual stimulation from eating roasted flesh as a more satisfying alternative. The image draws on a mythology of masculine virility in which male potency and the eating of red meat is linked, and domestic violence is implied by the comment about the knives.

Recipe books assert that meat for roasting and grilling should be from young animals or from muscles that do little work. The rules of grilling and roasting are to
ensure ‘juices’ are preserved in order to capture the “real taste” of the flesh (Sainsbury's Magazine..., June, 1993: 86). There are gendered, natured and sexualized discourses which may be read in the representation of such meat. For example, a recipe for grilled lamb cutlets, captioned “Sweet Young Things”, describes the meat as “sweetly pink within, and trimmed with a thin, crisp frill of burstingly juicy fat” (Sainsbury's...August, 1994: 96-7). The presentation carries a pornographic story in which the flesh of young animals actively presents itself for the sensual pleasure of the consumer, this is a relatively subliminal form of what Adams calls “anthropornography” (2003: 109).

It is popular to eat birds who have been roasted whole, and images are abundant in the British food literature. Numerous photographs feature decoratively arranged carcasses or collections of legs. Indeed, chickens intended to be sold as whole carcasses are bred to “keep their shape” (Good Food, September, 1999: 22), and to have overdeveloped breasts. The bodies of larger animals are rarely roasted whole, but butchered into ‘cuts’ or ‘joints’. The most expensive is the fillet, part of the pelvic region, followed by the thigh and rump. On birds the most expensive cut is the breast. This fragmentation of animals and the valuation of their body parts can be read as a sexualized and gendered process. The narratives of human flesh in heterosexual ‘soft’ core pornographic stills photography involve fetishism of legs, bottom and breasts and women are sometimes referred to in such narratives as ‘pieces’ of flesh or meat. Animals’ bodies are divided and ranked in ways that arguably reflect the symbolic fragmentation of the pornographic body, and the fetishization of certain elements of it. There are various ways in which the carcasses of whole bodies or body parts of animals are photographed to look appealing and may be feminized either by the photography, the caption, or a combination of both. In an advertisement for ‘Bisto’ gravy products, a recipe for roasted chickens legs is accompanied by a picture of an arrangement of ‘drum sticks’ and the caption: “It wasn’t the first time Mrs. Davies had been complimented on her legs”. Chef Marco Pierre White appeals to female foodworkers with one of the “ways I spice up my cooking”. Using ‘Knorr’ stock cubes as a seasoning for chicken skin before roasting can, according to this advert, “Enhance your breasts, your chops, your cutlets and your ribs” (The Independent Magazine, 28.3.09). In these examples, we see a range of interlinked processes - the gendering and sexualization of both foodwork and of the body parts of animals. Such presentation has been a continuous element of the representational regimes of popular British gastronomy throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
Men can also be presented as meat, but here, and as Adams has suggested, the regime of representation differs. First, men epitomize health, vitality and power (albeit of the body and not of the mind!), as in the representation of highly muscled men as ‘beefcake’, confirming their status and their masculinity. Second, when men are reduced to a ‘piece’ of meat, it is one piece only, the penis (Adams, 2003: 131). A series of British advertisements for ‘Quality Standard’ English meat ran from 2004-9, funded by the English Beef and Lamb Executive. The series centered on the character ‘Beefy’ - a cartoon depiction of Ian Botham, a well-known and successful, retired English cricketer and his housemate ‘Lamby’ (Allan Lamb, who also played for the England cricket team in the 1980s). Rather bizarrely (given the ‘macho’ style of their former cricketing play) Beefy and Lamby cook meals of roast beef and roast lamb in ‘their’ convivial kitchen where homoerotic asides abound. At the close of the series however, Beefy is alone in magazine advertisements, seen, for example, lying on a ‘zebra skin’ rug by an open fire, holding over his crotch, a platter with a rolled joint of roast beef, which, we are told “is impossible to resist”.

Whilst the British Meat and Livestock Commission (MLC) campaign in the early 1990s, based on the “Meat to Live” theme, targeted young men and deployed discourses of masculine virility, the “Recipe for Love” campaign of the mid to late 1990s, focused directly on the sexualized context of meat consumption, and targeted both sexes as potential consumers. A series of television adverts promoted meat by deploying gendered discourses that implied that heterosexual relationships might be enhanced by meat consumption. These advertisements portray couples whose relationships are cemented by eating meat. The first in the series depicted an elder woman cooking steak for her husband, on their anniversary. Gratified, the husband puts a slow record on the record player, to which the couple dances, cue the caption: “Meat: the recipe for love”. A second advert involved a sketch with three young (twenty-something) women working out in the gym, then eating pork chops, whilst discussing that consuming this low fat food means they will have no trouble ‘finding a man’. The final few adverts depicted a series of dinner parties designed to partner inconveniently single friends. In each case, a joint is brought to the table and carved - the singles bite the meat as they look into each other’s eyes. The context for such narratives lies in the research conducted by the MLC in mid 1990s Britain, which found young single women are most likely to be vegetarian. The MLC considered this abstinence from meat eating to be temporary and re-established when women ‘settle down’ with a male partner. These MLC adverts deploy sexualized
narratives of femininity in which women are expected to desire and seek a male partner, and feeding men meat, or eating it with them may enhance a man’s desire and perhaps cement a relationship.

There are associations in British food culture between women’s sexuality, fishes and ‘sea-food’ which is presented in recipes and on menus, as food with the greatest aphrodisiac properties. Whilst British food culture does not abound with the seductive cartoon lobsters and prawns that Adams finds in the US, many recipes, accompanied by straightforward photographs of plates of food from animals, may still sexualize the bodies of such animals and the contexts of their consumption. For example, a prawn and coconut ‘curry’ is captioned “Prawn Star”. Any other ‘star’ would render this caption nonsensical, because the absent referent here is the ‘porn star’. In addition, the prawn and coconut curry is “something spicy for two” – with the sexualization of the prawns presented as a means to enhance heterosex.

I have suggested here that food advertisements and recipes are targeted to particular kinds of consumer, and a key aspect of food gendering is the (hetero)sexualization of food items, in terms of their inherent qualities and affect. Food from non-human animals is presented to us as an object of desire, and the exploitative treatment of ‘food animals’ is absent from its public presentation. The examples drawn upon here offer more subtle constructions of the kinds of processes of the gendering and sexualizing of food of which Adams speaks. They also suggest that methods of cooking themselves are an important element in the constitution of the discursive regimes of meat food because the narration of gender and (hetero)sexualization differs with respect to whether the flesh to be eaten is fried or roasted, boiled or spiced.

**Sexy figs and happy pigs - changing texts?**

This final section explores the possibility of change in dominant food mores. In an examination of vegetarian cookbooks, Smith (2008) has suggested that the discourses of vegetable food also have become increasingly concerned with enabling sensual experience. This, I will suggest is a normalizing aesthetic in which vegetarian food
becomes articulated into the dominant culture of food pornography.\textsuperscript{4} For Adams however, the sexualization of vegetable foods is heavily masculinised and male identified and as such, cannot contest the dominant food culture in which the “category of species is gendered” and women are represented as meat (2003: 38, 168). Here, we consider the extent to which the interpolated narratives of gender, nature and sexuality that are evidenced in the cultural texts of food and eating in Britain, are reconfigured by some contemporary developments such as vegetarian food sub-culture, and the attempts to promote meat produced according to certain standards of animal welfare.

In early 1994, the publishers of \textit{BBC Good Food} magazine launched a sister publication, \textit{Vegetarian Good Food}. The publication ran for eight years, at which point its abandonment was explained by the publishers as a mainstreaming process, with vegetarian cookery included in \textit{Good Food}. The majority of recipes used animal products such as free-range eggs, vegetarian cheeses, milk, cream, and butter, and as such, the presence of the politics of species dominion still made its presence felt. In \textit{Vegetarian Good Food} however vegetables were not regarded as an accompaniment to a meal, but as its substance. By contrast, the mainstream food literature presents an all-vegetable menu as exceptional. For example, “unrepentant carnivore” Smith, acknowledges that the preparation of a vegetarian meal is “difficult” (\textit{Sainsbury’s}…, September 1993: 69-73), and according to Dimbleby, “vegetarian friends can pose a problem” (\textit{Sainsbury’s}…, September, 1994: 76).

In contrast to the use of pornographic tropes in the PETA ‘Veggie Love’ campaign, the sexualization of vegetable food in these cookery texts was subtle in terms of their supposed effect on the consumer. Thus \textit{Vegetarian Good Food} produces recipes for meat free ‘Valentines Day’ meals, claiming: “Onions...are an aphrodisiac vegetable and so make an ideal romantic starter” (February, 1995: 44). Many non-animal foods are sexualized in this way: “From asparagus to avocados, and apples to figs” (February, 1996: 69). There is a difference however between mainstream and vegetarian forms of sexualization. Vegetable foods are aphrodisiac no matter who consumes them, whereas meat food is likely to be associated with male sexual potency.

\textsuperscript{4} The sources drawn upon in this section are overwhelmingly vegetarian and not vegan. I did not find vegan food, recipes and cookery very much at all in the mainstream popular cultural sources and where I did, vegan food was generally presented as a ‘specialist’ diet within vegetarian publications. The framing discourses around the presentation of veganism (health, ethics) were generally positive. Whilst I did not find them sexualized, my examples were too limited to extrapolate from.
This publication was more reflective of diverse household arrangements than the mainstream literature. There were, for example, supplements on “Cooking for One”, encouraging the reader to “Enjoy the single life with great recipes” whether they “live alone, are making the most of a night in alone, or are the lone veggie in a household of meat eaters” (March, 1995: 3). Such recipes emphasize speed and convenience of preparation whilst also encouraging the reader to consume “healthy and delicious” food to “pamper” themselves (May, 1995: 16). The target market can be seen from advertisements the publication carried (which were overwhelmingly for female ‘beauty’ products in addition to food), and the subject matter of some articles. Features on women’s health were common, and in articles on ‘treating yourself’, the focus is female, with facials, manicures, and hair care (for example, December, 1994; February, 1995; May, 1995). The targeting of the publication towards women may simply be that women are still presumed to undertake most cooking, or reflect the greater numbers of female vegetarians, but an important difference between this and mainstream British food publications was that women were encouraged to cook interesting vegetable food for their own gratification.

Public concern about food produced by modern intensive methods has increased markedly, and one response by food companies and supermarkets has been to deploy animal welfarist narratives in the presentation of meat. Such concern is one of the motivations behind the current “emotional turn” (Cole 2009: 10) in public animal welfare discourse. This was the basis of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) ‘Freedom Food’ campaign (launched in April 1993) which approves meat from producers who guarantee provision of ‘basic freedoms’ for farmed animals. The campaign involved major supermarkets who consequently advertised their approved meat in terms of both taste and animal welfare: “farming was so intensive that pigs were leading an utterly miserable life, the meat had no flavour” (Good Food, March, 1993), “You can pig out with a clear conscience on the free-range, oak-smoked sweetcure bacon” (Good Food, April, 1994). Tesco’s ‘Nature’s Choice’ brand pork based its initial advertising largely on the lifestyle of the pigs: “we insist that pigs live like pigs” (Good Food, January, 1993). All these adverts featured photographs of pigs living outdoors. The current advertising used by a small British company, Easterbrook Farms to promote their quickly cooking ‘Speedy Sausages’ presents free range, GM free meat as “from British happy pigs”. The adverts feature cartoon pigs on motorbikes “who live life on the wild side”, with the label “Suitable for Carnivores”. Welfarism brings animals back into the
presentation of meat, but does not rid us of the power relations of species, albeit that the pigs reconstructed into these sausages probably live better short lives than do the vast majority of pigs in intensive farming systems.

Welfare and sex can occasionally be seen together in meat promotion and a campaign by the British-based chain store Marks and Spencer in 2008 used very direct meat pornography to raise sales of the most lucrative part of its business - food. The first highly successful television advert in a series features an ‘appetizing’ roasted hen. The smooth voice over, by the actress Dervla Kirwan is both sultry and assuring: “This is not just a chicken. This is a naturally reared, farm assured, extra succulent Oakham White chicken”. The ‘Oakham’ is not a breed of chicken as one might expect, but a brand. RSPCA approval or claims for ‘natural’ rearing mean very little however, even in terms of a fairly limited conception of farmed animal welfare. These ‘broiler’ chickens live for thirty eight days, rather than the standard thirty five in the UK, have only slightly lower stocking densities in the sheds, and the presence of a few straw bales constitutes “natural behaviour enhancers” (Russell, 2007).

Welfarist narratives are problematic in that they may raise questions about apparently ‘excessive’ cruelties in animal farming and animal food production, whilst suggesting amelioration by welfare reform. However, ‘welfare’ standards often imply little change in the conditions of life of these birds farmed for meat. Welfarism is located within a wider discourse that presents meat eating as benign. Animal farming involves manipulation of animals’ fertility, artificial shortening of their lives, and, for the overwhelming majority, the experience of the slaughterhouse. The assumption that the key ‘function’ certain species of animal fulfill is to become human food is inevitably a reflection of human-centrism and human domination. The increased consumption of ‘organic’ and ‘free-range’ meat, and the presence of welfarism in some narratives of meat is but marginally disruptive to the cultural and economic formations of human-animal relations, or the gendering of meat food. The vegetarian cultural texts examined here suggest elements of contestation in terms of a more pluralist understanding of household composition. However, the gendering of advertising for non-food products is consistent with the mainstream food literature, albeit that the sexualization of non-meat foods was relatively rare. This indicates that the pornography of food is largely dependent on what Adams (2003) calls ‘anthropornography’, and the ways in which the sexualisation of species and the sexualisation of gender are intersected discourses, reflecting co-constituted relations of species and gender.
Conclusion

I have suggested that the model developed by Adams (1990) continues to be applicable, and is so beyond the specificities of US culture. Animals are Others in the cultural texts of meat, being killed and reduced to the status of food, and/or being reproductively exploited in producing eggs and ‘dairy’. These natured goods are presented through gendered narratives that constitute different food products as appropriate for different types of consumer. Within contemporary narratives of food and eating, there remains a marked tendency to assume meat will be consumed by men and prepared by women; it is a cultural good that reflects and constructs the intersected social relations of both species and gender. The relationship between meat, gender and sexuality also makes its presence felt across a range of food texts such as recipes and menus in food magazines, which provide convincing, albeit far more subtle examples, than the kinds of advertisements that might be found in US food culture.

Despite the more subliminal qualities of the British case, meat consumption can fairly readily be associated with male virility, and can also be considered as a form of food pornography, or anthropornography. Images and texts of meat eating may be framed heteronormatively or directly heterosexualized and the fragmentation and presentation of animal bodies can be read as recalling the pornographic fetishization of human bodies, overwhelmingly of women’s bodies. The cultural texts of meat are not always pornographic. The images which illustrate this paper however, are certainly not exceptional or extreme examples. Rather, such images are both commonly and consistently used in the food advertising and popular cookery writing in the UK over the last thirty years. This suggests that eating meat continues to be part of the cultural construction of heterosexuality. Persistent, complex and co-constituted forms of domination, such as those of gender and species are often “experienced as, ‘desire’, as ‘appetite’, as ‘pleasure’…unmoored from the privilege that permits it” (Adams, 2003:171). The mainstream culture of gendered animal food and the pornography of meat are challenged, at the margins, by the increased visibility of minority food cultures such as vegetarianism. The last fifteen years have seen some degree of mainstreaming of vegetarian food culture but the tropes of the dominant culture remain little changed, and vegetarian food culture has articulated the narratives of heteronormativity and sexualization as part of the process of incorporation.
References


COMMENTARY

Limited Funds: Assessing Rescues and Sanctuaries

Lisa Kemmerer

Intent on familiarizing myself with local animal organizations, I took off across the state in my sister’s old truck, hoping to hit up every sanctuary and rescue I could find – there were only a half dozen to consider. Mostly, I wanted to network with other vegans, but my adventures quickly turned into an examination of various forms of direct action, and an assessment of which types of organizations offered the greatest return on donations.

My first stop was a horse sanctuary sitting on one thousand two hundred beautiful acres, in a remote region, purchased by a very wealthy donor. Horses are popular with “animal lovers,” along with cats and dogs, and this Horse Sanctuary was clearly well supported. Though the directors did not work outside the sanctuary, they noted that they easily make their $4000 monthly deposit on the $700,000 that they still owe on their land. (And they already have $50,000 squirreled already to put toward this debt). Though founded only six years ago, this sanctuary already has a host of worthy volunteers, and plans to build an indoor arena, quarantine barn, hay barn, and turnout shelters. They use homeopathic medicines, and trailer their rescued horses out of town for professional training. The Executive director noted: “We have to be sure the horses are well trained. Otherwise people will not want them after awhile, and they will come back to us.”

This horse sanctuary and rescue provides grants to buy hay for horses with families who have come on hard times. In 2009, their grants kept roughly 60 horses at home, and also helped with law enforcement to protect horses from neglect and abuse. The sanctuary has started a similar veterinary grant program in 2010. Unfortunately, there are not many visitors to the sanctuary, as it is 25 miles outside of a town of 57,000, and more than one hundred miles from the main artery that runs across the state. But the sanctuary offers educational workshops in various places around the region (such as “How to care for a Rescued Horse” for $75), which they present for the benefit of both horses and their people. These events help to support the sanctuary while educating the larger public about horses and horse-human relations.
I asked how rescues were selected from among the thousands of unwanted and slaughter-bound horses; they are chosen to keep a “mix” of ages, types, etc. at the sanctuary. I also asked the story behind the rescues I met. Several were starved, one was taken by court order, another had to be given up when his caretaker lost her job. An old Mustang from wild herds in Montana had been given up simply because he was no longer wanted. Their youngest charge was a colt born of a Premarin mare. (Premarin is an estrogen product manufactured by Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories – also sold under the name Prempro – which requires the urine of pregnant mares, who are impregnated and tethered in stalls for four or five months out of each year for the purposes of this drug company; their foals are shipped off to be fattened and slaughtered when they are just four months old, though foals are not normally weaned this young.) Each horse is provided with food and medical care, rehabilitation as needed, and professional training. Most importantly, every horse is guaranteed a permanent home, though that home might be with someone else. If they are not too old or injured, rescues are up for adoption. Adopted horses cannot be sold or given away, but must be returned to the sanctuary if the caretaker no longer wishes to keep a horse. Additionally, every adopted horse is tested annually to be sure that their caretaker is not breeding the rescue.

As someone who grew up around horses, I can testify that the horses at this sanctuary were contented and well cared for; the people running the sanctuary were knowledgeable and dedicated, no doubt this was a wonderful place for any endangered horse, but was this a good investment for my animal liberation dollars? It takes time to establish a rescue and sanctuary, and this sanctuary is currently paying off land, but I was nonetheless startled to learn that they have only six rescues. Frankly, my best buddy from high school supports five rescued horses (as well as rescued dogs and cats), on just 40 acres. My sister also has several rescued horses, and over the course of time has additionally rescued and tended cats, dogs, chickens, geese, ducks, and turkeys. She has, at times, supported as many as forty rescues on less than ten acres. Both she and my buddy go to work five days a week to provide safe and comfortable homes for their previously unwanted and abused rescues, and do not ask for any donations.

What seemed most striking was the economics of the sanctuary. It was obvious that they were channeling thousands of dollars into the purchase of land to keep horses, and also into food, medicines, and training for rescues. While it is reasonable to have a small plot
of land and keep a few horses as part of an outreach program, the ultimate goal of any sanctuary ought to be to prevent the ongoing problem – unwanted horses. Grants to buy hay and pay for veterinary care are excellent ways to keep horses in homes, and do not require acreage, or the ongoing expense of horse care. Workshops also seem an excellent form of outreach. But buying and maintaining acreage – no matter how many thousands of acres – will not stop the flow of unwanted horses, and cannot provide homes for all of those who are in need. Money is optimally spent on prevention, not by housing a token group of horses who would otherwise be slaughtered, meanwhile ignoring the millions of other neglected, abused, and doomed horses.

I recalled the director’s comment about training horses to maximize adoptability. Professional horse trainers are expensive, and it would be more beneficial to horses – and all animals – if the director overtly and publicly reject the mentality of the “useful horse,” and help to reeducate people to recognize horses as independent individuals and companions, rather than tools for our purposes. The conventional, exploitative attitude toward horses will only perpetuate the need for sanctuaries, which will never be able to keep up with need: There are currently thousands of abused and neglected horses in need of rescue – for starters, there are 50,000 “Premarin mares” and their 40,000 foals, born every year. Neither my sister nor my buddy keep horses to ride; they keep horses because horses need homes, and also because horses are wonderful beings with whom to share daily life.

This led me to the realization that the horse sanctuary did not seem to take into consideration the bigger picture. While the directors rescue horses, they consume cattle, pigs, chickens, and turkeys, and help to create a market for veal, eggs, and dairy products. While the director expressed her frustration that so many people seem indifferent to such atrocities as horse slaughter and the Premarin industry, she appears to be indifferent to the slaughter of cattle, and the dairy industry. For example, when I asked her about Montana’s recent vote to build horse slaughterhouses, she lamented this cruel demise, commenting that “horses are more aware than other animals in the slaughterhouse.” She recognizes horses as individuals who suffer terribly when abused, who grow attached to people and others whom they come to know, and that they struggle desperately to remain alive when endangered, yet she verbally resisted the simple truth that cows and pigs are similar on all counts. Those running the horse sanctuary rally to protect horses from
neglect, abuse, and slaughter – and ask others to do the same – while supporting these very same immoral acts with regard to other exploited animals.

I was eager to compare this horse sanctuary with another that was established specifically for draft horses. The draft horse sanctuary did not have a rich donor, and was operating on just ten acres located on the edge of a tourist town of about 7000. She had nine gigantic horses on this little plot of land – most of whom she had rescued from deplorable conditions and all of whom had been saved from imminent slaughter.

Unlike the director of the first sanctuary, the director of the draft horse sanctuary had not intended to start a sanctuary – she was simply determined to rescue one horse from slaughter. She had worked with horses some as a child, but had never kept horses. The director admitted, with a smile, that she had no idea what she was getting into when she adopted that first rescue. But she would be the first to say that her decisions are not necessarily her own. Her work is spiritually based; she felt “called” to offer these rejected behemoths a reasonable retirement. She understands her role to be one of healing: healing horses, humans, and relations between the two.

At 2000 pounds, these are expensive rescues – I helped her feed four fifty pound bags of grain at a morning feeding. But feed is not her most formidable cost – most of the horses are arthritic, with serious leg, back, and hoof problems, and her greatest difficulty is finding a farrier who will trim the feet of these elephant-sized equines, most of whom are too old and stiff to support themselves on just three legs.

The horses she rescues are home to stay. They cannot be adopted out because of their age, injuries, and/or lack of training. Most of them worked all of their lives, but when they became arthritic, or foundered, their people were unwilling to continue caring for them. Only one young draft horse stood among the older rescues, born from a “Premarin mare” who had been bound for slaughter, fetus and all. The director sees her sanctuary as a place where unwanted horses live out their remaining years with pasture, grain, hay, and veterinary care, free to mingle with their own kind, free from human contrivances. All told, she has kept twelve horses from slaughter, and placed hundreds of other horses in safe homes.
How did this compare with the previous sanctuary? The director works a full time job to support her small herd of large horses. Additionally, she welcomes visitors, offers workshops, holds fund-raisers, and has a little gift shop with cards, calendars, and pictures – all created from her own photography. In a pinch, her rescue could be self-supporting, like that of my friend and my sister. This seems essential, as it is unwise to adopt animals whose welfare is ultimately dependant on an expectation of donations. This is possible because the director is an employed professional who has purchased a home and land within her means. From the perspective of maximizing the effectiveness of donations, this means that moneys donated can go toward outreach and education, though the director did not seem to be pitching for larger change for all nonhuman animals. Still, by participating in local events, such as parades, and by holding healing workshops for people and horses, this sanctuary seemed to be working toward a closer human-animal connection – at least for draft horses.

What about the bigger picture? This sanctuary director seemed more cognizant of the horrible plight of farmed animals in the food industry – and more sympathetic. Still, she consumes animal products, and she does not stock any literature on this subject in her gift room. Furthermore, with a board already in place, she noted that advocating for a vegan lifestyle could be problematic. Consequently, the draft horse sanctuary, like the previous horse sanctuary, does not work for deep and lasting change for nonhuman animals. And of course this is what is needed if horses – or any other nonhuman under the power of humanity – is to live a fully and freely among humans.

My next stop was a large animal sanctuary about which I had heard a great deal: They were notorious for strange telephone interactions. I had heard only one positive comment; every other report indicated that this sanctuary was suspicious and problematic. Most notably, they clearly did not want visitors. They had hung up on me once, and only returned my repeated calls when I mentioned a donation. Consequently, I was not so much visiting as investigating this sanctuary.

With no address or sir names on their website, it was tricky locating this “rescue.” The sign outside their facility read “Black Bear Ranch,” and was complete with state-of-the-art video cameras aimed at the driveway.
I could tell that the man who came out was prepared to send us packing, so I immediately offered fifty dollars for a tour, indicating that I might be a major donor if I liked what I saw. He agreed, and we walked about 50 feet to a fence. That was as far as I was allowed to go because they “were not insured for visitors.” From the fence I could see several emus (out of a dozen), a couple camels, a herd of burros (20), and a batch of lamas – of which he told me they had 700! He admitted that the baby lamas were mistakes – and I saw a lot of mistakes, not only in the herd of lamas, but also among the cattle that we had seen from the road.

I worded my questions and responses to avoid bringing up his guard. He said that he was a vegetarian, and that the sanctuary owned 400 acres, including parcels of land located elsewhere. I could not see sheep or goats, but he said that they had about a dozen such ungulates. I saw one pony, and though their website shows horses, he said that this was their only equine. I had heard from others that their very fancy website sported animals who were no longer residents, and I wondered where these previous residents had gone. I asked about the camels, and he admitted that the sanctuary had purchased a camel from a dealer two states to the West to keep their rescued camel company.

While the horses had disappeared, the “sanctuary” was buying camels, and lamas were overtly propagating. This was not a sanctuary as I understand the term. This raised a key question: What qualifies as an animal sanctuary? First and foremost, sanctuaries do not buy or permit breeding among their charges. Buying supports exploitative industries; breeding creates yet more needy animals in a world where there are millions of nonhuman animals in need of rescue and sanctuary. Because all sanctuaries have limited space and funds, a new baby fills a sanctuary spot, for many years to come, which cannot be filled by any other needy animal.

There were yet more fundamental problems at this suspicious sanctuary. In front of me, as I stood at the fence, was a burro with hooves so long and curled that he or she could not walk – could not even stand comfortably. I was looking at neglect and abuse, and it was exactly what I expected to find at a sanctuary closed to visitors. (For the record, I pursued this as a cruelty case as soon as I arrived home, with the help of PETA.)
Though the burro’s feet were not trimmed, I noticed that I was standing next to a state-of-the-art swimming pool. The grounds were exquisitely manicured. The director explained that they had a rich donor in Texas, who visits once or twice a year. I wondered if she had any idea what was going on at this sanctuary, or if she was part of the problem – billing her exquisite home as a sanctuary to help support a hoarder’s lifestyle. It also occurred to me that unscrupulous sanctuary owners and/or tenders were primarily interested in a good life for themselves – living on expansive lands in remote areas – and created sanctuaries as a way to support their lifestyle preference.

I asked my “tour guide” (while we stood at the railings of the nearest fence) about outreach. “We have school kids,” he reported. On further inquiry, I found that just one class visits every autumn, from a local school. There is no other outreach: No workshops, no leaflets, no community education – nothing. As an advocate for nonhumans, this place made very little sense. As if to cap off the experience, their dogs appeared to be purebreds, and when the caretaker tried to pet one of the dogs, he was bitten.

My next visit was to a farmed animal sanctuary that was just a few years old. Like two of the three sanctuaries I had already visited, they had purchased an ideal piece of property – on the side of a hill overlooking both mountains and valleys. They did not have a wealthy donor, so they had placed a modular on the land, along with a small barn, a chicken coop, and a giant garage filled with every imaginable shop tool – only the wife was interested in rescue, and the husband had his own hobbies. Both were retired, and she chose to create a sanctuary as a retirement lifestyle.

Every morning she wanders into the fresh air to feed half dozen pot-bellied pigs, nearly as many full-sized pigs, three cattle, a couple pigmy goats, a few sheep, a couple of lamas, a dozen hens and roosters, and two naughty, boisterous dogs. This was the place that I was most excited to visit – the director told me up front that she was vegan, and she not only seemed aware of the larger picture, but also seemed interested in bringing long-term, deep-rooted change. Furthermore, they were located on just 20 acres, just 3 miles from one of the largest cities, and there were no other farmed animal sanctuaries for hundreds of miles around. It seemed that this sanctuary had every possibility of encouraging locals to rethink their diet.
The director referred to her charges as “ambassadors” for change, busy changing the minds and hearts of whomever they meet – turning omnivores into vegans. As it turns out, they were pretty good at their job, and several student interns had become vegans after working at the sanctuary. Others had not, but at least the director requires that they read books, such as Tom Regan’s *Empty Cages*, as part of their internship. The director also visits primary and secondary schools with a hen and rooster tucked under her arms, allowing the children to meet healthy, well adjusted chickens. She explains a little bit about where meat comes from, and briefly describes the lives of animals. She also speaks out against 4-H, encouraging Roots and Shoots as a non-exploitative alternative, and always invites children, church groups, and other interested parties to visit the sanctuary. She even sponsors a plant-based potluck for the larger community.

It all seemed too good to be true – initially. Having grown up on a small farm, it was soon obvious to me that the caretaker did not know some of the basics of farmed animal care. Grain was thrown out for the animals onto the ground, amid rocks and mud – a danger to their teeth and increasing the likelihood of internal parasites. Neither did this method allow for portion control, and larger or greedier residents routinely crowded out smaller or less assertive ones. I was also concerned about the hens, who were kept in a small, barren pen with four roosters. One little hen was afraid to come down to eat. I had long ago learned that the minimum ratio of roosters to hens is one to fourteen. Roosters beyond this ratio brutalize hens with their incessant breeding. Furthermore, hens prefer to be released from their coop at dawn, and I never saw the director open their door before 9, four hours beyond the preferred time. It may seem a small matter, but with too many roosters in a small henhouse, this bordered on neglect. There was also a goat that trailed a webbing lead-rope, which was tied in a large loop, so that the goat could be caught, if need be. I watched the goat become entangled in the loop several times in my short stay, and while the goat always managed to free herself, a looped rope should never be left on a nonhuman animal who is roaming free – I would question the need to leave any kind of a rope on the little goat.

One morning watched the director worm her yearling calves, and I could see that she had no idea how to worm farmed animals. In the end, she overdosed the cattle, and the wormer is poisonous. She is fond of her residents, and quickly became hysterical. The calves were fine, but for me, this brought a critical insight: Those who lack long-term
experience in tending farmed animals, even if they would like a rural lifestyle graced with farmed animals, should not open sanctuaries. On reflection, only one sanctuary director seemed highly qualified to work with the animals at the rescue; two others, with years of experience, had become fairly proficient. Who knows what mistakes they made along the way, or with what consequences. On one of the horse sanctuaries I pointed out that one of the horses needed to be treated for a particular problem that the director was unable to recognize.

Being present on sanctuary grounds was key in assessing the situation, but talking to the director was equally important, and unveiled yet more disappointments. The director had purchased one of the hens from a local store, and two of the cattle from a dairy – $75 each: “I waited for a couple of years, and no cattle showed up, and I needed a couple if I was going to have ‘Old McDonald’s Farm’.” The director’s vision of her lifestyle choice – “Old McDonald’s Farm” motivated her actions, not the desire to rescue nonhuman animals. To add insult to injury, I also learned that the husband eats meat and supports hunting, and before I had been on the premises for half an hour, the director pulled a cheese burrito from her freezer.

In search of the perfect sanctuary – or at least one that understood that protecting a few select animals is probably not a good expenditure of donor moneys – I headed across the border. I had heard about another comparatively new sanctuary, which had only been up and running for a few years, in the hills of a neighboring state. With a little handful of sheep, half a dozen pigs, nearly twenty horses, and about that many cats and as many dogs, they had already accumulated a fair number of residents. This sanctuary was unique in taking in research animals. It was also unique in charging for tours, and providing plush accommodations – at about $100 for the first night (since you also had to buy a membership to stay), and roughly $80 for other nights. The animals were very well cared for, the grounds well kept.

The dogs and cats were housed in round, yurt-style structures, and more accommodations were needed if they were to take on more dogs – or cats. They had a recent request to take twenty more beagles. These dogs were special needs citizens. Without the companionship and kindness that most dogs experience, they need considerable socializing, and the sanctuary had just hired a full-time trainer to live and work with the
rescues. She seemed competent, and confident, and was also a vet tech – perfect for a sanctuary.

I also met three interns who were coming to the end of a six-week internship. They were all gathering to talk about a book they had been reading, and the director did a fabulous job of engaging these students. I asked the interns what they had learned during their time at the sanctuary. One reply demonstrated that the student had backed off from her dream-career – breeding horses. She was considering a sanctuary, instead. Excellent! Another intern commented that she had learned to be wary of what was behind the products she was buying. Bingo! This young woman had learned exactly what I would hope such a facility would teach visitors, and two of the three were adopting cats to take home with them.

Still, this mammoth facility could surely change more minds than one or two in a summer – were this a priority. Again, I found myself at a sanctuary where the primary focus was rescue, and where every dog counted – so long as that dog had already arrived on the property. This sanctuary, like the others, was doing very little for any deep-rooted change. In fact, by charging for tours and only allowing members to stay overnight, this possibility was extremely limited. Furthermore, the accommodations did not have any of the books on their shelves that I would have hoped for, such as a work by Singer or Regan, or perhaps Kaufman and company’s book on animal research. This sanctuary, like the others, was designed primarily to save the few, not to bring lasting change. And the director was not a vegan – nor were the interns or the vet tech; worse yet, the topic was sensitive, and discussion on the matter was generally unwanted.

My sanctuary tour, though undertaken in hopes of networking, helped me to clarify the purpose of sanctuaries in the animal liberation movement, and how best to assess which sanctuaries to support. Those interested in supporting rescues/sanctuaries are wise to first understand, as donors, what makes a sanctuary legitimate and worthwhile. From my perspective, a rescue/sanctuary must have people in charge who have an in-depth knowledge of the animals they tend, and must be operated with an eye to ending all animal suffering and exploitation. They must not buy animals. They must not allow animals to breed. They must prioritize outreach. They must stock and keep literature
available on key problems facing nonhumans, which explain how each of us can help alleviate suffering.

Additionally, sanctuaries ought to invest a minimum of fifty percent of their budget and labor in education, outreach, and prevention. This means that they must not focus on maximizing adoption, but must instead limit rescues in order to reserve funds and energy for changing the larger picture. If those running sanctuaries wish to keep animals, but not work hard for larger changes, it is reasonable to expect that these facilities will support their own rescue – as my sister and buddy do – and not ask the rest of us to support this lifestyle choice. My assessment is that the goal of a rescue/sanctuary is to bring deep and permanent change for all nonhuman animals. It is good to pull people (or cattle) out of a river if we see them floating by, but it is much better to go upstream, find out why they are falling in, and prevent future mishaps. Rescuing a handful of farmed animals without offering year-round, far-reaching education and outreach does not help foster a deep or more lasting change for all animals, and when these rescues/sanctuaries take funds away from organizations that are working toward such change, they betray the billions of nonhuman animals who are cruelly exploited and prematurely killed every day. That said, what percentage of outreach/education justifies tending a handful of animals while billions are killed, will be a matter of personal reflection and priorities.

I noticed, in my travels, a difference between those who began sanctuary life by rescuing an animal who was in dire straits, and those who set out to create a sanctuary because they were in search of a particular lifestyle. The former is the method by which Farm Sanctuary and United Poultry Concerns, for example, were founded. Both of these organizations have about thirty years of experience with farmed animals, both started with one rescue, and both now engages in extensive, national (and international) outreach and education. Among newer organizations, Lorri Houston’s Animal Acres (near Los Angeles) is designed for outreach and education aimed at deep and lasting change. Another option is to spend all of your dollars upstream. For example, Vegan Outreach works tirelessly (with no overhead costs or land payments) to educate people about suffering, slaughter, health, and diet.

I recommend that anyone supporting local rescues/sanctuaries visit before you send a check, and before you visit, sort out what matters to you in a rescue/sanctuary. If possible,
take someone along who understands animal care. For my part, I will only support organizations that spend most of their time and resources upstream, working to prevent cruelty and exploitation through outreach aimed at deep and lasting change, and that advocate for all species – they must practice and advocate a vegan lifestyle.
REBUTTAL

Rebuttal #2 to Dr. Perlo on Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Appeals¹
David Sztybel, Ph.D.

I. Introduction: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism?

Dr. Perlo has been good enough to offer a reply to my critique of her article on intrinsic and extrinsic arguments for animal advocacy. I very much like how she ended up with her penultimate sentence: “…my goal is the same as Dr. Sztybel’s: to end, as soon as possible, the human-inflicted suffering and untimely death of animals.” Here there is a shared goal and a hearty commitment to carrying it out, as a movement, to maximum effect. That is, I assume—to pay homage to the obvious—that we cannot end speciesism as soon as possible without maximum effectiveness. I appreciate the expression of solidarity and applaudingly return the sentiment.

I will not attempt to recapitulate all of her article or my reply, but will presuppose some working knowledge of both, while providing some refreshers. She entitles her reply to my critique, “Fundamentalism or Pragmatism?” However, the title puzzles me in light of what she writes in that same article. I earlier wondered if she was an animal rights fundamentalist, referring back to my article in this journal, “Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism” (see this article for a refutation, in effect, of a fundamentalist exclusion of extrinsic appeals). The fundamentalists will not tolerate a certain amount of deviation from animal rights in laws they are prepared to support, whereas the animal rights pragmatists advocate animal rights laws for the long-term, but are prepared to accept animal “welfarist” laws in the short-term that merely reduce animal suffering while not ensuring animal rights in any strong sense. Dr. Perlo has indicated

that she could support some “welfarist” reforms. Therefore she is not an animal rights fundamentalist. It follows that she cannot consistently and indeed does not use animal rights fundamentalism as a support for her position against extrinsic appeals, since she disowns fundamentalism in the other context of evaluating kinds of possible legislative reforms. So the fundamentalism versus pragmatism distinction cannot intelligibly serve as a key distinction in this debate, and is more of a side-bar. That is why I am puzzled she chose that for her title. At the same time I do believe that Dr. Perlo is correct in, like me, seeking to assess legislative and other advocacy strategies for their pragmatic value. In posing the question, “Fundamentalism or Pragmatism?,” obviously her decision is: pragmatism. We agree on that at a general level, but specifically we disagree on which strategy is the most pragmatic.

II. Formulating Terms for this Debate

I suppose we need to come up with new language, other than fundamentalism and pragmatism, in fact, to be clear about what we are discussing. This language is heavily indebted to Dr. Perlo’s own phrasing. First, by way of review of Dr. Perlo’s valuable distinction, because it is so crucial, an intrinsic appeal for animal rights is one that utilizes a moral theory or ideology of animal rights. It is called “intrinsic” presumably because it is based “in” animal rights itself. An extrinsic appeal for animal rights advocacy would not be based in animal rights, but in something “outside” animal rights discourse in the strict sense, such as the consideration that meat-eating is unhealthy, or that vivisection is incompetent science, to invoke two prominent examples. I propose, accordingly, that there are three general kinds of strategy here:

(1) intrinsic strategy – this is Dr. Perlo’s stance. It means that animal rights campaigns should only use intrinsic arguments, and not include extrinsic strategies even as prominent supplements. However, she grants that if people are concerned, we can indeed reassure them that vegetarianism is healthy and that anti-vivisectionist research does work. We can even proactively build such reassurances into our campaign, we newly learn in her response.
(2) **extrinsic strategy** – this stance rather cynically holds that we should not invoke animal rights arguments at all, and only use extrinsic appeals, presumably because the public would otherwise cease listening to us. I have met such advocates.

(3) **intrinsic-extrinsic strategy** – this is a mixed stance, reflective of my own view. I believe we should use intrinsic arguments, centrally in most contexts, but that it is often prudent on behalf of the animals to point out extrinsic arguments as well.

### III. An Argument for the Intrinsic-Extrinsic Strategy

I am now going from the defensive not to the offensive, but rather to being *assertive* concerning the intrinsic-extrinsic strategy. In the following I present my justification of the intrinsic-extrinsic strategy from a best caring perspective, the theory that I articulate in other works. That said, most any commitment to the best will do in this case…

1. Intrinsic arguments are needed for animal rights advocates since we will never achieve animal rights—the animals’ just due—without being *assertive* about them. The sooner we are proactive about animal rights, the quicker and stronger the realization of such rights. An extrinsic strategy would miss the people who might be influenced by intrinsic appeals. (This is a sketch of a reply to the extrinsic strategists.)

2. Best caring claims that the best ethic will advocate what is best for each and every sentient being. Anything else is a worse ethic. (No, I am not a utilitarian. See my essay earlier in this journal, “The Rights of Animal Persons.”)

3. The best means the most good and the least bad.

4. Some people will be won over by intrinsic arguments, which is ideal.

5. Less ideally, some people will not be convinced by intrinsic arguments (alone), but may only adopt vegetarianism because (at least as an essential part of the given
reasoning) meat-eating is a disaster in terms of health, the environment, and other factors, and may only adopt anti-vivisection since (at least as an essential part of the reasons given) vivisection is so useless and dangerously misleading.

6. The people convinced only under condition of accepting extrinsic arguments (who may—importantly—thus become more receptive to intrinsic arguments at a later time) will lead lives that mean more good and less bad for animals, because they will not create (as much of) a demand for slaughtering, and make it more likely that a given democracy will ban vivisection in the future, or otherwise frustrate the harmful activities of vivisectors in particular cases.

7. Therefore extrinsic arguments are straightforwardly part of what is best, since there would be significantly less good and more bad for animals without them.

Now this argument, I affirm, consists only of true statements. (Recall that Dr. Perlo herself concedes there has been some effectiveness attributable to extrinsic appeals—a proposition anyone would contest to the peril of their argumentative stance.) Furthermore, the logical implications, it seems to me, are air-tight. I do not see how anyone could possibly refute the above argument, and I assert that Dr. Perlo has done nothing to show that any of these statements are false, nor anything to illuminate that the logical implication given in 7. is somehow a case of jumping to conclusions (not that the above argument was available to her, but the general intrinsic-extrinsic position has been on the table for three “episodes” in our series now). She would have to refute this argument to make good her position, but I doubt she can do this.

She wrote in her response that she can “reassure” people, even proactively, that vegetarianism is healthy and that medical research can progress without harming. Does this mean that she will cover the same material as extrinsic or intrinsic-extrinsic strategists, thus rendering this dispute purely academic? By no means. First of all, such material is explicitly de-emphasized by Dr. Perlo. Second, one can reassure people that vegetarianism is healthy without educating people about the ills of meat-eating, bearing in mind that the latter are highly motivating for people. Similarly, one can list viable forms of medical research that do not involve vivisection without illuminating how vivisection itself is so lacking in utility and promotive of harms. So missing the enormous truth-
value and activist-value of extrinsic appeals is something very much at stake here, and the animals simply cannot afford us turning a blind eye to such means if we are to have their best interests in mind.

I taught animal liberation courses in the Fall of 2008 at Brock University, and I had an extensive unit on animals used as food. Many students were not moved by animal rights arguments, although some were. However, some were swayed by a fear of, say, cancer (40% more for flesh-eaters, says a facts sheet for the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine) or global warming (18% caused by animal agriculture, which exceeds that resulting from all forms of human transport combined, according to a U.N. committee\(^2\)). Learning such valuable facts helped to transform the lifestyles of some students in pro-vegetarian ways by their own admission. This figures into my argument that such extrinsic appeals result in more good and less harm not only for nonhuman animals, but indeed for human animals too. I point out additionally that being swayed “extrinsically” will mean less practical resistance to intrinsic arguments since there is no longer the problem of a conflict between vested interests and being interested in doing the right thing. After all, people ignoring, dismissing, or belittling animal rights arguments because they want to go on eating “their meat” is a huge problem in the experience of all animal rights activists.

Consider relevant statistics about peoples’ reasons for becoming vegetarian. *The Vegetarian Times* surveys vegetarians in order to obtain statistics about Americans in particular.\(^3\) In a 2008 poll, it was revealed that reasons for turning to vegetarianism include:

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<th>reasons for choosing vegetarianism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. animal welfare</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. overall health</td>
<td>53</td>
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This is a virtual tourist’s guide of reasons with which to equip audiences potentially interested in vegetarian-related issues. Notice that most of these concerns are “extrinsic,” to use Perlo’s terminology. Yes, most of the people who change do so for directly animal-related reasons, but it is far from an overwhelming majority. Perlo’s strategy suggests that the 46% of people who might switch to vegetarianism for “extrinsic” reasons not directly regarding animals, based on these figures, should essentially be passed by as insufficiently significant, their potential benefits for the animals—who as a consequence would be left in peace—fit to be ignored. I will be honest in declaring that Perlo’s supposed “strategy” for best reducing animal suffering and death—through essentially “de-commisioning” these extrinsic reasons in discourse—is utterly absurd.

Keep in mind too that the survey is somewhat unrevealing as to how many people change for an accumulation of reasons. Animal welfare is only one. It may also be the case that a large percentage of those who cite concern for animal welfare would not have made the change unless there were added on human-centered concerns such as human health and the human environment. Indeed, note that 54% change because of concern for animal welfare, and 53% change for overall health reasons. These add up to 7% more than 100%—and indeed the grand total of the lot is 283%—so people must commonly base their switch on a variety of reasons. It is therefore hard to make an absolute separation between “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” reasons in terms of overall motivation for decisive action, even if all of the factors are conceptually distinct. It is not purely a case of either-or.

Statistics as to how many people turn anti-vivisectionist for scientific and/or ethical reasons would also be instructive. However, I have never come across such data, and nor have numerous academic experts and activist societies in the field of anti-vivisection
whom I have consulted for this paper. The consensus from those I wrote to is that most anti-vivisectionists are so for ethical reasons. That matches my own perceptions. However, it must be borne in mind that speciesism is very common, and as a result, many people would not care about animals enough to spare them from vivisection if they thought that it could benefit humanity. Such multitudes of people, then, would be more interested in the scientific aspects. Dr. Katy Taylor, Scientific Coordinator of the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, e-mailed me back regarding my inquiry for this paper on March 4, 2009, informing us: “There are statistics that scientists are more persuaded by scientific rather than ethical arguments.” She did not have the statistics on-hand, but I have no reason to doubt the truth of the generality which she has gleaned over the course of her extensive anti-vivisectionist career as researcher, writer, and activist. The finding should not reflect a surprising tendency, since scientists are often dismissive of ethical appeals and are commonly pro-vivisection, but for obvious reasons can ill afford to neglect scientific arguments. Vivisectors and their friends have a stranglehold over controlling what happens in animal research, so not appealing to their most receptive side—the scientific—is once again absurd if we are aiming for the best strategic approach. We must conclude overall that the scientific arguments alone—which are indeed convincing to many—are of inestimable value in swaying considerable numbers of speciesists.

I do not see how anyone could possibly negate the above logically and empirically based arguments. It is really a scientific, cumulative argument (at least granted the assumption that our intention is to avoid the most animal suffering and death as Dr. Perlo implies). In a way, I think it is also sufficient to decide this whole question, given the lack of logical space for discounting extrinsic appeals in genuinely seeking what is best. However, to be

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4 Among others: Stephen Kaufman of the Medical Research Modernization Committee; Kenneth Shapiro of the Animals and Society Institute who works extensively on this issue; Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine; American Anti-Vivisection Society; National Anti-Vivisection Society; New England Anti-Vivisection Society; British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection; and The Hans Ruesch Centre, a group that Dr. Perlo would not approve of, which is devoted to the scientific refutation of vivisection modeled on works by Hans Ruesch such as, especially, *Slaughter of the Innocent* (Civitas, 1983). Many followers of Ruesch have been extrinsic strategists solely—the polar opposite of Perlo’s approach—and could be haranguing towards anyone who would use ethical arguments against vivisection. However, in 1993, at a conference organized by Gary Francione and Tom Regan at Rutgers University, called “A New Generation for Animal Rights,” a Rueschian whose name I cannot recall presented and apologized for his people having a history of attacking activists who would use moral argumentation against animal experimentation.
fair to Dr. Perlo, I will have to consider her points of rebuttal to my critique of her intrinsic strategy. We will see that her own differences with the full-spectrum approach are not scientifically justified at all but really are driven by numerous logical fallacies and ignored outcomes. But first let us attend to…

IV. Points That Dr. Perlo Neglected

First, I will note refutations I made in my critique which she does not even address in her response. This is significant because I have argued for all of my points of rebuttal. The thing about arguments is that they stand unless or until they can be refuted, and failing even to address my arguments entitles me to think that I have refuted her points on the relevant scores unless she or someone else will show otherwise. These points of hers that I have explicitly refuted include:

(1) Extrinsic appeals consign animal rights to a marginal or extreme position.

(2) Extrinsic appeals “disown” animal rights.

(3) Extrinsic appeals presuppose a double-standard in that we would never use them in advocating on behalf of humans.

(4) Extrinsic appeals do not “stick to the subject,” and we cannot win the debate about animal rights by talking about something else.

(5) Extrinsic appeals such as regarding vegetarianism and anti-vivisection are separable from intrinsic appeals (actually, Figure 1 in the present paper gives the lie to this assertion in the context of overall motivation to become vegetarian).

(6) Extrinsic appeals involve inconsistency or a concession to speciesism.

(7) Extrinsic appeals suggest that animal-related considerations are not important
enough to make the case on their own.

(8) Avoiding extrinsic appeals and embracing only intrinsic appeals is more “honest.”

Now this listing is significant since I enumerated twelve arguments that she uses in favor of what I call the intrinsic strategy approach, and I have just documented that she does not even consider my rebuttals to eight of these arguments, or two-thirds of them—a solid majority. Has she disowned these earlier arguments? Does she suddenly consider them not worth attending to after asserting them in a scholarly work? Does she somehow consider my rebuttals to be unworthy of consideration? It is not clear, but in any case, her failure to address my refutations of these earlier claims is a significant part of my case in this current phase of the discussion, and will figure into my final summation of “the state of the debate.” Dr. Perlo indicated that she would not address my points in the order that I made them because she states that this would lead to repetition. However, I must confess my incomprehension as to how addressing the points in the order that I gave must somehow lead to repetition, since they are all distinctive issues. In this current piece, I will once again use the order of points from my earlier response so that the reader can more easily verify what she has responded to, and what she mostly neglects.

V. Addressing Dr. Perlo’s Attempted Rebuttals

Now I will rebut rebuttals. My level of detail is due to the fact that I think this whole strategic question is very important. Therefore, I do not wish to neglect any aspects that may be involved in persuading someone one way or the other. Now the following enumeration of contested rebuttals is new and does not correspond to numbers used in earlier articles:

1. I interpreted that Dr. Perlo would only deploy extrinsic considerations, say, about vegetarianism, if people happen to ask. She replies by pointing out that peoples’ questions can be anticipated and answered in advance. That seems to me dead-right. She warns, however:
…there is a significant difference between that [reassuring people that vegetarianism is healthy] and ‘Another reason for going vegan is that it will make you healthier.’ The first statement has the subtext ‘You may be, understandably, wondering about this’; the second: ‘I’ve got to offer some additional positive incentive.’

A few things. First, of course there is a difference in these types of statements, and the first is indeed consistent with the intrinsic strategy and the second might not be. But what does it mean to say, in effect, “I need to offer an additional incentive”? She does not really clarify this, but it would be useful to do so. It could be saying (a) I need to offer an additional incentive otherwise I will not be able to convince you; or (b) I need to offer an additional consideration because you might not be won over by the intrinsic appeal and I at least need to see if you can reduce your damage to animal lives after considering a mixed appeal. I would agree that we do not need to always agree with (a); it is sometimes false since some are convinced by animal rights arguments. Unfortunately, (a) seems to be true in some individual cases involving stubborn, selfish, or prejudiced folk—or others who are operating in good faith but are simply not convinced. However, Dr. Perlo has not refuted (b), which relates to my whole argument (see above) for the mixed approach. She is begging the question, which means assuming what she needs to justify.

2. I took issue with her statement, “To hurt or kill animals is wrong, regardless of any other considerations,” by citing self-defense against bears for example. She concedes the point, indicating that her “statement was in the context of debate with supporters of animal abuse.” That is irrelevant, because my qualification applies not only to debates with speciesists, but also debates with critical anti-speciesists. Anyone, anytime, anywhere, anyhow should avoid anything like such oversimplifications in academic writing, in my opinion. Liberationists too must sometimes unhappily choose between inevitable harms.

3. I wrote that if extrinsic appeals result in less killing of animals and less suffering, then intrinsic concerns of animal rightists may partly be won by extrinsic appeals, and that helping animals is therefore part of “the subject” of animal rights. Her
reply? “Both these statements equivocate between intrinsic argument and intrinsic concerns. An extrinsic argument that serves an intrinsic concern is still an extrinsic argument.” To be clear, I am not saying otherwise. If health arguments for vegetarianism further intrinsic concerns for longevity and freedom from suffering, those arguments are still extrinsic. But they are still “part of the subject” of animal rights since anyone interested in animals’ rights to life and freedom from avoidable suffering should be interested in all substantial means towards these ends. I am not trying to confuse the categories together as she implies with her charge of equivocation. I agree that intrinsic concerns extend to extrinsic appeals, which is indeed part of my whole point. She does not seem to perceive how animal rights concerns lead to an affirmation of using extrinsic appeals to reduce animal suffering and death. This whole point 3. relates to my earlier overall argument that my approach does more good and prevents more bad than hers. She has done nothing to refute this. Equivocation means that I am illicitly confusing two things together, but I affirm that I am correct in saying “extrinsic appeals” which is also her very own language. To say that I am arguing that using extrinsic arguments are really somehow part of intrinsic arguments is an unwarranted misunderstanding of my position, and I never state nor imply this. We need to keep these types of arguments analytically distinct and I have always done so. I am only saying that intrinsic concerns invite a mixed strategy, and Dr. Perlo seems to be unaware that this is being argued, or else unconcerned to rebut it. But she should be.

4. Consider here Dr. Perlo’s response to my rebuttal of her point that the audience will suspect an ulterior motive and infer loss of credibility from intrinsic-extrinsic strategy use. (She still maintains this in her response.) I said that people will often not think ill, but grant that extrinsic appeals are being used to make things better for animals. However, to say there would be lack of credibility implies that my argument for the intrinsic-extrinsic strategy is somehow questionable or flawed. I remind the reader that, to date, Dr. Perlo has said nothing that even remotely refutes the argument either by showing that it contains false statements or fallacies of inference. She is begging the question once again.

5. Recall her statement that the mixed strategists “confuse” people by saying that
vivisection does not work because animals are *different*, but animals deserve rights because they are *similar*. I pointed out that the first is due to physiological differences, but that does not mean that animals of different species lack the psychological similarity of sentience. But I might even add here that animals’ psychological differences render them scientifically unsound models for human psychology, even given the shared psychological trait of sentience. Similarity for moral purposes and differences for scientific modeling purposes are entirely different areas of difference and similarity, and one would indeed have to be confused in the first place to be confounded by the mixed strategists’ use of the argument that we cannot extrapolate experimental results from one species to another. However, even in a single area of comparison, such as comparing two nations’ coins, there may be both similarities and differences without incoherence. In her response, she has failed to rebut my point that no “confusion” or “conflicting claims” need be interpreted. Once again she begs a point at issue.

6. She adds that “…the public is smart enough to be suspicious of statistics and expert pronouncements that seem just too convenient for the promoters of an ethical cause.” Convenient? Is she implying that the extensive literature showing that vivisection does not work is printed up just because it is “convenient” to do so? Let the audience be suspicious of such anti-vivisectionist claims. Let them research it. They will find convincing evidence that vivisection is a failed methodology, or so I and many others warrant. If Dr. Perlo does not wish to invoke such literature or disagrees with it, that is her privilege, although I doubt she has grounds to do so in the final analysis. She says the audience will wonder how selective is the information, and what other experts have said, whether differences are enough to discount results. True. But I say: so what? Arguments being complex does not mean they should be discarded. All of science involves the kinds of sophisticated questions that Dr. Perlo anticipates. Would she then say we should discard all of science because it is too complicated? If not, then we should not discard the part of science that pertains to vivisection’s counter-utility. Such extrinsic appeals do not always make a convenient sound-bite, but I can tell you citing a study showing that 95% of drugs tested as safe and effective on
animals were discarded at human clinical trials will have a great effect. I know this from an anti-vivisection talk I delivered that was mainly about animal rights ethics. The statistic just mentioned was the one thing that most stuck in the mind of one listener, according to him.

7. I point out that it is not always possible to erase species prejudices, or to change public policy using animal rights arguments. Dr. Perlo responds by stating that mixed strategists, she thinks, will not denounce speciesism “often enough, prominently enough, or analytically enough to cause people to re-examine their thinking.” It is possible to find this remark insulting, as implying that intrinsic-extrinsic theorists lack the ability to be as “analytical,” or that we are not diligent about advocating animal rights. If she bothered to elaborate, however, I think she might have said that communication opportunities are limited and because mixed strategists have more to get across, they will go less into depth and perhaps miss the chance to broach animal rights altogether on occasion. There is some sense to this thought. However, it does not take much effort to list different reasons for vegetarianism at a general level, and dedicated talks or writings can lavish focus on all of the relevant aspects. If it serves the best for sentient beings to address a spectrum of issues, ways can be and have been found to educate people in these matters and to communicate effectively. I turn the tables here though. Her approach guarantees that extrinsic appeals will not be voiced often enough, prominently enough, or with any kind of depth since it is her intention largely to omit such appeals from animal advocacy and education. (What immediately follows her seventh point here are some remarks by Dr. Perlo that do not decisively bear on the debate at hand, and so I will not refer to them here.)

8. She earlier argued that animals do not care about extrinsic appeals, and I rejoined that these nonhumans might not care about PETA’s slogans either but they are significant. Dr. Perlo’s rejoinder?

Saying that animals don’t care about human-centered concerns is a way of saying that their interests are more important to them than human interests, so that if they could understand the issues they would not care about the non-animal concerns, but they would care about PETA’s slogans.

She concedes the animals would care about PETA’s slogans. Is this because they are animal rights slogans? My point is that the animals, even if they could care “only” about what impacts them, should also care about extrinsic appeals because it is best for anyone concerned about animals to do so as I have argued. I do not even conced her phrasing that extrinsic factors are necessarily “non-animal concerns,” since they are very much of concern and connection regarding animals—although I do get her meaning. Again, Dr. Perlo has not refuted the key point at issue here.

9. She says extrinsic appeals involve more uncertainty and remoteness. I indicated by way of rebuttal that it is certain that meat-eating is a health/environmental disaster, and that vivisection is not very useful. I pointed out that even animal rights arguments often refer to animals who are remote from us, or who may not even come to exist thanks to our boycotts, etc. Her point of reply, rather than addressing my points directly (yet another case of unrebutted arguments), is that people might want to eat a little meat because that might not be unhealthy. That is an important point and it is true. However, why is the reduction of animal-product-consumption by degrees somehow insignificant? Additionally, she cannot ignore the significance of health vegetarians who go all the way, and they are legion. She points out that many people will not be convinced “in their hearts” that green actions by individuals are going to matter. Again, it is true that some people are like that. But she ignores the multitudes of environmentalist vegetarians or meat-eating-reducers out there. Turning a blind eye thus is perilous to her position. It merely ignores that the mixed approach reduces harm and increases benefits by trying to shift the focus to selective cases in which such appeals fail. She points out that many people are unconvinced by vivisection-does-not-work arguments and that industry and government rebut such arguments. True again. But once more, she ignores the huge swaths of the public, including medical experts, who find
such arguments persuasive. What are we to make of a debater’s arguments which only focus on the negative and rigorously avoid any fair consideration of the positive? It is called undue bias and begging the question, among other applicable labels. Should we discard ethical arguments too because they sometimes do not work? I do not think so, and neither does Dr. Perlo.

10. She disowns the fundamentalist position explicitly in her response—so why does she make this part of the title? In any event, she claims that:

…too great a reliance on human-centered supports weakens the great potential of the liberationist case for helping animals, and is thus the very opposite of the pragmatism claimed for those supports.

Has she said anything to rebut my overarching argument that the mixed strategy offers greater benefit/protection than the intrinsic strategy? Not a whit. By “pragmatic” she presumably means having greater practical effect for animals, but she has not supported her case effectively, nor rebutted my central argument that shows quite the converse (not that that argument was available to her in the formalized version presented in this installment).

11. I earlier pointed out that it is ethically virtuous to be concerned about human health and the environment. She claims we must choose where to place resources and emphasis. True, but she has not rebutted my virtue argument, nor my thought that it is best to use resources and emphasis to include extrinsic appeals. She is once more begging the question at this point. She points out it is also virtuous to argue that speciesism is evil. True, but so what? I argue much the same thing.

All of Dr. Perlo’s attempts to respond to my criticisms fail in my estimation.
VI. Dr. Perlo’s Two New Arguments

To Dr. Perlo’s credit, she has come up with a few new arguments in favor of her intrinsic strategy. To be thorough, I feel constrained to consider them:

1. She claims to cite evidence that the intrinsic strategy works. She notes that the Swiss include the dignity of animals in their laws. So what? I also advocate animal rights, so this is irrelevant to the key issue of excluding extrinsic appeals. She mentions this fact was cited by someone opposing vivisection on scientific grounds, reinforcing the inclusion of extrinsic appeals. A cat farm breeding victims for vivisection was closed down relying mainly on cruelty to cats rather than scientific fraud. Again, I would also emphasize the cruelty, but pointing out the scientific problems with vivisection would have been another problem for this “farm,” and it would be remiss to ignore such a hugely influential appeal. After an Animal Rights Day protest, some monkeys were released. Again, I use animal rights arguments too. She gives many more examples. The same irrelevance prevails because I also campaign for animal rights and she ignores the benefits to the animals of the extrinsic appeals to her logical peril. She offers nothing in the examples to show the insignificance, impotence, irrelevance, or anything else negative about extrinsic appeals. Thus she fails to make her case.

2. She claims that intrinsic-extrinsic campaigners attempt “to ingratiate ourselves with the mainstream.” This is condescending. It makes people like me sound like obsequious cowards who try to curry favor from anyone with any degree of power or influence. I am an animal rights campaigner. Let the establishment deal with that. The prevailing powers are not “ingratiated” to me for such advocacy. But if the extrinsic arguments are sometimes more effective with the mainstream speciesists, I demand to know what is wrong with adapting to that fact? I reiterate at this point, at the risk of being tedious, that it is best for animals to secure the most good and least bad for each and every one of them.
VII. Conclusion: The State of the Debate

I would like now to briefly consider, in overview: (1) Dr. Perlo’s initial article; (2) my response; (3) her response to me; and (4) the above continuation of this discussion. We are in conflict. To me, this is a struggle over trying to secure what is best for animals. I think I have clearly illuminated how her approach is less than best, although the intrinsic strategy will have some good effects (as will my approach which shares the animal rights component). She has not in the least bit refuted my argument for intrinsic-extrinsic strategy. On the contrary, it confuses matters to have a title implying that the whole thing turns on fundamentalism or pragmatism. Even she admits she is not being fundamentalist in effect, and she fails to show that her approach is more pragmatic (which in this context I interpret to mean practically effective for animals). She neglected eight of my rebuttals to most of her own arguments. Selective or conveniently narrowed focus also appears in other of her remarks (see especially 3. and 9. in Section V). As for instances in which she takes issue with what I have written, the following logical problems are present in each one as follows:

1. She begs the question in implying that we do not need to offer audiences additional incentives to abandon meat-eating.

2. She commits the fallacy of irrelevance by informing us that her earlier statement that it is always wrong to hurt or kill animals is part of a debate over animal abuse. Right—so what? It is still an erroneous statement in any context of debate.

3. She makes a useful distinction between intrinsic argument and intrinsic concerns (while falsely claiming that I equivocate between the two) and then simply ignores how intrinsic concerns can be furthered by extrinsic appeals.

4. She begs the question by reaffirming that my approach entails a credibility loss, implying there is something wrong with my sort of argument although she shows no flaws whatsoever.

5. She reaffirms how vivisection as poor science involves confusion or conflicting
claims but *begs the question* by failing to substantiate this claim, in the face of my clarification that no confused or conflicted thinking need be involved at all.

6. She commits the *fallacy of irrelevance* by indicating that audience may be critical of scientific arguments against vivisection. So what? She simply dismisses these influential arguments as part of her general nay-sayer’s approach.

7. She indicates that people such as me will not denounce speciesism as often, prominently or “analytically” as people who follow her approach. This could be perceived as insulting, but rather assumes that there would be a structural incapacity to conduct academic inquiry or to educate others if there is more to one’s message. This is simply a *dubious empirical claim* that does not concede the need to deliver a broad-based message as effectively as possible. On the contrary, given her *excessively narrow focus*, her approach guarantees that she will not broach extrinsic appeals either often or in sufficient depth.

8. She *begs the question* by asserting, but not defending, how animals would not care about extrinsic appeals if they could understand them. My argument dictates otherwise.

9. She shows *bias* by stressing cases in which extrinsic arguments fail wholly or by degrees, simply ignoring the many success stories.

10. She *begs the question* by calling her approach more “pragmatic” for animals.

11. She *begs the question* by saying it is an issue as to how to place resources and what to emphasize in campaigning, without providing evidence that we should follow her line. She commits the *fallacy of irrelevance* in pointing out that it is virtuous to point out that speciesism is evil—so do intrinsic-extrinsic campaigners if they have anything like integrity.

Dr. Perlo then offers two new sorts of arguments. One provides evidence of animal rights appeals working, which is *irrelevant* because I also use such arguments. She needs to show that extrinsic appeals are *not* part of what is best—a negative burden as it were—but
utterly fails to do this. Finally, she resorts to the *ad hominem fallacy* by painting mixed strategists such as myself as trying to “ingratiate” ourselves to “the mainstream.” That is not only false and distasteful since I advocate radical animal rights, but *begs the question*. Why should mainstream effectiveness be dismissed?

This completes my review of the first four segments of this exchange of ideas (including the present one). I conclude that an intrinsic-extrinsic strategy is by far the best approach, even if her grossly flawed articulation of intrinsic strategy retains certain merits. To me, the chief positives in what she presents are twofold. First, she stresses the value of advocating *animal rights* when people are sometimes excessively self-censoring about such advocacy. Second, she formulates a valuable new distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic appeals, which helps us to think much more lucidly and in depth about a key aspect of animal protection strategy. For these and other contributions I would like heartily to thank Dr. Perlo.

As for the actual fundamentalism versus pragmatism debate, I welcome the fundamentalists to engage my responses to their arguments in my aforementioned article, “Animal Rights Law.” Dr. Perlo’s unfortunate title might have attracted the interest of those interested in this much more prevalent animal rights debate about tactics. In the almost two years since the publication of my critique, the fundamentalists have not put a single dent in my arguments, whereas I have won over several of a Francione-type bent who have written to me in gratitude for—in their opinion—laying to waste their former fundamentalist positions. Do the fundamentalist arguments terminate in dead-ends as I think I have shown? Can they introduce new arguments that will turn the tables? I doubt it, but if they do not even try, people will often think or at least suspect that they lack what it takes to make an effective response.
POETRY

Three Poems on Gestation Crates: A Pig Triptych
Dana Medoro

Introduction

For eight years, I’ve been part of a campaign to ban the use of gestation crates for breeding sows in Canada’s pork industry. We have a genuine gestation crate procured from a retired pork producer, as well as a life-sized sow made out of papier maché. Her name is Penelope, and she stands inside the crate, along with a sign that reads, “This is not a temporary holding pen; this is how a sow spends her entire life in Canada’s factory farms.” She is so life-like that people often stick their hands between the bars of the cage to touch her, to see if she’s flesh and blood.

We take Penelope out to the shopping malls in Winnipeg—and, more recently, to the University of Manitoba—in order to show the public what pork production looks like. Most people are stunned. Their whole lives? They ask. No room to turn, nowhere to go? We take their signatures for a petition that urges the government to ban this intensive-confinement system. We started counted the signatures four years ago: we have 10,000 of them.

We have always encountered hostility from people in the industry (though not from the migrant laborers who work in the barns and tell us that we’re right). But the most hostility we receive comes from the students in the Faculty of Agriculture at the University. It took me a while to figure out why: they are taught by professors mandated to work with (and on behalf of) the meat industry. At first, when we set up on campus during Environment Week with Penelope and our petitions, the Animal-Science students mostly glared at us. Now, they set up across from us, with pamphlets that read:

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“Breeding sows are fine in their independent gestation accommodations because a happy animal doesn’t reproduce.” Who has convinced them of this unbelievable, unbearable statement?

In response, I started writing editorials for the campus newspapers. I am a professor in the Department of English at the University, so my work gets fast-tracked by the editors every time. My most recent article, “Animal Rights and Academic Freedom”—which addressed the Faculty of Agriculture’s promotion of confinement systems and the problem of corporate funding—got me a “cease-and-desist” letter from the Department of Animal Sciences. My lawyer laughed it off, but she also told me to be careful. They’ll pick apart every word you use, she said; they’ll isolate sentences and phrases and turn them against you.

So, it’s about language, who gets to use it and who doesn’t. The words tell the students what to see: See this pig; she is happy in a narrow metal cage. We are the experts; we speak about objective facts. Everything else is rhetoric.

How do you counter that? With different words, from other perspectives, and in many genres, poetry included. Poetry, like other animals, is both strange and recognizable. It invites us to view its riddles, at the same time that it refuses to give them up entirely. If you approach it respectfully, it will yield something to you. But not everything. You cannot beat its meaning from it.

Poetry persists because critical thinking exists. We may not teach students “animal science” in the Department of English, but we can ask them to think about what a pig is, how she is represented, whom she matters to and why she is hidden from sight. Poetry lets her have a voice, an imagined one, just for a moment, before the silence fills the spaces and the scientific experts take over again.
Three Poems on Gestation Crates: A Pig Triptych

I: The Sow to the Professor of Animal Agriculture

Move your hand across the page,
the image detaches and floats.
The surface of your desk no place
    for anything still--no host.
Not here.
Your hand shifts, the world falls off the edge,
    clings to the words,
    and drops.
Nothing to land on.

Read the bottom line, left to right,
and cover your eye--
the letters lift and sound themselves out
P O R K.
Now the other: E X P O R T

Your hand spins flesh into cash, your sight
    narrowed to a whiplash.

II: The Professor Responds to the Sow

Hush: it's because your hoofs are cloven and split.
The devil's distinguished print.
Even to dream them is to portend sorrow:
a broken seal,
    a false friend.
Lift the whitest hem, it's the mark of necromancy--
    and you have four of them.
My eyes defile my sight.
Say after me: the metal makes sense,
    the gods themselves fashioned the fence.
The English Professor's Last Word: An Acrostic for Swine Rights

Don't you dare sully philosophy like that. I take such Umbrage. Your learning comes not from the Muses, but slams toward death, in service of it. Better to work the kill floor than the classroom.

Ask God what knowledge springs from and Sinks to: earth, air, water, sadness. You Stick wisdom in the neck; the blood roars in your throat.
BOOK REVIEWS

Statement: In line with the goals of Critical Animal Studies book reviews are oriented toward the critical questioning of the politics of human/animal relations. However, the Editors of JCAS do not necessarily agree with the statements contained in book reviews, and neither do they assume responsibility for the reviewers' assessments of the books that they evaluate.

Leonardo's Choice: Genetic Technologies and Animals

Reviewed by Dan Lyons¹


The main title of this collection of essays refers to their underlying normative stance which emphasises the duty of scientists and artists to recognise the ethical implications of using nonhuman animals as means to their ends, particularly in biotechnology. In that sense, it is a call to both individual moral responsibility and, at the same time, resistance to hegemonic norms which:

1. view other species of animals as mere instruments of humankind rather than intrinsically-valuable sentient beings
2. relegate ethics as a guide to action in favour of a teleological conception of human flourishing which fetishises creative freedom and scientific advance for their own sakes

This critical standpoint also refutes the atomistic and mechanistic ontology that underpins genetic technologies, including the false notion of humanity’s separation from the rest of nature. In her introduction, editor Carol Gigliotti argues that genetic technologies in science and art produce ‘profoundly disastrous effects’ to the interests of humans, other animals and the biodiversity which sustains life on earth as we know it. In order to expand that argument and challenge the notion that such damaging developments are inevitable,

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the volume includes contributions from a range of disciplines including philosophy, cultural studies, law, history and geography.

Steven Best kicks off the collection with a piece on the ethical and democratic challenges posed by genetic animal science. He describes how animal biotechnology, driven by industrial science for commercial purposes, creates major additional sources of suffering and destruction for nonhuman animals as they are subjected to xenotransplantation research, “pharming”, and intensified meat and dairy production. The maladies affecting animals are both intentional and unintentional, highlighting the enormous complexity and unpredictability of genetic technologies. At the same time, Best articulates a broader concern about the implications of the commodification and instrumentalisation of life itself by animal biotechnology. Meanwhile, certain apparently benign applications such as recreating extinct species are exposed as naive and ill-conceived. However, Best does suggest that biotechnology might be applied in positive avenues that mitigate and end harmful practices towards animals; for example, enabling the production of human tissue for transplantation instead of xenotransplantation.

In order to change the development of biotechnology for the better, Best argues for greater public participation in debates about science and technology, asserting that the public not only can, but must, engage effectively in such discussions given the weighty social implications. Best correctly identifies the acute need for a paradigm shift in science to one involving a holistic ontology and methodology, democratic accountability, and non-violence towards members of other animal species. The challenge remains in identifying political strategies to achieve this essential goal, upon which the future of billions of animals, including human civilisation, probably depends. To that end, Best calls on all those with an interest in progressive social change to engage with the politics of biotechnology, given its momentous implications. He also recommends radical changes in education systems to promote greater cross-engagement between natural scientists and the arts and social sciences, in order to sensitise scientists to ethics and social issues, and vice versa.

Clearly, the steps described by Best represent part of the solution. Henceforth, I believe the onus is on critical animal studies and animal advocates in wider society to work out how to build effective coalitions with other progressive movements and develop strategies to achieve the radical policy changes implied by the requirement for democratic control of scientific research. However, the radical nature of the changes required not only
in the architecture of governments, but also the nature of the policy decisions to emanate from them, is testament to the structural power disadvantages suffered by animals and their advocates and, thus, the scale of the obstacles to realising those changes. This speaks to the need for more research in political science on the practical aspects of these matters and more attention by advocacy groups to the findings of such research which offer insights into overcoming these obstacles.

In the next essay, Vincent Guihan tries to explore the paradox that ‘Most popular western discourses take it for granted that animals are not machines, and yet, this is precisely how science and agribusiness treats them and only a very small number of people see this as morally problematic’.

His essay is broadly descriptive and posits coincidences between various contemporaneous discourses, technologies and power relationships, but without really making any convincing or novel arguments. For example, his observation that ‘The American slaughterhouse and the Nazi gas chambers share a common technological framework and a common interest in eugenics’ (32) is both obvious and too vague to advance our understanding of the origins and ethics of our relationships with other species. Given animals are sentient and self-aware like us, why do ‘we’ continue to exploit them? To answer this he explores the modern ‘discourse of species’ which he states ‘reflects, largely, the interplay of science and philosophy’. At one end of this discursive spectrum, the tendency is to define nonhumans as property to be used by the ruling class of humans, while at the other end discursive tendencies challenge or mitigate hierarchies and accompanying power relations among animals, including human beings.

So, from the animal rights perspective animal biotechnology is ‘ethically problematic’ because it treats animals as means rather than ends-in-themselves. Based as it is on propositions of biological similarity, animal rights discourse also breaks down the conceptual barrier between our understanding of what it is to be a human and nonhuman. This, he concludes, is one of Darwin’s legacies.

However, Guihan appears to neglect the pivotal role of institutionalised power relations in both producing knowledge and interpreting it for most people who are non-experts. Attention to this crucial driver of social change would facilitate a more satisfying discussion of the issue he raises but doesn’t really focus on, namely the reasons for human society’s increasingly painful exploitation of animals in agriculture and research despite the emergence of what appears to be a persuasive animal rights discourse.
Beth Carruthers’ contribution looks at the ontological underpinnings of moral theory and discourse. She notes that an anthropocentric assumption of the primacy of human interests and desires underpins defences of the use of animals in art and science. These assumptions are strongly challenged though when public attention comes to be focussed on a particular animal as an individual being, revealing tensions in humanity’s relations with animals. The veil of secrecy surrounding abattoirs and animal research laboratories is thus a means of soothing cognitive dissonance through denial, and maintaining their existence.

The obvious remedy to this would be via an analysis of how such secrecy is maintained through the control of information by legal, political and cultural means and its impact on discourses, public opinion and policy processes. Instead, Carruthers contends that it will be impossible to save nonhuman animals and nature from human damage by extending ‘human-centric’ moral concepts such as rights to animals, because such concepts – even when extended – rest on a flawed Cartesian dualist ontology that determines that nonhumans must be ‘inferior’. However, given that animal rights and liberation theories are based on an explicit refutation of Cartesian ontology, her critique of such moral extensionism seems unconvincing. Furthermore, in the absence of any empirical evidence that a radically different ontology can usher in universal respect for the intrinsic value of animals, it appears unwise to neglect those extensionist approaches that recognise the intrinsic value of animals in terms that are comprehensible within current discourses and hence more likely to be accepted. Moreover, when it comes to institutionalising the recognition of nonhuman intrinsic value it is hard to see how this can be achieved without concrete legal concepts such as rights.

Part of the problem here is with the generalised and simplified conception of ontology at work. A universal ‘Cartesian dualist ontology’ is posited as underpinning Western culture. However, there are clearly enormous variations and tensions in the assumptions we hold about reality across time and between cultures, regions, individuals and even within the same individual. The true complexity of our ontologies is manifest in the very existence of this volume. The difficulties in extrapolating a particular ethics from a specific ontology emerge when Carruthers attempts to characterise the relationship between hunter and prey in a hunter-gatherer society with a relational ontology as ‘essentially non-violent’. Rejecting the accuracy of that description is not an arrogant Eurocentric moral judgment, it is a simple statement of fact. Despite these caveats,
Carruthers is surely correct to draw attention to the potential benefits of an ontology that recognises our inalienable interconnectedness with the rest of nature.

The existence of ‘artistic’ animal biotechnology will come as a shock to readers in the UK, where the genetic modification and subsequent breeding of animals for non-scientific purposes is effectively prohibited by Government regulations that require a cost-benefit assessment of scientific procedures on animals. However, clearly such extreme uses of animals are deemed permissible in North America, for instance. A prominent example is artist Eduardo Kac’s commissioning of a transgenic green fluorescent rabbit created through the insertion of jellyfish genes. Thus Carol Gigliotti’s essay Leonardo’s Choice: The Ethics of Artists Working with Genetic Technologies effectively critiques the absurdity and self-indulgence of artists who claim to be questioning the dominance of humans over other animals while simultaneously exercising and reinforcing anthropocentrism by seeking to establish a new genre involving the creation and exhibition of genetically-altered animals.

Reading the specious excuses offered by ‘genetic’ artists, it crossed my mind that such artists would not (and indeed could not) abuse women, gay or ethnic minority individuals in order to challenge patriarchy, homophobia and racism. In this light, their objectification of animals clearly demonstrates their own lack of autonomy and inability to think outside dominant paradigms. Therefore not only do they fail on an ethical level, but on their own terms as they lack the necessary critical faculties to answer the questions they themselves pose. As Gigliotti notes, there is a huge body of nonanthropocentric ethics literature that could have been drawn on by such artists to inform their approach, which renders their interference with animals even more inexcusable. One is left with the impression that talk of ‘challenging anthropocentrism’ is merely a smokescreen for these artists’ ruthless and hubristic self-publicity. As the UK regulatory system indicates, subjecting animals to genetic manipulation can be considered unacceptable even within a broadly anthropocentric paradigm. This suggests that such ‘artistic’ animal biotechnology could be eliminated in those states that currently permit it, but speaks to the problem raised earlier by Best regarding the lack of democratic accountability over animal biotechnology, a universal problem which appears particularly acute in North America.

The dialogue between Gigliotti and art historian Steve Baker focuses directly on the conflict between the interests of (certain) artists in absolute creative freedom and ethical goals. Although Baker appears – at a personal level – to be sympathetic to animal
rights, his stated position appears to emerge from his professional position and holds that the end of offering new perspectives on ethical questions justifies means that involve the harmful use of an animal, and that artistic integrity is not an ethical or moral matter. However, this raises the question of how oppressing animals can contribute to a questioning of the ethics of such oppression, and highlights the problem of how the mores of a professional group – in this case art and art history - can structure the beliefs and attitudes of individuals in that group, such as the reluctance to criticise professional colleagues.

How can ‘post-modern animal art’ that harms animals be considered ‘subethical’ (I think Baker intends this phrase to mean ‘not an ethical matter’)? Only if one thinks of art as a privileged, elite practice, separate from society: an ironic position given the common rhetoric decrying dualism and atomistic ontologies. Presumably, these artists are capable of (if disinclined to) thinking ethically, so why should they regress to a juvenile state, disregarding their duty as moral agents whose actions can cause harm to others to wash their hands of their responsibilities? Once again, when their rationalisations are applied to humans, the true anti-social nature of transgenic animal artists comes into focus and Gigliotti’s defence of ethics justified. After all, an artist is not expected to become a rapist or a racist thug in order for them to effectively explore and critique patriarchy and racism.

Caroline Langill traces the biotechnology industry’s manipulation of animals and other organisms to find its origins in scientific disengagement from and codification of non-human nature, which has resulted in scientific discourse which obscures the real subjects of such manipulation. She argues that a historic shift from natural history to molecular biology represents a change from an engaged, holistic, contextual understanding of organisms to a distant, reductive, quantitative perspective characterised as a ‘masculine’ stance. At the same time, a moral disengagement from the nonhuman world took place, draining it of intrinsic value. While the Romantic of the 19th Century critiqued instrumental reason and its objectification of nature, some contemporary art submits to it. Langill identifies the epistemological and ontological flaws in mainstream biology, flaws that arise largely from a denial of the natural world’s true complexity, which itself emerges from a desire to manipulate and control nature (or at least give the impression of such control in order to boost professional status, see Rupke (1987)). Seen in this light, artists who use methods of genetic modification are not really ‘radical’ or evaluative
because they are deploying techniques that are driven by profit-maximising biotechnology corporations and which embody the very disengagement they purport to be critiquing.

Lynda Birke extends this critique by claiming that transgenic art is deeply conservative because, in the absence of any installations of green fluorescent human babies, it reinforces anthropocentrism and trivialises the lives of other animals. Furthermore, it is not radical in a scientific sense because the techniques used are commonplace in biotechnology. Rather than challenging traditional human/non-human dichotomies, the ‘bioart’ of GM rabbits sharpens discrete anthropocentrism because it represents a shift from breeding processes that relied fundamentally on natural processes to one that, although still parasitic on nature and evolution, is controlled in much more deliberate and invasive fashion by the (human) artist. Using rhetoric reminiscent of animal researchers’ misdescriptions of their practice as ‘working with animals’, artists like Kac fool themselves and/or others by expressing their work as some form of communication between human and animal. In practice it is clear that Kac is not interested in the rabbit’s perspective.

Taimie Bryant’s chapter argues that US law prioritises the protection of those interested in exploiting nature, and hence is not amenable to immanent reform that would prevent bioart that cause suffering to animals. Instead external social and political pressure is required to cause the more significant legal changes needed to protect nature.

Bryant notes incoherence in bioartists’ claims that they are democratising the genetic manipulation of life: in reality, their use of transgenic animals is only possible because their source is scientists, a situation which also provides them with legal cover. Their work is thus based on the continuing privileging of scientific activity. Furthermore, transgenic art reinforces human dominion and involves exploitative and cruel treatment of animals. Therefore, transgenic artists are hindering rather than facilitating the external shocks required to achieve the reforms in the US legal system that would promote the protection of nature rather than those who wish to instrumentalise it.

Animal biotechnology is analysed from a philosophical perspective in Traci Warkentin’s essay, which examines the ideological basis of such uses of animals for human consumption in transplantation and agriculture. A process of ‘mechanomorphosis’ is
identified whereby sentient, conscious life is reduced to a machine-like status. This in turn leads to the corruption of the integrity of beings subject to mechanomorphosis. Thus, for Warkentin, the quality of ‘integrity’ is a fundamental moral value, together with the related notion of intrinsic value. Both concepts are said to arise from an organism’s own biophysical processes, which are threatened by biotechnological interference.

Thus, in respect of the possibility of ‘growing’ meat from less or insentient sources using biotechnology or tissue engineering, Warkentin’s downplays the significance of any animal welfare improvements and instead emphasises the highly negative consequence of the mechanisation of animals and natural processes, and the radical degradation suffered by animals as a result. Actually, to my mind this type of biotechnology appears to be divisible between, on the one hand, animals that are genetically-engineered to be less sentient, even ‘decerebrate’, and more tissue-culture based approaches where the starting points are muscle cells. The implications for integrity and animal welfare may well be different in each case and I think Warkentin’s analysis would benefit by making this distinction.

Nevertheless, Warkentin explains that as we impoverish animals, we simultaneously impoverish our relationship with the natural world and lay the foundations for our own colonisation by biotechnology, becoming disembodied, mechanised, and incapable of metaphysical and ethical reflection.

H.G. Wells’ 1896 novel The Island of Dr Moreau and its subsequent adaptations provide a narrative of animal biotechnology in Susan McHugh’s essay, which explores their implications for social constructions of human species being in relation to other animal species. She finds that transgenic animals tend to be portrayed as damaging or malevolent in popular culture, and that this symbolizes both the enormous environmental hazards associated with GM plants and the potential re-making of humans through biotechnologies. Meanwhile, new evidence of animal consciousness is challenging the anthropocentric ideology with legitimises animal biotechnology, and may contribute to the high levels of public anxiety she perceives around GM animals. Such anxiety is exacerbated by the knowledge that we only differ from other animals in 0.1% of our genetic composition.
David Delafenetre’s contribution explores the impact of animal protection ethics on the tradition of ‘cosmetic surgery’ applied to animals, particularly the tail-docking and ear cropping of purebred dogs, as mediated by political debate in Australasian legislatures and in the face of conservative resistance from dog breeders. He argues that this case is relevant to animal biotechnology because it involves deliberate interference with the bodily integrity of the animals concerned. This argument appears to be confirmed by the references made to the exploitation of genetic deformities by breeders during the Parliamentary debates on measures to outlaw mutilations.

However, new genetic technologies could undermine the effectiveness of legislation designed to prevent cosmetic mutilations, as they may be deployed as an alternative means of mutating animals’ forms for anthropocentric reasons. Delafenetre is optimistic though, that the ban on tail-docking and ear-cropping may have long term consequences as a step towards a less speciesist society that recognises the intrinsic value of animals, and may therefore prefigure resistance to animal biotechnology.

The history of the domestication of sheep is employed in Kelty Miyoshi McKinnon’s essay as a case study of the impact of biotechnology on animals and ‘the resulting deterritorialization of both animal and human from the three ecologies outlined by anthropologist Gregory Bateson: environment, social relations and body/mind’ (2009: 215). McKinnon identifies a fundamental shift in the human-sheep relationship with the advent of genetic engineering, from one of mutual understanding to one of disconnection, not only between the human and the sheep but of both from the three ecologies.

Thus, the genetic modification of animals isolates their being from their environment, their fellow sheep and their minds, and develops the means for a similar separation of humans from their ecologies. However, the goal of total biological control implicit in biotechnology and the Human Genome project is associated with immense sacrifice of life, not just of individual domesticated animals but wild creatures, species and hence biodiversity. In order to save ourselves we must reconnect with our ecological context, each other, other animals, and accept the intermingling of body and mind instead of seeking to distil life into ‘pure’ abstraction.
In the final chapter, Carol Freeman examines how biotechnological attempts to re-create extinct species such as the quagga and the thylacine are presented by their proponents and in the media, and the values implicit therein. She finds that aspects of the novel and film *Jurassic Park* forms a dominant cognitive framework or reference point which mediates the social construction of real-life re-creation projects. Although Freeman says she finds this surprising, the consistent failure of previous real-world attempts to recreate extinct species would seem to me to explain the preference in these cases to reference a fictional scenario describing ‘successful’ re-creation. Interestingly, the overarching message of *Jurassic Park* – a warning of the potential catastrophic risks posed by biotechnology – is absent from the often hyperbolic promotion of the two actual projects.

Freeman goes on to examine and critique the motives behind these projects, the wellbeing of the animals and the chances of successful re-introduction into the wild. Their publicity often criticises the previous human exterminations of these species, giving an image of their motivation as redemption of these actions. However, closer scrutiny of the projects’ claims indicates a tendency to exaggerate their significance and likelihood of success.

The values implied by these projects and their social constructions echo the anthropocentric belief systems trenchantly criticised throughout this volume – little respect or recognition is given to the well-being of animals used in research or produced by these projects. Thus, issues relating to the suffering caused by capture of wild animals, cloning and breeding procedures, the danger of unforeseen complications for the surrogate mothers and offspring, and the harm caused to any animals later used in research of exhibition, are ignored or downplayed.

There are also potential ecological complications associated with any re-introduction of extinct species, although Freeman suggests that if such projects increase public awareness and activism for conservation, such outcomes might count as a justification for a re-creation project if animal suffering can be largely eliminated from the process. However, ultimately both projects are speciesist insofar as they prioritise human commercial and scientific interests over those of individual animals. Thus, as Freeman explains, they divert scarce attention and resources from dealing with current threats to endangered species that have greater chance of success, a problem which could be exacerbated by the
emergence of a complacent attitude to preservation may arise due to the notion that cloning technology provides a safety net for extinction.

References

Muzzling a Movement

Reviewed by Dan Featherston


In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, politicians, industry spokespersons, and the media have increasingly used the words terrorism and terrorist to discredit not only the tactics but also the very causes of social justice movements. The word ecoterrorism, for example, has been used to label a wide spectrum of environmental activist organizations, which raises the question: When does activism become terrorism? As lawyer and animal activist Dara Lovitz argues in Muzzling a Movement: The Effects of Anti-Terrorism Law, Money, and Politics on Animal Activism, the answer may have less to do with the tactics of animal activists than with the strategies of animal enterprise industries to reshape public policies and perceptions.

In her exploration of the rhetoric of terrorism used in recent US legislation against animal activism, Lovitz argues that the 2006 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) is unconstitutional and sets a dangerous precedent for restricting civil liberties, which in turn will have a negative impact on animal advocacy. The argument is grounded in meticulous research that marshals hundreds of sources and notes, and includes a bibliography as well as appendices of state and federal laws under discussion. But the book is no fussy hermeneutics of arcane laws; instead, it reads like a piece of investigative journalism, drawing on trial testimonies, news accounts of animal activism, personal narratives of courtroom experiences, and interviews with leading animal rights advocates.

Muzzling a Movement begins with the story of the author’s own “muzzling” while researching her book. After sending copies of a law journal article she had published and requests for interviews to animal activists serving prison terms for their involvement in the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty case, Lovitz receives a letter from the Federal Bureau of Prisons stating that her “publication has been rejected because it contains

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information which could facilitate criminal activity” (18). Her letters and journal articles go undelivered, and any contact with the inmates is denied. In the process of writing a book that explores “the silencing of animal activists,” Lovitz observes, “I have been halted by the very blockade about which I am writing” (19).

The culture of silence surrounding animal rights also extends to the court room, as Lovitz demonstrates in a chapter on her attempt to prosecute multiple counts of animal-cruelty violations in Pennsylvania criminal case Commonwealth v. Esbenshade. The author’s recounting of the animal-cruelty violations and the court’s ruling will surely shock even those readers who have no strong opinions about animal welfare. Indeed, Muzzling a Movement is addressed not only to animal advocates and scholars of constitutional law, but also to a general audience who may have little knowledge about or interest in the treatment of animals in industries such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals, let alone the particulars of state and federal laws that are supposed to ensure the humane treatment of animals. With this broader readership in mind, Lovitz gives an overview of animal abuses common in agriculture, aquaculture, vivisection, entertainment and sport, and the pelt industry, and then details some of the gross inadequacies of state and federal laws designed to protect animals. Readers may be surprised to discover, for example, that the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) excludes from its definition of “animal” virtually all of the animals the act is designed to protect: 95% of animals used in vivisection, and 98% of animals used in agriculture (39). In another example, Lovitz notes that “the common farming exception, inherent in the majority of state animal-cruelty codes, allows the agricultural industry to be free from prosecution where their practices comply with what is considered, by the industry itself, to be the norm” (40). There is a perverse logic in these sorts of animal-cruelty laws that either exclude the very animals they are supposed to protect or are dictated by the norms of the very industries they are supposed to regulate.

The culture of cruelty in animal enterprises and the failure of legislation to adequately protect these animals lead Lovitz to conclude:

It was not until I became aware of how futile so-called animal-protection legislation was that I realized that people of conscience need to seek remedies outside of the legislative process; they need somehow to speak out against animal exploitation in a way that would be heard. However, we are prevented from speaking out. Indeed, laws not only fail animals, but they fail animal activists as well. (43)
The absence of adequate animal-protection legislation gave rise to the animal liberation movement in the 1970s, which in turn has given rise over the past few decades to federal legislation targeting animal rights groups. After a brief overview of the origins of the animal liberation movement, Lovitz discusses a number of congressional hearings on animal rights activities and federal acts that came out of these hearings, focusing on the 1992 Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA), which is an amended version of the 1989 Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act, and the 2006 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). A key argument in *Muzzling a Movement* is that anti-terrorism legislation targeting animal activists is motivated less by preventing violence against people than by preventing financial loss. Indeed, to date there have been no deaths linked to animal activist activities, which cannot be said of other groups labeled by the US as domestic terrorists. Of course, animal enterprises are some of the largest and most powerful industries in the US, and it is no surprise that these industries provide strong economic incentives for support of legislation that increases protections against, and penalties for, animal activism. And it is no surprise that the sponsors of this legislation have been handsomely rewarded by these industries. In her investigation, Lovitz uncovers a long list of animal enterprise corporations and organizations that have given millions of dollars of donations and other gifts to sponsors of the AEPA and the AETA. A small sample of the list includes Abbot Laboratories, the American Farm Bureau, the American Medical Association, Dairy Farmers of America, Dow Chemical, Johnson & Johnson, the National Cattleman’s Beef Association, Pfizer, Smithfield Foods, United Egg Association, and Wyeth (51). In addition to receiving these corporate gifts and donations, nearly all the cosponsors of the AETA have significant stock holdings in agricultural, pharmaceutical, and other animal-enterprise industries that have a long history of exploiting animals (84–87).

* Muzzling a Movement focuses on congressional hearings and legislation between 1989 and 2006, and it is worth noting two internationally significant events that occurred during this 17-year period. First, of course, are the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act on October 24, 2001. This act “created a new legal category of ‘domestic terrorism,’” Lovitz explains, and “provided the framework for various state eco-terror bills designed to criminalize speech activity of environmentalists or animal activists that would otherwise be deemed constitutionally protected” (57). The second event involves Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). In 1999 animal rights activists in the UK formed SHAC with the objective of shutting down
Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), one of the world’s largest animal-testing labs. Their strategy was to target financial supporters of HLS, including shareholders and investment firms. As Lovitz notes:

The AETA was created partly—perhaps, largely—in response to significant financial losses that HLS experienced as a result of the SHAC campaign. These losses include a $50,000 fine imposed by the USDA for violations of animal-welfare standards at HLS’s New Jersey facility, the plummeting value of the company’s stock, and the removal of HLS from the NYSE after its market capitalizations fell below the NYSE minimum. (84)

The increasingly sophisticated tactics used by animal activists, including consumer activism and what is now commonly referred to as Internet activism, together with the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing climate of public fear, come together to create a perfect political storm. On March 2, 2006, a federal grand jury convicts six members of SHAC and the organization SHAC USA, Inc., under the 1992 Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA); on September 12, 2006, the SHAC defendants receive prison sentences ranging from one to six years; and on November 27, 2006, President George W. Bush signs into law the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act.

Lovitz weaves the story of SHAC into Muzzling a Movement, devoting an entire chapter to detailed narration and analysis of the arrests, trial, conviction, and unsuccessful appeal of the SHAC-7. She also makes a strong case that the SHAC defendants are innocent of charges, based among other things on the prosecution’s blurring of the distinction between “supporting an action on a theoretical level and actually participating in it” (emphasis in original, 72). The SHAC-7 were charged with violating the Animal Enterprise Protection Act, and the final chapters of Muzzling a Movement focus instead on the more recent Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: its constitutional failures, as well as its broader effects on the future of animal advocacy. The first thing to note is the replacement of the word “Protection” in the title of the former act with the word “Terrorism” in the latter. The change is not simply an issue of semantics but “highlights the trend away from passively protecting animal enterprises toward aggressively prosecuting animal activists” (77). Lovitz argues that the AETA violates activists’ right to freedom of speech because it restricts expression on the basis of the ideas of animal activists, not simply their tactics:

Animal enterprise terrorism statutes are unconstitutional because they are based on the content of the speech and penalize the speaker for his/her
viewpoint, which opposes animal use and abuse. No comparable law penalizes a speaker whose viewpoint, for instance, opposes gun control. By singling out animal activists, the AETA violates their constitutional right to equal protection and is viewpoint-discriminatory. (96)

For those who would argue that the Rules of Construction added to the AETA resolve the question of the civil rights of animal activists, Lovitz states, “Because the Rules of Construction don’t specifically protect what might be considered non-peaceful activities—like boycotts, whistle-blowing, and undercover investigations—the AETA thus still hinders these legitimate activities” (95).

Readers may wonder why there is a need for federal legislation when there are already state laws in place against eco-terrorist activities. For those who are unfamiliar with the procedural differences between federal and state cases, Lovitz lists at least a dozen ways in which a federal trial opens up advantages for the prosecution that aren’t available in a state trial. “Not surprisingly,” the author notes, “more than ninety-nine percent of federal grand juries indict the defendant” (101). Furthermore, those who are convicted of violating the AETA may receive any number of additional “terrorism-enhancement penalties” (124–126).

Of course, anti-terrorism legislation such as the AETA raises broader questions about the negative impact of the rhetoric of terror on the public’s perception of animal advocacy, and Lovitz gives a number of examples of ways in which this has already begun. She also provides an insightful discussion of the words terrorism and terrorist. “In sharp contrast to terrorists,” Lovitz argues, “animal activists seek a nonviolent world, and to free nonhuman animals from human violence” (108). I would have liked to have seen more exploration of how the nonviolent world of the animal activist differs from the worlds sought by other political activists. For one thing, animal activism is based on a biocentric worldview that is inclusive by its very nature. By contrast, Al Qaeda or any of the various hate groups listed as terrorist organizations by the US government are exclusive by nature. With the possible exception of the worldview of environmental activists, which has also been targeted as “terrorist,” the animal activist’s nonviolent worldview is also more inclusive than any other social justice movement. Ironically, this very inclusivity may explain in part why animal activism is so easily singled out in anti-terrorism legislation. Humans don’t profit from animal activism in any immediate and obvious ways, which makes it that much easier to pass legislation that values the financial interests of animal enterprises over animal welfare. Moreover, animal activists speak out
against violence toward those who are not considered subjects in any moral, legal, or political sense of the word. Animal activists must therefore operate within a speciesist system that assigns animals the status of objects (i.e., property).

As Muzzling a Movement makes clear, nonhuman animals can rely on neither the animal enterprise industries that exploit them nor a legal system that enables such exploitation. Given this fact, the animal rights movement faces a kind of double silence. Unlike other exploited groups, animals obviously cannot speak for themselves or organize themselves in any politically meaningful way in order to protest their conditions. This is the first silence. In order to speak from this first silence, animals must therefore rely on activists who speak on their behalf. And when the voices of animal activists are themselves silenced, there is a second silence and the muzzling of a movement.
Livestock/Deadstock: Working with Farm Animals from Birth to Slaughter

Reviewed by Audrey E. Kali¹


Whether one is a vegan, vegetarian, omnivore, or carnivore, the raising and killing of animals for food is wrought with controversy. The scale of industrial agriculture, the publicized abuses, the food recalls, and the rise of the local meat movement, assure that no matter what one’s orientation on the topic, it claims a prominent role in daily life. In contrast to how invisible farm animals may be to those of us who live in more or less urban settings, their lives and their deaths shielded from the general public view, the food products derived from them are ubiquitous in their multiple arrays. Most of these items bear little or no resemblance to the animals from which they come, making it easy to forget that animals were part of the equation at all. Furthermore, given a euphemism such as “processing” to talk about where edible meat comes from, images of actual slaughter may rarely come to mind. If they do, they are most often associated with “slaughter gone wrong” exposed in cruelty investigation videos.

The recent onslaught of negative depictions of the slaughterhouse workers cast them as little more than sociopaths, people who take out their personal frustrations on innocent animals.² While this may be true in many of these cases, what can we say about those who embrace the concept of humane slaughter and do all they can to protect the animals from any suffering? Does the fact that they kill animals at all entitle us to make the judgment that they must, in some way, be callous? This is a very difficult question, especially for people inclined towards animal liberation philosophy, where there is really no grey area in which to rest an opinion.

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Rhoda M. Wilkie, in *Livestock/Deadstock*, gives us an opportunity to take a few steps back from proselytizing, advocating, and judging, and enables us to look squarely in the faces of people whose livelihoods cause animals to die. Does meandering through this grey area conflict with animal rights ideologies that have no “ifs” and “buts” to allow for animal use industries? Perhaps. But reading Rhoda Wilkie’s book catapulted me to a place where my belief system was painfully stretched and I found myself having an empathic response to those who kill animals for a living. Did it change my basic position as a vegan? No. Did it alter my abolitionist ideology? No. Did it help me to understand the complications of this position? Most certainly. Wilkie definitely struck a chord in me when she wrote that it is “non-farming people” who are not very informed about those who work with animals that make such absolute assumptions (39). With this book she invites us to question our notions that livestock animals are only commodities to farmers who raise them for meat and that the workers treat them uncaringly (3).

In making the case that people who work with livestock should be viewed outside of a factory-farming lens (12), the animals in Wilkie’s study were mostly beef cattle from northeastern Scotland. The thirty men and twenty-three women in her research sample were stockmen, mart workers, auctioneers, hobby farmers, veterinarians, and abattoir workers. To these interviews she supplemented well-researched accounts of the history of domestication and commercialization, women’s roles in livestock farming, the hobby farmers in the niche market of rare breeds, and the processes involved in the pricing of livestock. Although Wilkie’s ethnographic interviews were from these beef farmers in Scotland from August of 1998 to August of 1999, she includes detailed, current research and commentary from the UK and the United States. The result is a relevant and scholarly book that weaves historical and empirical research with well-documented interviews of farmers who grapple with Wilkie’s direct questions about their lives. Wilkie herself follows a vegan diet and had to come to terms with being an ethnographer of such difference during her research (14). This disclosure of her food preference helped me to have an affinity to her as I journeyed through her book, burdened with the angst of

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3 Wilkie explains that she was still able to be a competent ethnographer even though she was the “embodiment of ambiguity” (14).
confronting narratives of very likeable, honest, and hard-working people who just happen to send animals to their deaths to make a living. 4

It is Wilkie’s purpose to write a book that evades the “rights and wrongs of rearing, killing, and eating food animals” and instead, to have us look at how people who actually work with livestock “make sense of their interactions” with their animals (2). She makes it clear early on that the background historical and sociological information in the first half of the book are prefatory and will lead to the discussion of how farmers reconcile the transition of healthy livestock to deadstock.5 To this end, Wilkie is very successful. Her interviews with the farmers about how they struggle with the fact that their animals die are the most poignant.

Through frequently including testimony from farmers, Wilkie emphatically demonstrates how “sentience and production are not necessarily inimical to each other” (134). By the end of the book, readers find themselves confronting that “fine perceptual line workers have to negotiate in terms of seeing animals as both economic and sentient beings” (182).

For example, one farmer remarks that when he takes his animals to the slaughterhouse, that he doesn’t “want to see them going down the chute and actually having the bullet put in their face” since it’s not his job to do that (143). Another reports that he tries never “to get to know the ones that are going to be slaughtered as individual animals” because he doesn’t like the “idea that they’re eaten” (144). Similarly, another farmer reflects that she thinks it’s unfortunate to cut it short “when they’re at the prime of their life” (151). In explaining the paradox farmers face of having to keep animals healthy that are just going to be killed, Wilkie stresses that it is precisely this caring and humane treatment that helps them to “extricate themselves from slaughter” (170). To further assuage this dissonance, farmers have created euphemisms for slaughter such as “going away” or “down the road” and even will say “meat plant” or “meat designer” instead of slaughterman (156).

An important aspect of Wilkie’s work is to also show us that the “instrumental and emotional components of livestock production can and do coexist” (42). It’s quite

4 Wilkie, herself a speaker of the rural dialect, Doric, transcribed her field notes to reflect these nuances of the interviewees’ speech. She includes a glossary of Doric terms as an appendix to help the reader navigate the characters’ testimonies. Writing their stories in the actual vernacular brings the farmers to life in the text, and brings the reader into the vivid details of their lives.

5 As a reader, I appreciated the opportunity to review the history of the livestock industries in Europe and America. Revisiting the genesis of industrialized slaughter in the Chicago stockyard at the beginning of the 20th century and how it contributed to the erosion of good husbandry helps one to reflect on the commodification of farmed animals.
It may be the case that the context of production determines the commodification level at which a livestock animal is treated. And Wilkie may draw attention to the ambiguity by referring to livestock as “sentient commodities” (123). But what has struck me profoundly in reading through this book is that regardless of the productive category, the animals are viewed as food products. Period. This awareness shrinks the nuances of paradox that Wilkie builds throughout her eloquent thesis. There is “no economic reason for keeping them” a farm stock manager remarks, “if they’re not producing” (115). Wilkie herself admits that even if agricultural workers treat some of their animals as pets, they are still products and will be slaughtered (123).

In the end, Wilkie succeeds in making her point that farmers have “rich experiences of personal interaction with animals” (128), that “workers have to negotiate in terms of seeing animals as both economic and sentient beings” (182), and that “those who manage them are not homogenous” (186). For me, however, Livestock/Deadstock made a point that it didn’t necessarily set out to make. Perhaps my most startling epiphany in wrapping my mind around the disturbing, yet illuminating facets of Wilkie’s writing, resides in the fact that she did not address factory farming – the “dominant model for understanding livestock production in contemporary industrialized societies” (185). She states this focus clearly in the beginning of the book when she informs the reader about her research sample in northeastern Scotland, and iterates it again at the end of the text. In not writing about the hyper-intensive farming model of industrial agriculture, I
found my thoughts turning towards the locavore meat movement and how small-scale regional meat processing has recently been argued to be not only more humane, but more sustainable and healthy. These assumptions alone have converted many professed vegans and vegetarians to become carnivorous again. But irrespective of the “good” of local farming and the “bad” of factory farming, it is profit that drives the breeding and killing of animals for human consumption. And it is in this world of profit that farmers find themselves inextricably bound to the belief that “they have the animals’ best interest at heart, despite sending the animals to slaughter” (170).

I recommend Wilkie’s book to anyone who thinks that an animal liberation philosophy can be a tenable position situated on the abstract veneer of the absolute. Reading through the contradictions and paradoxes of livestock production humbles such ideologies and can refract previously held truths into myopia.

References


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6 Some of the more popular books touting the accolades of local meat farming are Foer’s Eating Animals (2009), Masson’s The Face on Your Plate: The Truth about Food (2009), Niman’s The Righteous Porkchop: Finding a Life and Good Food Beyond Factory Farms (2009), Pollan’s Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals (2006), and Lovenheim’s Portrait of a Burger as a Young Calf: The Story of One Man, Two Cows, and the Feeding of a Nation (2002).
Eating Animals

Reviewed by Heather Hillsburg¹


In 2006 and 2007 a surge of books about food and human eating habits were published. Specifically, Michael Pollan’s *The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals* and Barbara Kingsolver’s *Animal, Vegetable, Miracle: A Year of Food Life*, explored the virtues of local food, homemade or homegrown food, and mixed diets. A year later, Robert Kenner joined the conversation and explored the industrial food complex in his Oscar-winning documentary *FOOD Inc*. In 2009, Jonathan Safran Foer added his voice to the growing body of literature about industrial food production with his book *Eating Animals*. While his predecessors worked to open conversation about food production, genetically modified food and dietary needs, Foer’s text centers on the impact industrial meat production (otherwise known as factory farming) has on the environment, human health, and on the animals themselves. In his investigation of factory farming, Foer sets out to answer the following question: As a new father he is committed to feeding his son nourishing food, but also ethical, sustainable food- where does meat fit into this picture? As he explores the hidden costs of industrial meat production, Foer also continuously asks the reader “what are we willing to pay for cheap meat”?

These questions led Foer to conduct research that was both exhaustive and unconventional- he breaks into farms at night with an animal rights activist identified only as “C”, interviews family farmers, draws from immunology and genetic research, candidly describes how fecal matter is removed from farms (or, rather, how it is displaced within these farms as it is sprayed into the air to settle where the wind takes it) interviews independent slaughterhouse owners, speaks with slaughterhouse employees and draws from his own childhood recollections of Thanksgiving dinner. The family forms the moral center of the text, and Foer fluctuates between outlining his findings and recounting

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family events to underline not only the gravity of his decision to stop eating meat, but also the social repercussions of making this choice. Foer is writing against reports that vegetarian diets are low in iron and protein, and assertions that factory farmed meat is the only way to produce enough food to feed the population. The result is a text that is part statistical analysis, part collection of first person memoirs from interviews, and part anecdotal evidence. The nuclear ‘family’ as it appears in Foer’s text is a problematic concept, as the ‘family’ is often the site where social norms (such as eating meat) are produced and reaffirmed. I understand that Foer draws from his own experience as a new father who wants to teach his son a strong code of morals that excludes eating meat, and was pleased to read about a family who refuses to eat meat in the name of teaching children to be responsible and caring. Nevertheless, Foer ultimately reaffirms hegemonic norms that dictate that a nuclear, heterosexual family is the site where children learn about morals and values. It would have been nice to see Foer problematize, rather than romanticize, the alignment of ‘family’ and morality.

Foer draws from a wide variety of rhetorical strategies to convey his argument. For example, Foer uses the pronoun “we” to discuss consumers who demand inexpensive meat. Foer locates himself among the people who must change their habits rather than preach to his readers that it is they who must change their eating habits. By locating himself as both part of the problem and as part of the solution, Foer invites his readers to reconsider their eating habits along side of him rather than assume a morally superior tone and telling readers to do as he says. In Eating Animals Foer also fluctuates between talking about factory farming and actually showing the reader the inhumane conditions in which animals live. For example, rather than simply state that he could “keep a flock of hens under my sink and call them free-range” (2009, p.61) Foer traces a 67 square inch square across 2 pages to indicate how little space laying hens, as well as their “free range” counterparts actually have (2009, p.78-79). Foer uses examples like this to define and debunk terms like “free range” and “kosher”, illustrating that the qualifiers that are sold to consumers to allow them to buy according to their morals can actually mean very little. This combination of telling and showing is one of the virtues of Eating Animals, allowing Foer to engage with complex debates in animal welfare and animal liberation ideologies, while making the text accessible to readers ranging from experienced animal rights activists to people who are just beginning to explore the trajectory animals take from farm to ‘meat’.
Readers who pick up this book through an appreciation for Foer’s novels will be happy to see that, despite the gravity of the topic, Eating Animals is characterized by the same wit as his fiction. Foer keeps his literary minded fans happy with references to Kafka, Derrida and Descartes, and grounds his analysis of industrial farming in a critique of Cartesian dualisms. Foer opens his text by outlining a Jonathan Swift-inspired solution to both pet overpopulation and factory farming: we should eat dogs. Foer argues that a huge number of canines are abused, given away or simply not cute or well behaved enough. For Foer, “dogs are practically begging to be eaten” (2009, p.27). He eventually concedes that it would be foolish to eat your companion animal, Foer foregrounds both the arbitrary nature of human devotion to some animals and disregard for others as well as the unrealistic standards humans set for their companion animals. From the point onwards, Foer works to dismantle dualisms such as human/animal, pet/food, intelligent/unintelligent that, combined with increasing demand for cheap meat products, inform the rapid growth and animal cruelty that characterize the factory farming industry. Foer argues that what is often lost in conversations about meat are the animals themselves. According to Foer, factory farming has radically re-written the ethics that used to inform meat production. The ethic of “eat carefully” that called for treating animals with kindness before they were killed has been erased during the rise of factory farms. This is replaced by an either/or scenario: either “eat” (eat meat that is not ethically raised) or “don’t eat” (turn to a vegetarian or vegan diet). What gets left out of this debate, and what Foer tries to include into the conversation, are the attempts made by consumers and farmers to “eat meat ethically”. Eating Animals thus chronicles the work of various farmers who work tirelessly to provide consumers with alternatives that would allow them to “eat carefully”. While many vegetarians and vegans may be opposed to eating animals altogether, Foer presents his readers who would continue to eat meat with options that do not cause the same level of destruction as factory farmed animal products. This is certainly an intervention that would minimize the environmental degradation caused by industrial farming. However, this solution ignores the reality that “ethical meat” still depends on the human exploitation of animals, and that “ethical consumption” erases the animals that Foer argues that he is trying to bring back into the conversation. As a result, Foer’s analysis of “eating carefully” can also be read as an alternative to factory farming that undermines his argument that animals must be treated with dignity and care. Foer also draws from identity politics to argue that what we eat is deeply tied to who we are. Changing those habits is to undergo a transformation of identity as well. Foer opens
the text with his own relationship to vegetarianism, admitting that as a teenager he was not a consistent defender of animal rights but rather, wanted an identity that would distinguish him from his peers. Foer traces his own transformation from teenager to concerned father, insisting that eating factory-farmed meat and self-identifying as an environmentalist are mutually exclusive. Foer states “most simply put someone who regularly eats factory-farmed animal products cannot call himself an environmentalist without divorcing that word from its meaning” (2009, p.59). This aspect of Foer’s analysis may prove to be too simplistic for readers whose interests lie in identity politics or philosophy. My point here is not that omnivores can also be environmentalists, but rather that regardless of the topic, it is important to remember that identification is a continuous process. Foer rightly underlines the hypocrisy of simultaneously eating animals and self-identifying as an environmentalist, however, this brief engagement with identity politics detracts from his analysis of factory farms. This topic is too urgent for such distractions.

Nevertheless, the value of this text greatly outweighs the contradictions. Over the course of his book, Foer works to place animals at the center of the conversation, occasionally using humor, wit or sentimentality, and other times using shame and vivid detail. Are his gruesome depictions of the cruelty suffered by animals in a killing line too graphic? (particularly the depiction of the torture enacted on a pig in a slaughterhouse) Perhaps, but the damage factory farms cause to animals, ecology and people have become so widespread and extreme that graphic depictions might be one of a handful of ways that might make people reconsider their food choices. As a result, a more appropriate question might be, are these descriptions effective? Months after reading Eating Animals, my mind continues to wander to the gruesome descriptions of slaughterhouses. Each time I am tempted by a plate of breakfast meat or feel pressured by relatives to eat meat, this image flashes through my head and shame rises in the pit of my stomach. I was left with the uncomfortable choice as to whether or not I could continue to eat meat. In the end, after reading “Eating Animals” eating a sentient being is no longer something I can do in good conscience.

References


FILM REVIEWS

Statement: In line with the goals of Critical Animal Studies film reviews are oriented toward the critical questioning of the politics of human/animal relations. However, the Editors of JCAS do not necessarily agree with the statements contained in film reviews, and neither do they assume responsibility for the reviewers’ assessments of the films that they evaluate.

Skin Trade (2010)¹
Reviewed by Carol L. Glasser²

Skin Trade, the newest documentary by director Shannon Keith, investigates the fur industry via live undercover footage in fur salons and fur farms and interviews with experts, actors, and animal rights personalities. Keith portrays fur as a product of misguided capitalist enterprise, the needlessly brutal treatment of animals, and as a fashion statement that is nothing more than conspicuous consumption. Skin Trade relies heavily on interviews with Hollywood personalities such as James Cromwell and Jorja Fox to debunk the idea that fur is glamorous. The movie also debunks the myth that it is cruelty-free, by showing video footage of the actual trapping, farming and killing of nonhuman animals.

The majority of the film focuses on the fraud involved in the fur trade. Keith juxtaposes undercover footage of fur salon salespeople telling customers that there is no cruelty involved in the production of fur with footage from actual fur farms and interviews with experts, including undercover investigator Matt Rossell. The undercover images are raw and minimally edited. The sounds of beatings and slaughter and the grainy undercover camera footage invite visceral reactions of disbelief, disgust and outrage.

Keith does not hold back from showing the audience graphic images. The undercover footage shows fur-bearing animals trapped in cages, cannibalizing each other due to stress, being killed at the hands of humans by beatings or anal electrocution and having their skins torn from their bodies (sometimes while still alive). This footage is woven into a complex story of consumer fraud that covers international issues in the fur

¹ An Uncaged Films and ARME production directed by Shannon Keith, 82 minutes
http://www.skintradethemovie.com/

² University of California, Irvine
trade, the mislabeling of real fur as faux fur, fashion magazines dictating the use of fur in clothing design, Native American tradition being misappropriated in advertising, and green washing in the fur industry.

Though *Skin Trade* covers a wide array of issues, it is digestible because it is telling a very simple story: animals are being killed in horrific ways for the sake of capitalist interests. What this documentary does that makes it so compelling and successful is to invert the ways we tend to think about animals and industry. Typically, people think of animals as species rather than as individuals. Conversely, people rarely think of industries on a mass scale; rather, stores or owners or workers are thought of on an individual level. In *Skin Trade* the opposite occurs; nonhuman animals are shown as individuals and, rather than focusing on individual furriers, fur industry is portrayed writ large.

Most people in Western cultures are taught to think of animals as species rather than as individuals. This is what allows people to devalue other humans as well as non-human populations:

> The failure to see individuals *as* individuals is the essence of all bigotries. White racists see an individual black as an embodiment of race; sexist men see an individual woman primarily as female...To large extent, nonhuman individuals lack basic rights because speciesists don’t think of them as individuals. This is especially true of speciesists who think mainly in terms of group membership rather than individual characteristics. (Dunayer 2004, p.13; see also Adams 2007)

The images in *Skin Trade* show *individuals* suffering. Elsie Able, President of Foxwood Wildlife Rescue, tells stories of individual foxes and a dog caught by leg-hold traps. Throughout the documentary, the camera will follow one individual at length as she or he suffers in a cage or is beaten or killed. The closing scene of the movie is one of the most intense, prolonged scenes of individual suffering that many viewers will have ever seen. The images of animals suffering are certainly meant to shock, but they are not without focus. They are contrasted at appropriate moments in the story to images of nonhuman animals that have been dismembered and remade into commodities. We see the gruesome lives and deaths of individuals, and then we see them after their individuality has been stripped away and they have become objects of fashion rather than subjects of a life. Viewed from Keith’s lens, the tragedy of nonhuman animals’ suffering takes precedence over any pleasure that can be garnered from looking at them as “pretty” commodities.
At the same time that *Skin Trade* challenges the way we are taught to think of nonhuman animals, it rejects typical portrayals of business owners in the fur industry. The story Keith tells about the skin trade is a story of capitalist enterprise and exploitation. Furriers, fashion designers and fur salon managers are not portrayed as hard working individuals struggling to achieve the American dream; rather, they are part of a system of capitalism that exploits for profit. The fur industry is portrayed as one that is propagated by a web of industries and individuals: the fashion industry, weak laws, trapping, farming, retail stores and consumer demands.

The gravity of these issues makes for a heavy documentary but the audience is provided occasional reprieve, with a few scenes interjected to provide the viewer some relief. First were touching words from Peter Young, a man who served two years in prison for breaking into a mink farm and releasing minks:

> I was able to do the math on the number of animals they say we released. As it turns out, I was serving about 10 hours per mink that was never recaptured as a result of these actions. When I put it in those terms, it really really made it all worth it and, frankly, made my time in prison much easier.

Keith also introduces the audience to fashion designers who refuse to use fur, the story of Overstock.com becoming a fur-free retailer, and a woman who runs a high-end faux-fur retail shop to provide cruelty-free options to those who insist on fashion first. Comic relief is also woven into the documentary with sporadic scenes of fashion and lifestyle expert Joshua Katcher interviewing people on the street who are wearing fur. These interviews bring some humor to this gruesome story via quippy comments, such as when he calls out, “What’s it like to have a cold heart but a warm neck?” to a woman wearing a coat with a rabbit fur collar.

One thing that *Skin Trade* does not do is move beyond the issue of fur to other issues of exploitation. The only explicit tie made is to issues of the environment via a discussion of how the fur industry has caught onto the trend of “green washing.” No claims of animal rights are highlighted in the film beyond that of fur. A very clear connection that is lacking, which is suggested in the title but nowhere else in the film, is the tie between fur and leather, as they are both skins. Some of the exploitations suffered by those used for fur are also suffered by those used in other industries that rely on animal exploitation; for example, both the fur trade and factory farming keep nonhuman animals in extreme...
confinement and unsanitary conditions, rely on physical beatings to control nonhuman animals and practice very gruesome and painful methods of killing.

Issues of human exploitation in the fur industry are not discussed either. One scene of the movie is of a tannery; workers hunched over huge vats of chemicals are visible in this scene. This would have been a wonderful time to highlight human labor issues; namely, the link between working in tanneries and increased rates of cancer (see Veyalkin and Milyutin 2003). However, this issue, and other issues of labor exploitation in the fur trade, are not addressed.

The absence of these connections leaves the documentary lacking in some ways, particularly in the choice to avoid addressing the very obvious similarity between the fur and the leather industry. I think that this was a very deliberate choice on Keith’s part in order to avoid the risk that having a multi-issue approach would overwhelm people new to issues of nonhuman animal exploitation. It is a choice that also has benefits in terms of validating animals’ right not to suffer or be used for clothing.

*Skin Trade* makes the case that fur is wrong solely because it is based on extreme cruelty for the sake of vanity; it does not rely on ties to human exploitation to argue that fur is immoral. In this way, the suffering of individual animals is validated as meaningful. Highlighting the human suffering in the fur trade can risk a misinterpretation by the viewer that fur is bad not just because nonhuman animals suffer but because nonhuman and human animals suffer.

*Skin Trade* is a brave documentary; it relies on difficult-to-obtain undercover footage and does not shy away from showing that footage in full, even though it is gruesome and at times unbearable to watch. This resulted in a powerful documentary, which has received a number of awards, including the 2010 Critical Animal Studies Media of the Year award, the Best Documentary award from LA Movie Awards, and the Award of Merit for Feature Documentary from the Indie Fest. Keith has also received the LA Movies Awards prize for Best Director for this film.

*Skin Trade* exposes unimaginable cruelty as standard industry practice and, though the realities that the film highlights are difficult to watch, it is a wonderful primer to the fur industry. This documentary is appropriate for multiple audiences. It would be a nice accompaniment to a class on social inequality or animal rights. It may also have an important role in fashion design classes, providing students with the information needed make an informed decision about using fur as a “fabric.” *Skin Trade* is also an important
film for public and academic library collections, as it is the only feature length documentary on the fur industry. Finally, this is a must-have for animal advocates and animal rights organizations to assist them in educating others about fur industry.

References


JCAS: AUTHOR GUIDELINES

Editorial Objectives

The Journal for Critical Animal Studies is open to all scholars and activists. The journal was established for the purpose of fostering academic study of critical animal issues in contemporary society. While animal studies are increasingly becoming a field of importance in the academy, much work being done under this moniker take a reformist or depoliticized approach that fails to mount more serious critique of underlying issues of political economy and speciesist philosophy.

JCAS is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on animal liberation philosophy and policy issues. This journal was designed to build up the common activist’s knowledge of animal liberation while at the same time appealing to academic specialists to address the important topic of animal liberation. We encourage and actively pursue a diversity of viewpoints from the frontlines of activism to academicians. We have created the journal for the purpose of facilitating communication between the many diverse perspectives of the animal rights movement. Thus, we especially encourage submissions that seek to create new syntheses between differing disputing parties and to explore paradigms not currently examined.

Suggested Topics

Papers are welcomed on any area of animal liberation philosophy from any discipline, and presenters are encouraged to share theses or dissertation chapters. Because a major goal of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies is to foster philosophical, critical, and analytic thinking about animal liberation, papers that contribute to this project will be given priority (especially papers that address critical theory, political philosophy, social movement analysis, tactical analysis, feminist, activism and academia, Continental philosophy or post-colonial perspectives). We especially encourage contributions that engage animal liberation in disciplines and debates that have received little previous attention. The following are a few topic suggestions:

The reviewing process

Each paper submitted is initially reviewed for general suitability for publication. All submissions will be read by at least two members of the journal’s editorial board.

Manuscript requirements

The manuscript should be in MS WORD format, in 1.5 line spacing and 12 point Times New Roman. Good electronic copies of all figures and tables should also be provided. All manuscripts should be run through an American English spell check prior to submission.

As a guide, we ask that regular essays and reviews be between 2000-8000 words, and have limited endnotes. In exceptional circumstances JCAS will consider publishing extended essays (up to 15,000 words). Authors should supply a brief abstract of the paper (of no more than 250 words).

A brief autobiographical note should be supplied which includes full names, affiliation, e-mail address, and full contact details.

References to other publications must be in Harvard style and carefully checked for completeness, accuracy and consistency.

You should cite publications in the text: (Best, 2006) using the first named author’s name or (Best and Nocella, 2006) citing both names of two, or (Best et al., 2006), when there are three or more authors. At the end of the paper a reference list in alphabetical order should be supplied:

For books: Surname, Initials (year), Title of Book, Publisher, Place of publication. E.g. Gray, J. (2002), Straw Dogs, Granta Books: London


For published conference proceedings: Surname, Initials (year of publication), “Title of paper”, paper presented at Name of Conference, date of conference, place of conference, Publisher, Place of publication, Page numbers.


For working papers: Surname, Initials (year), “Title of article”, working paper [number if available], Institution or organization, Place of organization, date.

For encyclopedia entries (with no author or editor): Title of Encyclopedia (year) “Title of entry”, volume, edition, Title of Encyclopedia, Publisher, Place of publication, pages.


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